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AN 



ANALYTIC 



PHILOSOPHICAL GRAMMAR. 



By JOEL CHAPIN, 

Principal of the Boarding School, Springfield, Mass. 



" It is the business of grammar rightly understood, to teach two things ; 
first, the complete and undisguised construction of words in a sentence, 
and second, how far it is allowable to abridge or modify this structure in 
practice - ' ' — Car dell. 



d\ 



SPRINGFIELD : 

PRINTED AND PUBLISHED BY 

WOOD AND RUPP. 

1842. 



M 



^v x 



Entered according to Act of Congress, in the year 1840, 

By JOEL CHAPIN, 
in the Clerk's office of the District Court of Connecticut. 



H wJ 



PREFACE. 



If it is asked why another Grammar is added to the 
multitude already extant, I answer, because another 
is needed. 

Grammar has universally been considered c a dry 
study,' and there is none to which the scholar ap- 
proaches with greater reluctance, or pursues with 
less profit. This fact so notorious, suggested the 
inquiry, Where is the difficulty ? Is it in the subject, 
or is it in the mode of treating it 1 If it is in the 
subject, then it should be laid aside ; if it is in the 
mode of treating it, then that should be changed. 
Reflection and experience convinced me that it could 
not be in the subject, for grammar is as interesting as 
history, and as profitable as mental philosophy. The 
difficulty, then was to be sought in the mode of teach- 
ing. And this was found to be in direct opposition 
to the most obvious principles of the mind. The 
natural law of procedure is from generals to particu- 
lars ; but in grammar this order has ever been re- 
i- versed. In Geography we first draw the outlines, and 
, : then fill up with more particular items according to 
capacity and opportunity. In History also we pro- 
ceed from more important to less important items, 
fn Botany too we take the same course, first examin- 
ing the plant as a whole, and afterwards dissecting 
and examining its individual parts. Now it is well 
known that these are among the most interesting stu- 
dies to which the learner attends ; but this interest is 



IV PREFACE. 

owing no more to the nature of the subjects than to 
the mode in which they are treated. It is an estab- 
lished and invariable fact that those studies which are 
pursued in the analytic method are interesting and 
pleasant, while those pursued in the synthetic order 
are abstruse and dry. This fact can be accounted for 
in no other way than that the latter course is in oppo- 
sition to the principles of the mind. Why then 
should grammar be pursued in this way ? Is it neces- 
sary thus to oppose natural principles 1 It appears to 
me that a unanimous response will be given in the 
negative. If an intelligent silver smith wished to 
learn an apprentice to construct a watch, would he 
begin by setting him to work upon the most minute 
and unimportant parts, proceeding upwards by slow 
degrees to those more important, without so much as 
showing him the object of a watch, or the combina- 
tion of its several parts 1 or would he first show him 
a w r atch and tell him its purpose, then letting him see 
the combination of the several parts, point out to him 
their arrangement and the effect, and then beginning 
with the most important, name and describe the parts 
separately, showing the construction and use of each, 
and thus enable the learner to proceed intelligently 
and with pleasure ? We see at once that the latter is 
the course of reason, yet grammar has always been 
taught in the former manner. In grammar the first 
thing the learner is taught, is, how many wheels there 
are in the watch, or in other words how many parts 
of speech there are. Now it must be obvious that 
the scholar does not care how many parts of speech 
there may be, if he does not know what they are ; it 
is a matter of indifference whether there are ten y 
twenty, or a hundred, they are to him as so many 
nothings, so long as he does not understand them. 
But before he understands what a part of speech is, 
or indeed before he understands what the subject is 
he is studying, for he thinks it is grammar and not 



PREFACE. V 

language, he is put to learning the names of these 
nothings, and is told without any reasons being given, 
that they are Article, Noun, Pronoun, Adjective, &c. 
Then beginning with the Article he is led through 
ail the dry technicalities of these nine parts of speech 
without so much as knowing the result or the benefits 
of all his wearisome labor. Is it surprising that un- 
der such circumstances the scholar often exclaims 
1 What good does it do V ' I hate grammar, 5 &,c. Is 
it surprising that grammar has become a loathing and 
an abhorring unto all pupils 1 It would be surprising 
if it was not, for no intellectual being will long vol- 
untarily pursue a course from which it derives no 
present pleasure and sees no prospect of future bene- 
fit. We might as well expect that a person would be 
induced to stand and strike upon the ground with a 
stick constantly, day after day, by the plea that exer- 
cise is necessary to health, as that scholars would, un- 
der present circumstances, choose the study of gram- 
mar to enable them ' to speak and write correctly;' 
the value of the object is lost in the repulsiveness of 
the means. 

By the synthetic mode of teaching grammar, the 
erroneous impression is conveyed that the study of 
grammar is not the study of the principles of lan- 
guage, but is merely a study of rules and of technical 
terms and definitions. Is not this the impression that 
nine in ten receive from the present manner of teach- 
ing ? and is it not apparently the view which some 
authors have taken of the subject? If not, how can 
we account for the multitude of technical distinctions, 
and the pertinacious adherence to them which we find 
in many grammars ? 

Another error is that of beginning to study gram- 
mar when too young. It has become popular to set 
children from six to twelve years of age, to studying 
grammar, but it is a practice utterly opposed to rea- 
son, and arose from the above misapprehension of 
1* 



VI PREFACE. 

the object and nature of grammar. In children of 
that age, memory is more active than judgment, hence 
studies which call into exercise the memory, are bet- 
ter adapted to them than those which exercise the 
judgment. But English grammar is not of that kind. 
If it consisted almost entirely, as many seem to sup- 
pose, of technical terms and distinctions, it would be ; 
but technicalities are of minor consequence, and con- 
stitute but a small part of what is truly grammar. 
The chief business of the learner is to construe or 
explain the sense of the piece, and that is an exercise 
requiring judgment rather than memory ; and no 
scholar, whatever may be his age, is prepared to enter 
upon the study of grammar until his reflective facul- 
ties are so far developed as to enable him to compre- 
hend the meaning of compositions of ordinary diffi- 
culty. The usual course has been, as soon as the 
child is able to commit to memory, to set him to 
learning the theory of grammar, and to keep him 
upon it one, two or more seasons, until he can repeat 
the whole in parrot-like style ; and this with many, 
constitutes the sum total of their grammatical know- 
ledge. But if at length they are put to parsing, they 
only apply the rules they have learnt, to the words 
before them, with the same parrot-like destitution of 
sense — they do it all by guess, without imagining that 
reason has any thing to do with parsing. Humbling 
as is this statement, it is but a true picture, not over- 
colored, of the grammatical attainments of the ma- 
jority in our land. 

The three errors, — that of commencing grammar 
in the reverse order of nature— that of making the 
theory constitute the whole or greater part of gram- 
mar — and that of commencing the study before the 
judgment is in any measure developed — have unjustly 
procured for grammar the opprobrium of * a dry study.' 
Authors have been aware of the aversion scholars 
have to grammar, and many are the remedies that 



PREFACE. Vll 

have been devised, but they have all proved fruitless, 
because they were not aimed at these fundamental 
errors. 

The main feature of the present work, and that 
wherein it differs from other Grammars, is the analytic 
method — it begins where others leave off, and ends 
where they begin. It proceeds upon the principle 
that the study of grammar is not the study of a theory, 
but the study of language. Hence it begins with 
language as we find it, considering it first as a whole, 
then in its largest natural divisions, and then in its 
subdivisions, proceeding from the most obvious dis- 
tinctions downwards, until the subject is completely 
analyzed. The theory of grammar is not to be given 
first, but last ; or in other words, technical terms are 
not to be learnt in a mass in advance, but only as in 
the process of analyzing they may he needed; they 
will then be received readily and retained easily. 
Making practice the main part in the study of gram- 
mar, and theory a secondary part, constitutes the 
second feature of the work. The third is that of 
having few technical distinctions , and those expressed 
in the fewest words precision will admit. 

An Introductory Essay has been given to create 
an interest in the study, and to rid the learner of the 
common impression that in the study of grammar he 
must wade through a mass of dry, grammatical rules. 
It is partly historical and partly scientific, for the pur- 
pose of introducing the learner imperceptibly to the 
science of grammar, through the interest in the his- 
tory. It may be objected that it is too lengthy for an 
introduction, and that an essay on language would 
be more appropriately placed at the end than the be- 
ginning of the work. In reply, I would say that 
although it is called an introduction, yet it is in fact 
a commencement of the grammar itself — it is a con- 
sideration of language as a whole, and that is essen- 
tial to the plan proposed. It is true it may be dis- 



Vlll PREFACE. 

pensed with, but in that case a partial substitute 
should be found in the teacher. In respect to the 
second objection, it should be remembered that the 
essay is not designed as a purely scientific and critical 
essay, if so, the objection would have a force that it 
now has not ; and besides, to place the essay at the 
end would be to subvert the very purpose for which 
it was written. 

In respect to the Theory — I have pursued straight 
forward, that course which the method proposed, re- 
quired. In all the alterations, whether of addition or 
retrenchment, I have made none which I did not think 
truth and utility demanded. As I have often re- 
marked in the course of the work, I take no pleasure 
in differing from established systems, and it has been 
no object of mine to produce a work whose only rec- 
ommendation is that of being novel. But whenever I 
found in use, terms, definitions and principles which 
were indisputably gross errors, I did not feel at liberty 
to retain them, but felt it a duty which truth and the 
public good required of me, to change or reject them, 
whatever effect it may have upon my reputation or in- 
terest. Whatever I have found not necessary I have 
retrenched, rather than let it remain a pernicious bur- 
den to the scholar, and whenever there was a manifest 
deficiency I have presumed to make such additions 
of terms, &c, as the cases required, guided by the 
simple principle of truth and utility. But in these 
alterations I have not forgotten that it is often neces- 
sary and wise to consult custom and prejudice. At 
the suggestion of a learned friend I made the attempt 
to adapt the analytic method to the present systems, 
or in other words, to retain all the terms and defini- 
tions of the old grammars. In some particulars I 
succeeded well, but soon found that the plan could 
not be executed unless I relinquished a conscientious 
regard to truth. I therefore abandoned the plan, and 
as the best substitute I could consistently furnish, have 



PREFACE. IX 

given the old nomenclature by itself, and subjoined in 
notes the reasons for the classification. 

In regard to some important changes, if they are 
not fully justified by the reasons given in the notes 
and extracts, I shall despair of doing it. 

Grammar has hitherto been an isolated study, per- 
fectly • sui generis ;' but the analytic method and the 
terms that have in this work been adopted, restores it 
to a proper fellowship with its sister studies, Logic and 
Rhetoric, and renders the transition from one to an- 
other easy and natural. 

The principles of the system have been tested by 
the author in his own school with satisfactory success. 
The work is now presented to the public for a more 
extended experiment. 



TO INSTRUCTORS. 



But a very small portion in this work is designed 
to be committed to memory, in the manner of set 
lessons. Read, understand, and remember, is the 
method. Part I, should be read over by the scholars 
either separately or in a class; they may then be ques- 
tioned upon it, to ascertain with what attention they 
have read. They should then commence Part II, 
and at the same time be set to analyzing ; a subject 
being selected from Part III, or from any other book. 
The successive steps, sentences, propositions, subject, 
predicate, &c. should each be thoroughly understood 
before proceeding to another. The definitions, &c. 
in large type may be committed to memory as the 
process of analyzing shall require. 



CORRECTIONS. 

Page 67, line 9th, for poets read parts, 
" 101, last line, add grave before discourse. 
" 106, the five lines preceding the last line should follow it. 



PART I. 

INTRODUCTORY ESSAY. 



Grammar is the science of language : or the ex- 
planation and application of the principles of speech. 

Its object is to give facility and accuracy in the 
use and interpretation of language. Language, like 
the arts, is founded upon and governed by princi- 
ples : and it is necessary to understand these princi- 
ples in order to become a proficient in it. Correct 
language is that which is in accordance with gen- 
eral practice; and grammar arises from an obser- 
vance of this practice, together with the principles 
upon which it is founded. Hence grammar rules 
have no arbitrary power, but are merely records of 
facts. And all who wish to express themselves 
with ease, elegance, and precision, will avail them- 
selves of the important aid which may be derived 
from them. 

u All science arises from observations on prac- 
tice. Practice has always gone before method and 
rule; but method and rule have afterwards improved 
and perfected practice in every art. We everv day 
meet with persons who sing agreeably without know- 
ing one note of the gammut. Yet it has been found 
of importance to reduce these notes to a scale, and 
to form an art of music ; and it would be ridicules 
to pretend that the art is of no advantage becatfV^ 
the practice is founded in nature. * ; — Blair. 
2 



14 AN ANALYTICAL AND 

And it is as absurd to think that grammar is of 
no importance because some who have not studied it 
are able to speak correctly. There is no art which 
men are not capable of practicing to a certain 
extent, without a knowledge of the scientific prin- 
ciples upon which it is based. Yet we do not for 
that reason consider science as valueless. It enables 
us to carry art to greater perfection. And there 
is as much difference between science and empiri- 
cism, i. e. art without science, as there is between 
certainty and conjecture. 

This remark applies with as much force to gram- 
mar as to any other science. If a person unac- 
quainted with grammar should be asked why an ex- 
pression he had used was correct or incorrect, he 
would be unable to tell. Such an inability cannot 
but be discreditable to a person of the present day 
and privileges. 

Grammar is in one sense the basis of all the 
other sciences, and yields to none in the amount 
of pleasure and profit its study affords. It is a des- 
cription, or history of language, as it was and is. 
So that the study of grammar is only the study of 
language ; and is as important, if not as interesting 
as the study of geography or history. Its importance 
is in exact proportion to the importance of the sub- 
ject upon which language is employed ; hence in 
many cases it is of superlative moment. 

It should be every person's aim to employ language 
so that it cannot possibly be misinterpreted. It is 
a very different thing to use language the meaning of 
which may be guessed out, from that whose meaning 
cannot be mistaken. Inattention to grammar often 
occasions an entire perversion of the person's mean- 
ing. A few illustrations of which will be given. 
- 1st. Josephus in speaking of what Darius did in 
behalf of the Jews at their restoration says, " He 
prohibited his deputies and governors to lay any 



PHILOSOPHICAL GRAMMAR. 15 

king's taxes upon the Jews ; he also permitted that 
they should have all that land which they could pos- 
sess themselves of without tributes" Now does he 
mean that Darius would give them what land they 
could possess without tributes ; or that he would 
permit them to have without tributes, what land they 
could possess? Undoubtedly he meant the latter, yet 
he says the former. 

2d. " It w r ould puzzle a man to keep flies which 
buzz in August, through the winter." To say l flies 
buzz in August through the winter' is a ridiculous 
absurdity, yet it is what the sentence most naturally 
indicates ; but if it was said, as no doubt it was 
meant, that it is difficult - to keep through the winter, 
flies which buzz in August 5 such a ludicrous mistake 
would have been avoided. 

3d. " Are these designs, which any man, who is 
born a Briton, in any circumstances, in any situation, 
ought to be ashamed or afraid to avow?" This sen- 
tence, although written by Lord Bolingbroke, is only 
a mass of grammatical blunders. Instead of asking, 
as undoubtedly he intended, whether the designs 
were such as any Briton ought to be ashamed or 
afraid to avow in any circumstances, or in any situa- 
tion, he inquires, if the designs were such as any 
Briton born in any circumstances, in any situation^ 
ought to be ashamed or afraid to avow; which is a 
very different thing from the other. And besides 
by an improper use of which, he makes the sentence 
to mean nothing at all. For in consequence of 
using ' which' instead of ' such as/ he makes ' are 
these designs, 5 an independent clause, and so far as 
the meaning is concerned might be thrown out; 
but any one will see that the rest of the sentence 
has no meaning. It should have been, " Are these 
designs, such as any man who is born a Briton 
ought to be ashamed or afraid to avow in any cir- 
cumstances or in any situation? 55 



16 AN ANALYTICAL AND 

4th. In the 14 chapter of Genesis, 18, 19, and 
20 verses, through faulty expression, it is said that 
Melchizedeck blessed Abraham and paid him tithes 
of all ; and we should not know to the contrary, did 
not Paul tell us that instead of Melchizedeck's 
paying tithes to Abraham, Abraham paid them to 
Melchizedeck. 

Grammatical errors are of immense consequence, 
in the Scriptures, and especially in law cases, where 
we are bound by the ' strict letter' and not by any 
1 probably intended meaning.' 

As a knowledge of grammar can be obtained only 
by a knowledge of language, that, therefore, will be 
the subject of our consideration. 

LANGUAGE. 

Language is the communication of ideas. It is of 
four general kinds; gestic, symbolical, spoken, and 
written. 

Gestic language is the expression of ideas by looks, 
gestures, and expressive cries. 

Symbolical language is the expression of ideas by 
characters representing ideas or objects. 

Spoken language is the expression of ideas by uni- 
form sounds called words. 

Written language is the expression of ideas by char- 
acters representing sounds. 

Language is either natural or artificial Natural 
language is that which is dictated by nature, and such 
as all persons would instinctively use in like circum- 
stances. It is common to man and the brutes. The 
natural modes of expression are such as laughing, cry- 
ing, looks, gestures and motions of any kind, either 
with or without the voice. Artificial language is the 
communication of ideas by artificial signs represent- 
ing natural expressions. A person wishing to com- 
municate something respecting a cat, a dog, or a sheep, 



PHILOSOPHICAL GRAMMAR. 17 

would by nature first mew, bark, or bleat, and then, by 
such motions and signs as nature would dictate, make 
known his ideas. But in the artificial mode, instead 
of mewing, barking, or bleating, he would direct atten- 
tion to the animal by calling it by its name, cat, dog, 
or sheep, and then by other words further express his 
ideas. The words cat, dog, and sheep are artificial 
signs to represent the same thing with mewing, bark- 
ing, &lc. And we should understand as readily by the 
one mode as the other what animal was meant. 

The Gestic is the only language that is purely nat- 
ural ; the three other kinds are artificial. All of them 
are universal, that is, all mankind employ them in com- 
municating their ideas. But men, not being guid- 
ed by the universal regulator, nature, in naming and 
representing objects and ideas, would adopt different 
names, words, and characters, according to their dif- 
ferent circumstances. Accordingly we find that differ- 
ent nations and tribes, have different names for the 
same thing, and different words and characters to rep- 
resent the same idea. Hence artificial language is 
subdivided into many different kinds, properly called 
tongues or dialects, but frequently languages : as the 
Chinese, Hebrew, Greek, Latin, French, Spanish, &c. 
languages. Hence grammar, which is the science of 
language, is of two kinds, universal and particular. 
Universal grammar explains those principles of lan- 
guage which are common to all nations; and particu- 
lar grammar, such as are common to a particular na- 
tion. A Latin grammar explains the principles of the 
Latin language ; a French grammar, of the French 
language; an English grammar, of the English lan- 
guage. As we are descended from the English, and 
speak the same dialect or language, the grammar of 
our language is also called English grammar. Our 
business then will be to consider the English language. 
The province of particular grammar is to treat of 
written and spoken language only, and chiefly of writ- 
2* 



18 AN ANALYTICAL AND 

ten language. But as these are materially modified by 
the gestic and symbolical, it is necessary in order to 
fully understand the principles of a particular language, 
to be well acquainted with universal grammar, or the 
principles which govern all language. We will there- 
fore begin with considering the " rise and progress 
of language. "* 

In the present refined state of the world, the facili- 
ties of communication are so great, and we have be- 
come so accustomed to them, that, like the common ele- 
ments upon which we subsist, we forget what they are 
or whence they came. Gestic language is scarcely 
named ; symbolical is almost entirely disused, and the 
power of speech is carried to such a state of cultiva- 
tion, and we are so farmiliarized to it, that we seem to 
imagine that spoken and written language are perfectly 
natural ; that there never was any other, and that men 
could always speak and write as well as they now do. 
A vague impression seems to pervade the minds of 
many, that, as man, by the fiat of his almighty Creator, 
was sent into the world in full corporeal stature, so his 
mind was endowed with all the powers and cultiva- 
tion it possesses in this late, enlightened age ; and that 
man in respect to personal ability has for six thousand 
years been like a horse upon the wheel, continually 
stepping, but making no head-way. 

" But carry your thoughts back to the first dawn of 
language among men. Reflect upon the feeble be- 
ginnings from which it must have arisen, and upon 
the many and great obstacles which it must have en- 
countered in its progress ; and you will find reason for 
the highest astonishment on viewing the height which 
it has now attained. We admire several of the inven- 
tions of art ; we plume ourselves on some discoveries 

* The copious extracts found between this and page 38 are 
from Blair's Rhetoric. Without intending any injustice to the 
author, we have taken the liberty to insert and modify as best 
suited our purpose. 



PHILOSOPHICAL GRAMMAR, 19 

which have been made in latter ages, serving to advance 
knowledge, and render life comfortable ; we speak of 
them as the boast of human reason. But certainly no 
invention is entitled to any such degree of admiration 
as that of language; which, too, must have been the 
product of the first and rudest ages, if indeed it can 
be considered as a human invention at all. " tk If we 
should suppose a period before any words were in- 
vented or known, it is clear that men could have no 
other method of communicating to others what they 
felt, than by the cries of passion, accompanied with 
such motions and gestures as were farther expressive 
of passion. For these are the only signs which nature 
teaches all men, and which are understood by all. One 
who saw another going into some place where he him- 
self had been frightened, or exposed to danger, and 
who sought to warn his neighbor of the danger, could 
contrive no other way of doing so than by uttering those 
cries and making those gestures which are the signs 
of fear ; just as two men at this day, would endeavor 
to make themselves understood by each other, who 
should be thrown together on a desolate island, ignorant 
of each other's language. Those exclamations, there- 
fore, which by grammarians are called interjections, or 
exclamations, uttered in a strong and passionate manner, 
were beyond doubt, the first elements or beginnings of 
speech." But we are informed by sacred history, 
that Adam as one of his first acts, conversed with his 
Maker, and gave names to all the beasts of the field 
and fowls of the air. Cain also talked with Abel. 
Therefore we conclude that Adam did not acquire 
language wholly in the inductive manner, but that he 
was created with, in some degree at least, the pow- 
er and knowledge of vocal communication. And we 
have no intimation that the exercise of this faculty 
was intermitted during a space of nearly two thousand 
years. At the end of this period, we read that " the 
whole earth was of one language and of one speech." 



20 AN ANALYTICAL AND 

But if there never was a time when man used the ges- 
tic language only; if there never was a time when he 
had the whole art of speaking to acquire, there was, 
undoubtedly, a time when he was extremely limited in 
the privilege of holding * sweet converse.' " For sup- 
posing language to have a divine original, we cannot 
suppose a perfect system of it was all at once given to 
man. It is much more natural to think that God taught 
our first parents only such language as suited their 
present occasions,leaving them, as he did in other things, 
to enlarge and improve it as their future necessities 
should require. Consequently those first rudiments 
of speech must have been poor and narrow.' 5 

But whatever may have been the communicative 
powers with which man was created, or whatever ad- 
vancement he may have made in the first seventeen 
hundred years of his existence, it matters not essen- 
tially. As, at that time, we are informed that men, 
actuated by an unholy design, commenced building a 
tower whereby to perpetuate their name and social 
existence. In consequence of which their Creator 
" confounded their language ,and scattered them abroad 
upon the face of the whole earth." By that event, 
mankind were reduced to a state of infancy in regard 
to communication. For whatever knowledge they 
may have had previously, it was of no avail to them 
now, as they were ' unable to understand one another's 
speech.' Consequently the only resource left them 
was the gestic language. Therefore, assuming this 
as the starting point, we will trace the progress of lan- 
guage upward through its several degrees of gradual 
improvement to the refined state in which we now find 
it. 

The dispersion of men, in consequence of the 
building of Babel, was the origin of the many differ- 
ent languages now prevalent in the world. That 
event placed individuals in the same relation to each 
other, in regard to language, as nations are in now. 



PHILOSOPHICAL GRAMMAR. 21 

In order to hold communication, each had to learn 
the other's mode of expression. At first they would 
have to depend entirely upon gestic language ; but 
having associated together for a time, they would 
be enabled to substitute some sign which would be 
briefer and more easily made, yet sufficient to make 
known their ideas. These signs would probably be 
accompanied by certain sounds of the voice ; which 
sounds being naturally uniform, would gradually be 
formed into words which should stand as the names 
or signs of the object to which they were applied. 
The manner in which men proceeded in the forma- 
tion of words or names Ct was undoubtedly by imitat- 
ing, as much as they could, the nature of the object 
named, by the sound of the name which they gave 
it. As the painter who would represent grass, must 
employ green color ; so in the beginning of lan- 
guage, one giving a name to any thing harsh or bois- 
terous, would of course employ a harsh or boister- 
ous sound. He could not do otherwise if he meant 
to excite in the hearer the idea of that thing which 
he sought to name. To suppose words invented, or 
names given to things in a manner purely arbitrary, 
without any ground or reason, is to suppose an effect 
without a cause. There must have always been some 
motive which led to the assignation of one name 
rather than another ; and we can conceive no motive 
which would more generally operate upon men in 
their first efforts towards a language, than a desire 
to paint by speech the objects which they named. 
Wherever objects were to be named in which sound, 
noise, or motion were concerned, the imitation by 
words was abundantly obvious. Nothing was more 
natural than to imitate by the sound of the voice the 
quality of the sound or noise which any external 
object made, and to form its name accordingly. 
Thus in all languages we find a multitude of words 
that are evidently constructed on this principle. A 



22 AN ANALYTICAL AND 

certain bird is termed a cuckoo from the sound which 
it emiis. When one sort of wind is said to whistle 
and another to roar ; when a serpent is said to hiss, 
a fly to buzz, and falling timber to crash ; when a 
stream is said to flow, and hail to rattle, the analogy 
between the word and the thing signified is plainly 
discernible." 

But in the progress of society, when men's ideas 
became more numerous and more refined, there would 
be some things which could not be represented by the 
sound of the name ; yet it is thought by many, that 
as some words are formed from others, the names 
given to such objects are formed from those whose 
sound does in some degree correspond with the ob- 
ject signified. [''Thus words containing as their 
radical the letters Fl, denote fluency ; CI, a gentle 
descent; K, what relates to rapid motion; C, to 
cavity or hollowness. Words formed upon St, always 
denote stabilty, firmness, strength : as stand, stay, 
stop, staff, stout, steady, stake, stamp, stately, &c. 
Words beginning with $tr, intimate violent force and 
energy ; as, strive, strength, strike, stripe, stress, strug- 
gle, stride, stretch, strip, &c Thr, implies forcible 
motion : as throw, throb, thrust, through, threaten, 
thraldom. Wr, obliquity or distortion : as wry, wrest, 
wreath, wrestle, wring, wrong, wrangle, wrath, 
wrack, &,c. Siv, silent agitation, or lateral motion : as 
sway, swing, swerve, sweep, swim. SI, a gentle fall, 
or less observable motion : as slide, slip, slay, slit, 
slow, slack, sling. Sp, dissipation or expansion : as 
spread, sprout, sprinkle, split, spill, spring. Termi- 
nations in a-s-h, indicate something acting nimbly and 
sharply : as crash, gash, rash, flash, slash. Termi- 
nations in u-s-h, something acting more obtusely and 
dully : as crush, brush, hush, gush, rush, push, blush, 
&c. &c."] 

" This principle, however, of a natural relation be- 
tween words and objects, can only be applied to Ian- 



PHILOSOPHICAL GRAMMAR. 23 

guage in its most simple and primitive state. Though 
in every tongue some remains of it, as shown above, 
can be traced, it were utterly in vain to search for it 
throughout the whole construction of any modern lan- 
guage. As the multitude of terms increase in every 
nation, and the immense field of language is filled up, 
words, by a thousand fanciful and irregular methods 
of derivation and composition, come to deviate widely 
from the primitive character of their roots, and to 
lose all analogy or resemblance in sound to the 
things signified. In this state we now find language. 
Words, as we now employ them, taken in the gen- 
eral, may be considered as symbols, not as imitations ; 
as arbitrary, or instituted, not natural signs of ideas. 
But there can be no doubt, I think, that language, 
the nearer we approach to its rise among men, will 
be found to partake more of a natural expression. 
As it could be originally formed on nothing but im- 
itation, it would, in its primitive state, be more pic- 
turesque ; much more barren indeed, and narrow in 
the circle of its terms, than now, but as far as it went, 
more expressive by sound of the thing signified." 

The order in which men, in the earlier stages of 
society, uttered and arranged their words was differ- 
ent from that we now use. When they w r ere thirsty, 
instead of saying, as we do ' give me some drink,' they 
would say ' drink give me ;' because drink being the 
exciting object, and that to which their attention was 
chiefly directed, it would naturally be uttered first. 
We sometimes at the present day, though rarely, hear 
such expressions as, ' a fine day this,' ( a beautiful 
stream that,' &c. It is on the above principle ; and is 
a more animated mode of expression than that we 
usually employ. 

" After words, or names of objects began to be in- 
vented, the mode of speaking, by natural signs could 
not be all at once disused. For language, in its in- 

/■» i CD 7 

fancy, must have been extremely barren : and there 



24 AN ANALYTICAL AND 

certainly was a period among all rude nations, when 
conversation was carried on by a very few words, in- 
termixed with many exclamations and earnest ges- 
tures. The small stock of words which men as yet 
possessed, rendered these helps absolutely necessary 
for explaining their conceptions ; and rude, uncultiva- 
ted men, not having always at hand even the few 
words which they knew, would naturally labor to 
make themselves understood by varying their tones 
of voice, and accompanying their tones with the most 
significant gesticulations they could make. At this 
day, when persons attempt to speak in any language 
which they possess imperfectly, they have recourse to 
all these supplemental methods, in order to render 
themselves more intelligible. The plan, too, accord- 
ing to which it has been shown, that language was 
originally constructed, upon resemblance or analogy, 
as far as possible, to the thing signified, would natu- 
rally lead men to utter their words with more empha- 
sis and force, as long as language was a sort of paint- 
ing by means of sound. For all those reasons it 
may be assumed as a principle, that the pronunciation 
of the earliest languages was accompanied with more 
gesticulation, and with more and greater inflections 
of voice, than what we now use ; there was more ac- 
tion in it ; and it was more upon a crying or singing 
tone." " To this manner of speaking necessity first 
gave rise. But we must observe that after this neces- 
sity had, in a great measure ceased, by language be- 
coming, in process of time, more extensive and copi- 
ous, the ancient manner of speech still subsisted 
among many nations ; and what had arisen from ne- 
cessity, continued to be used for ornament. Wher- 
ever there was much fire and vivacity in the genius 
of nations, they were naturally inclined to a mode of 
conversation which gratified the imagination so much ; 
for an imagination which is warm, is always prone 
to throw both a great deal of action and a variety 



PHILOSOPHICAL GRAMMAR. 25 

of tones, into discourse. Upon this principle, Dr. 
Warburton accounts for so much speaking by action, 
as we find among the Old Testament prophets, as 
when Jeremiah breaks the potter's vessel in sight of 
the people ; throws a book into the Euphrates ; puts 
on bonds and yokes ; and carries out his household 
stuff; all which, he imagines, might be significant 
modes of expression, very natural in those ages, 
when men were accustomed to explain themselves by 
actions and gestures. In like manner among the 
northern American tribes, certain motions and ac- 
tions were found to be much used as explanatory of 
their meaning, on all their great occasions of inter- 
course with each other ; and by the belts and strings 
of wampum, which they gave and received, they were 
accustomed to declare their meaning, as much as by 
their discourses." 

" With regard to inflections of voice, these are so 
natural, that to some nations it has appeared easier 
to express different ideas by varying the tone with 
which they pronounced the same word, than to con- 
trive words for all their ideas. This is the practice 
of the Chinese in particular. The number of words 
in their language is said not to be great; but in 
speaking, they vary each of their words on no less 
than five different tones, by which they make the 
same word signify five different things. This must 
give a great appearance of music or singing to their 
speech. For those inflections of voice which, in the 
infancy of language, were no more than harsh or 
dissonant cries, must, as language gradually polishes, 
pass into more smooth and musical sounds ; and 
hence is formed what we call the prosody of a lan- 
guage. Both in the Greek and Roman languages, 
this musical and gesticulating pronunciation was re- 
tained in a very high degree." 

" The case was parallel with regard to gestures; 
for strong tones and animated gestures always go to- 
3 



26 AN ANALYTICAL AND 

gether. Action is treated of by all the ancient crit- 
ics, as the chief quality in every public speaker. 
The action both of the orators and the players in 
Greece and Rome, was far more vehement than what 
we are accustomed to. Roscius would have seemed 
a madman to us. Gesture was of such consequence 
upon the ancient stage, that there is reason for be- 
lieving that on some occasions, the speaking and the 
acting part were divided, which, according to our 
ideas, would form a strange exhibition ; one player 
spoke the words in the proper tones, while another 
performed the corresponding motions and gestures. 
We learn from Cicero, that it was a contest between 
him and Roscius, whether he could express a senti- 
ment in a greater variety of phrases, or Roscius, in 
a greater variety of intelligible significant gestures. 
At last, gesture came to engross the stage wholly; 
for, under the reigns of Augustus and Tiberius, the 
favorite entertainment of the public was the panto- 
mime, which was carried on entirely by mute gestic- 
ulation. The people were moved and wept at it, as 
much as at tragedies ; and the passion for it became 
so strong, that laws were obliged to be made for re- 
straining the senators from studying the pantomime 
art. Now, though in declamations and theatrical 
exhibitions, both tone and gesture were doubtless car- 
ried much farther than in common discourse ; yet 
public speaking of any kind, must, in every country, 
bear some proportion to the manner that is used in 
conversation ; and su "h public entertainments as have 
now been mentioned could never have been relished 
by a nation, whose tones and gestures, in discourse, 
were as languid as ours." 

" Our plain manner of speaking, expresses the 
passions with sufficient energy, to move those who 
are not accustomed to any more vehement manner. 
But, undoubtedly, more varied tones, and more ani- 
mated motions, carry a natural expression of warmer 



PHILOSOPHICAL GRAMMAR. 27 

feelings. Accordingly, in different modern lan- 
guages the prosody of speech partakes more of 
music, in proportion to the liveliness and sensibility 
of the people. A Frenchman both varies his ac- 
cents, and gesticulates, while he speaks, much more 
than an Englishman. An Italian, a great deal more 
than either. Musical pronunciation and expressive 
gesture, are to this day the distinction of Italy." 

" As the manner in which men first uttered their 
words, and maintained conversation, was strong and 
expressive, enforcing their imperfectly expressed 
ideas by cries and gestures ; so the language which 
they used, could be no other than full of figures and 
metaphors, not correct indeed, but forcible and 
picturesque. First, the want of proper names for 
every object, obliged them to use one name for many; 
and of course to express themselves by comparisons, 
metaphors, allusions, and all those substituted forms 
of speech which render language figurative. Next, 
as the objects with which they were most conversant, 
were the sensible, material objects around them, 
names would be given to those objects long before 
words were invented for signifying the dispositions 
of the mind, or any sort of moral or intellectual 
ideas. Hence, the early language of men being 
entirely made up of words descriptive of sensible 
objects, it became of necessity extremely metaphor- 
ical. For, to signify any desire or passion, or any 
act or feeeling of the mind, they had no precise 
expression which was appropriated to that purpose, 
but were under the necessity of painting the emotion 
or passion which they felt, by allusion to those sen- 
sible objects which had most relation to it, and 
which could render it, in some sort, visible to 
others. Accordingly, the style of all the most early 
languages, among nations who are in the first and 
rude periods of society, is found, without exception, 



28 AN ANALYTICAL AND 

to be full of figures; hyperbolical and picturesque 
in a high degree," 

" As language in its progress began to grow more 
copious, it gradually lost that figurative style, which 
was its early character. When men were furnished 
with proper and familiar names for every object, both 
sensible and moral, they were not obliged to use so 
many circumlocutions. Style became more precise, 
and of course, more simple. Imagination, too, in pro- 
portion as society advanced, had less influence over 
mankind. The vehement manner of speaking by 
tones and gestures, began to be disused. The un- 
derstanding was more exercised ; the fancy less. 
Intercourse among mankind becoming more ex- 
tensive and frequent, clearness of style, in signifying 
their meaning to each other, was the chief object x>f 
attention. In place of poets, philosophers became 
the instructors of men ; and in their reasonings on 
all different subjects, introduced that plainer and 
simpler style of composition which we now call prose. 
The ancient metaphorical and poetical dress of lan- 
guage was now laid aside from the intercourse of 
men, and reserved for those occasions only, on which 
ornamental was professedly studied." 

Thus far we have confined our attention to ges- 
tic and spoken language; having traced their pro- 
gress from the time that the former was the preva- 
lent, if not the only language, down to the present 
time, in which we find it almost lost by being blended 
with the latter. We will now consider the symboli- 
cal and written languages. 

<l Next to speech, writing is, beyond doubt, the 
most useful art which men possess. It is plainly an 
improvement upon speech, and therefore must have 
been posterior to it in order of time. At first, men 
thought of nothing more than communicating their 
thoughts to one another when present, by means of 
words, or sounds they uttered. Afterwards, they de- 



PHILOSOPHICAL GRAMMAR. 29 

vised this farther method, of mutual communication 
with one another, when absent, by means of marks or 
characters presented to the eye, which we call writ- 
ing. Written characters are of two sorts. They 
are either signs for things, or signs for words. Of 
the former sort, signs for things, are the pictures, 
hieroglyphics, and symbols employed by the ancient 
nations ; of the latter sort, signs for words, are the 
alphabetical characters now employed by all Euro- 
peans. These two kinds of writing are generically 
and essentially distinct." 

" Pictures were, undoubtedly, the first essay to- 
wards writing. Imitation is so natural to man, that 
in all ages, and among all nations, some methods 
have obtained, of copying or tracing the likeness 
of sensible objects. Those methods would soon 
be employed by men for giving some imperfect in- 
formation to others, at a distance, of what had hap- 
pened ; or for preserving the memory of facts which 
they sought to record. Thus to signify that one man 
had killed another, they drew the figure of one man 
stretched upon the earth, and of another standing 
by him with a deadly weapon in his hand." We 
find, in fact, that when America was first discovered, 
this was the only sort of writing known in the king- 
dom of Mexico. By historical pictures, the Mexi- 
cans are said to have transmitted the memory of 
the most important transactions of their empire. 
These, however, must have been extremely imperfect 
records ; and the nations who had no other, must 
have been very gross and rude. Pictures could do 
no more than delineate external events. They could 
neither exhibit the connections of them, nor des- 
cribe such qualities as were not visible to the eye, 
nor convey any idea of the dispositions or words of 
men. 

To supply, in some degree, this defect, there arose, 
in process of time, the invention of what are called hie- 
3* 



30 AN ANALYTICAL AND 

roglyphical characters; which may be considered the 
second stage of the art of writing. Hieroglyphics 
consist in certain symbols, which are made to stand 
for invisible objects, on account of analogy or resem- 
blance which such symbols were supposed to bear to 
the objects. Thus, an eye, was the hieroglyphical sym- 
bol of knowledge ; a circle, of eternity, which has 
neither beginning nor end. Hieroglyphics therefore, 
were a more refined and extensive species of paint- 
ing. Pictures delineated the resemblance of external 
visible objects. Hieroglyphics painted invisible objects 
by analogies taken from the external world." 

" As writing advanced, from pictures of visible ob- 
jects, to hieroglyphics, or symbols of things invisible ; 
from these latter, it advanced, among some nations, to 
simple arbitrary marks which stood for objects, though 
without anv resemblance or analogy to the objects sig- 
nified." 

" Of this nature was the method of writing prac- 
ticed among the Peruvians. They made use of small 
cords, of different colors ; and by knots upon these, of 
various sizes, and differently ranged, they contrived 
signs for giving information, and communicating their 
thoughts to one another. Of this nature also, are the 
written characters which are used to this day, through- 
out the great empire of China. The Chinese have no 
alphabet of letters, or simple sounds, which compose 
their words. But every single character which they 
use in writing, is significant of an idea ; it is a mark 
which stands for some one thing or object. By con- 
sequence, the number of these characters must be 
immense. It must correspond to the whole number 
of objects, or ideas, which they have occasion to ex- 
press ; that is, to the whole number of words which 
they employ in speech ; nay, it must be greater than 
the number of words ; one word, by varying the tone 
with which it is spoken, may be made to signify several 
different things. They are said to have seventy thou- 



PHILOSOPHICAL GRAMMAR. 31 

sand of those written characters. To read and write 
them to perfection, is the study of a whole life ; which 
subjects learning, among them, to infinite disadvan- 
tage, and must have greatly retarded the progress of 
all science." 

" We have one instance of this sort of writing. 
Our ciphers, as they are called, or arithmetical figures, 
I, 2, 3, 4, &,c. which we have derived from the Ara- 
bians, are significant marks, precisely of the same 
nature with the Chinese characters. They have no 
dependence on words ; but each figure denotes an 
object, denotes the number for which it stands ; and, 
accordingly, on being presented to the eye, is equally 
understood by all the nations who have agreed in the 
use of these ciphers ; by Italians, Spaniards, French 
and English, however different the languages of these 
nations are from one another, and whatever different 
names they give, in their respective languages, to 
each numerical cipher." 

"As far, then, as we have yet advanced, nothing 
has appeared which resembles our letters, or which 
can be called writing, in the sense we now give to 
that term. What we have hitherto seen, were all 
direct signs for things, and made no use of the me- 
dium of sound, or words ; they were either signs by 
representation, as the Mexican pictures; or signs by 
analogy, as the Egyptian hieroglyphics ; or signs by 
institution, as the Peruvian knots, the Chinese char- 
acters, and the Arabian ciphers." 

" At length, in different nations, men became sen- 
sible of the imperfection, the ambiguity, and the tedi- 
ousness of each of these methods of communica- 
tion with one another. They began to consider, that 
by employing signs which would stand, not directly 
for things, but for the words which they used in 
speech for naming these things, a considerable ad- 
vantage would be gained. For they reflected farther, 
that though the number of words in every language 



82 AN ANALYTICAL AND 

is, indeed, very great, yet the number of articulate 
sounds, which are used in composing these words, 
is comparatively small. The same simple sounds are 
continually recurring and repeated ; and are com- 
bined together, in various ways, for forming all the 
variety of words which we utter. They bethought 
themselves, therefore, of inventing signs, not for each 
word by itself, but for each of these simple sounds 
which we employ in forming our words ; and by join- 
ing together a few of these signs, they saw that it 
would be practicable to express, in writing, the whole 
combinations of sounds which our words require." 

"The first step, in this new progress, was the in- 
vention of an alphabet of syllables, which probably 
preceded the invention of an alphabet of letters, 
among some of the ancient nations ; and which is 
said to be retained to this day in Ethiopia, and some 
countries of India. By fixing upon a particular mark 
or character for every syllable in the language, the 
number of characters, necessary to be used in writ- 
ing, was reduced within a much smaller compass 
than the number of words in a language. Still, 
however, the number of characters was great; and 
must have continued to render both reading and writ- 
ing very laborious arts. Till, at last, some happy 
genius arose, and tracing the sounds made by the 
human voice to their most simple elements, reduced 
them to a very few vowels and consonants ; and by 
affixing to each of these the signs which we now 
call letters, taught men how, by their combinations, 
to put in writing all the different words, or combi- 
nations of sound which they employed in speech. 
By being reduced to this simplicity, the art of writ- 
ing was brought to its highest state of perfection ; and 
in this state, we now enjoy it, with all the countries 
of Europe. 

To whom we are indebted for this sublime and re- 
fined discovery, does not appear. Concealed by the 



PHILOSOPHICAL GRAMMAR. 33 

darkness of remote antiquity, the great inventor is 
deprived of those honors which would be still paid 
to his memory by all the lovers of knowledge and 
learning. It appears from the books which Moses 
has written, that among the Jews, and probably 
among the Egyptians, letters had been invented prior 
to his age. The universal tradition among the an- 
cients is, that they were first imported into Greece, 
by Cadmus the Phenician ; who, according to the 
common system of chronology, was cotemporary with 
Joshua ; according to sir Isaac Newton's system, 
cotemporary with king David. As the Phenicians are 
not known to have been the inventors of any art 
or science, though, by means of their extensive com- 
merce, they propagated the discoveries made by other 
nations, the most probable and natural account of 
the origin of alphabetical characters is, that they 
took rise in Egypt, the first civilized kingdom of 
which we have any authentic accounts, and the great 
source of arts and polity among the ancients. In 
that country, the favorite study of hieroglyphical char- 
acters, had directed much attention to the art of 
writing. Their hieroglyphics are known to have been 
intermixed with abbreviated symbols, and arbitrary 
marks; whence, at last, they caught the idea of 
contriving marks, not for things merely, but for 
sounds. Accordingly Plato (in Phaedo) expressly 
attributes the invention of letters to Theuth, the 
Egyptian, who is supposed to have been the Hermes, 
or Mercury of the Greeks. Cadmus himself, 
though he passed from Phenicia to Greece, yet is 
affirmed by several of the ancients to have been orig- 
inally of Thebes in Egypt. Most probably Moses 
carried with him the Egyptian letters, into the land 
of Canaan ; and these being adopted by the Phe- 
nicians, who inhabited part of that country, they were 
transmitted into Greece." " The alphabet which 
Cadmus brought into Greece, was imperfect, and is 



34 



AN ANALYTICAL AND 



said to have contained only sixteen letters. The 
rest were afterwards added, according as signs for 
proper sounds were found to be wanting. It is curi- 
ous to observe, that the letters which we use at this 
day, can be traced back to this very alphabet of 
Cadmus." 

" The Roman alphabet, which obtains with us, and 
with most of the European nations, is plainly formed 
on the Greek, with a few variations. And all learn- 
ed men observe, that the Greek characters, espe- 
cially according to the manner in which they are 
formed in the oldest inscriptions, have a remarkable 
conformity with the Hebrew or Samaritan characters, 
which, it is agreed, are the same with the Phenician, 
or the alphabet of Cadmus. Invert the Greek char- 
acters from left to right, according to the Phenician 
and Hebrew manner of writing, and they are nearly 
the same. Besides the conformity of figure, the 
names or denominations of the letters, alpha, beta, 
gamma, &c, and the order in which the letters are 
arranged, in all the several alphabets, Phenician, He- 
brew, Greek and Roman, agree so much as amounts 
to a demonstration, that they were all derived origi- 
nally from the same source. An invention Jso use- 
ful and simple was greedily received by mankind, and 
propagated with speed and facility through many 
different nations." 

" The letters were originally written from the right 
hand towards the left ; that is, in a contrary order to 
what we now practice. This manner of writing ob- 
tained among the Assyrians, Phenicians, Arabians and 
Hebrews; and from some very old inscriptions ap- 
pears to have obtained also among the Greeks. Af- 
terwards, the Greeks adopted a new method, writing 
their lines alternately from the right to the left, and 
from the left to the right; which was called JBoustro- 
phedon ; or, writing after the manner in which oxen 
plough the ground. Of this, several specimens still 



PHILOSOPHICAL GRAMMAR. 35 

remain ; particularly, the inscription on the famous 
Sigean monument ; and down to the days of Solon, 
the legislator of Athens, this continued to be the com- 
mon method of writing. At length, the motion from 
the left hand to the right being found more natural 
and commodious, the practice of writing in this direc- 
tion prevailed throughout all the countries of Europe." 

"Writing was long a kind of engraving. Pillars, 
and tables of stone, were first employed for this pur- 
pose, and afterwards, plates of the softer metals, such 
as lead. In proportion as writing became more com- 
mon, lighter and more portable substances were em- 
ployed. 

The leaves and bark of certain trees were used in 
some countries : and in others, tablets of wood, cov- 
ered with a thin coat of soft wax, on which the im- 
pression was made with a stylus of iron. In later times 
the hides of animals properly prepared and polished in- 
to parchment, were the most common materials. Our 
present method of writing on paper, is an invention 
of no greater antiquity than the fourteenth century." 

Thus, as in the former case, we see the more an- 
cient language, of symbols, gradually giving place to, 
and finally becoming almost lost in, the modern writ- 
ten language. Gestic language is to spoken, what sym- 
bolical is to written. They both are primitive lan- 
guages, and both in the progress of man's civilization 
have gradually been merging into a more refined mode 
of communication. And so far have they become ab- 
sorbed in the two kinds of language to which they have 
gradually given place, that, in common nomination 
they have lost their names ; and all language is now 
frequently, though improperly, classed under the two 
generic terms, ' spoken' and ' written/ 

As has been said, men in their rudest state were 
restricted to the meagerness and poverty of the ges- 
tic language; but impelled on in their course of im- 
provement by the demands of necessity, and the ardent 



36 AN ANALYTICAL AND 

aspirations of immortal mind, they could not long have 
remained satisfied with so limited means of commu- 
nication. Inspired and guided by that inventive ge- 
nius bestowed upon rational creatures, they would not 
only find means for the impovement of their language 
then possessed, but would invent and perfect, as their 
necessities should require, other and more convenient 
modes of expressing and communicating their thoughts. 
The progress and improvement of language must ever 
keep pace with the progress and improvement of soci- 
ety. So that, the state of a nation's language shows 
the degree of its civilization. The scale of civiliza- 
tion corresponds to the following order of the lan- 
guages, viz. gestic, spoken, symbolical, and written. 
Wherever we find written language in its highest 
state of cultivation, there we find the greatest degree 
of social refinement. The symbolical language, though 
less important than the spoken, yet requires a more 
advanced state of society for its origin. While the 
gestic and symbolical languages can never be dispens- 
ed with entirely, but must ever remain distinct and 
important modes of communication, the spoken and 
written languages will be those the most employed, 
the most useful, and the most cultivated and adorned. 
And of these each has its peculiar advantages and ex- 
cellencies. 

" The advantages of writing above speech are, that 
writing is both the more extensive and a more perma- 
nent method of communication. More extensive, as 
it is not confined within the narrow circle of those 
who hear our words, but by means of written char- 
acters, we can send our thoughts abroad, and propa- 
gate them through the world; we can lift our voice 
so as to speak to the most distant regions of the earth. 
More permanent also ; as it prolongs this voice to the 
most distant ages ; it gives us the means of recording 
our sentiments to futurity and of perpetuating the in- 
structive memory of past transactions. It likewise af- 



PHILOSOPHICAL GRAMMAR. 37 

fords this advantage to such as read above such as hear, 
that, having the written characters before their eyes, 
thev can arrest the sense of the writer. They can pause 
and revolve and compare, at their leisure, one passage 
with another : whereas, the voice is fugitive and pass- 
ing : you must catch the words as they are uttered, or 
you lose them forever. 

But, although the advantages of written languages 
are so great that speech, without writing, would have 
been very inadequate for the instruction of mankind: 
yet we must not forget to observe, that spoken lan- 
guage has a very great superiority over written lan- 
guage in point of energy and force. The voice of the 
living speaker, makes an impression on the mind much 
stronger than can be made by the perusal of any writ- 
ing. The tones of the voice, the looks and gesture, 
which accompany discourse, and which no writing 
can convey, render discourse when it is well managed, 
infinitely more clear, and more expressive, than the 
most accurate writing. For tones, looks and gestures, 
are natural interpreters of the sentiments of the mind. 
They remove ambiguities; they enforce impressions: 
they operate on us by means of sympathy, which is 
one of the most powerful means of persuasion. Our 
sympathy is always awakened more by hearing the 
speaker, than by reading his works in our closet. 
Hence, though writing may answer the purposes of 
mere instruction, yet all the high efforts of eloquence 
must be made by means of spoken, not of written lan- 



We have been thus lengthy upon the subject of 
the 'rise and progress of language,'' not only to add 
interest to the study of grammar, but also to draw at- 
tention to the modifications our present language re- 
ceives from those which have become obsolete in name 
but not in force. 

Having traced language through the progressive 
4 



38 AN ANALYTICAL AND 

stages of its formation and improvement, we are now 
prepared to consider the genius or idiom of language 
in general, and of the English language in particular. 
You will, upon observation, find, not only that the 
gestic and symbolical languages are constantly blend- 
ing with, and modifying the spoken and written, but 
that there is a regular gradation in language, from 
the lowest to the highest qualities. Not only are our 
numeral figures and algebraic or geometrical signs 
symbolical; but our commas, semicolons, periods, in- 
terrogation and exclamation points, parentheses, aste- 
risks, &c, also are remnants of the same language. 
Passing upwards from these, we find those signs of 
emotion, used in exclamatory expressions, such as, O, 
Ah, Alas! &c. These, too, are symbolical charac- 
ters ; or in other words, symbolical representatives of 
gestic language. They are characters representing 
emotion, and for their expressive qualities depend en- 
tirely upon the manner of their utterance. They are 
obviously distinct from spoken or written language in 
correct acceptation, and hence many grammarians 
have denied them a place among the ' parts of speech. 5 
But, whatever may be said of them in respect to their 
nature or importance, they are, notwithstanding, lan- 
guage, and language that is frequently used by per- 
sons of weak mind or ardent temperament. Passing 
from the highest order of these to the lowest order of 
w r ords proper, the transition is slight, and the division 
line scarcely perceptible ; as, alas, indeed, aha, avast, 
avaunt, ahoy, halloo, hail, ' oyes' raca, selah, amen, 
yes, no, never, &c. And from these, we may still 
proceed : as, the, this, thus, so, how, what, that, I, he, 
it, &,c, until we arrive at words of the highest order. 

Words, as we have said, are founded upon analogy. 
And so important is this principle, and so universal 
in its prevalence, that it hardly seems exaggeration to 
say, analogy is both the base and the superstructure, 



PHILOSOPHICAL GRAMMAR. 39 

the material and the cement of language. This anal- 
ogy consists in three particulars. First, in the re- 
semblance in sound, of the word, to the object signi- 
fied ; second, in the resemblance to each other, of 
the objects named ; and third, the resemblance in 
formation and meaning, of one word to another. 

At first, words were formed and applied to things 
upon the analogy of the name to the thing signified; 
but in the extensive multiplication of ideas, this me- 
thod became impracticable, and then they were ap- 
plied upon the analogy of one thing to another ; of 
the thing to be named, to a thing already named. In 
modern times, words are mostly formed by joining 
to different bases, some given word or syllable; hence 
so far as they correspond in structure, they corres- 
pond in signification. 

I. Of words founded upon the resemblance of the 
name to the thing named, we have already spoken 
sufficiently. 

II. Words and expressions founded upon the anal- 
ogy of one thing to another, demand a full and care- 
ful consideration. It will furnish us with a key to 
the genius and nature of language, and open to us 
its beauties and its defects. 

In the progressive formation of words, one word 
from another, and another from that, and so on, the 
analogy which at first was obvious, gradually becomes 
less and less distinct, and finally dies away in vanish- 
ing shades ; so that the last word in the series may 
have no resemblance to that from which it originated, 
though it will undoubtedly be analogous to those im- 
mediately preceding it. 

Our word candidate, means one who stands to be 
elected to an office. It is derived from the Latin, 
candidatus, having the same meaning, and that from 
candidus, meaning 'shining white.' But candidate 
has not, in meaning, a particle of analogy to candi- 
dus. Candidate is taken directly from candidatus, 
and applied to precisely the same thing, but from an 



40 AN ANALYTICAL AND 

entirely different reason. Candidatus was applied to 
one seeking an office, because in Rome, those who 
sought preferment wore a white robe, made shining 
by the art of the fuller, as a signal that they were 
solicitous of office. Hence the name and strong the 
analogy. 

Again, our word ' sincere' comes from the Latin 
( sincerus,' and that from ' sine,' without, and ' cera/ 
wax. But what has ' without wax/ to do with sincer- 
ity ? Not the least. But ' cera' was wax that they 
used for making wax-figures, and painting their per- 
sons. Now, a wax-figure is not a genuine person, 
but a counterfeit; and painting is a deception. 
Therefore ' sine' ' cera,' or sincerus, means, ' without 
deception; 7 precisely what our word sincere means. 

A person is ' candid,' who receives with unbiased 
mind whatever may be communicated to him ; a per- 
son is ' open,' who makes known the secrets of his 
heart, or tells his whole mind without reserve ; a per- 
son is ' sincere,' who uses no deception. These 
terms are applied to persons from analogy. ' Sincere,' 
from the cause mentioned above; 'open,' probably 
from allusion to a mansion with its doors thrown open 
so that any one may readily enter and view the whole 
interior ; ' candid,' in allusion, probably, to clear 
white paper or surface, whereon you may inscribe 
whatever you please without its being obscured by 
pre-existing marks. 

Language contains multitudes of words, of which 
the above will serve as specimens. It abounds in 
such expressions as the following ; a clear head, a 
sound judgment, a penetrating mind, a. whole soul, a 
hard heart, * white as snow,' ' dark as Egypt,' &c. 

The delicacy of analogical expressions and terms, 
depends upon the refinement of mind of those who 
originate and use them. Persons, in the rude states 
of society, or of rude, uncultivated minds, will make 
coarse, vulgar comparisons. 

Meat that is raw, uncooked, is unpalatable, unfit 



PHILOSOPHICAL GRAMMAR. 41 

for use ; vegetables, that are green and growing, are 
full of juice and sap ; hence, by comparison, young 
persons that display awkwardness, immaturity and 
inexperience, are called ' raw/ ' green,' * sappy,' &c. 

But such expressions are called vulgar ; and why 
vulgar 1 Because they are not used by persons of re- 
fined taste. The very term ' vulgar' explains itself 
when we know the analogy upon which it is founded. 
It is from the Latin ' vulgus/ meaning the rabble, the 
common people, the uneducated. Wellerisms and 
many proverbs are but vulgar comparisons : as ' what 
is one man's meat, is another man's poison.' - Every 
one to their liking, as the old woman said when she 
kissed her cow.' Such should by all means be avoid- 
ed. 

But analogical comparisons may be obvious, yet 
chaste ; distinct, yet delicate ; and when such, especially 
if prolonged, they are called ' figures of speech,' 
and constitute one of the highest beauties of language. 

A recent writer, having shown that the preservation 
of science through the dark ages, was owing to Chris- 
tianity, says, " Thus, the flickering and almost ex- 
tinguished light of science was kept alive until the 
dawning of a better day. And even at a later period, 
when the vital spark of piety had departed, and the inan- 
imate form of Christianity was discovered by the Re- 
formation, she was found, with maternal solicitude, 
clasping to her lifeless bosom, this first born offspring 
of her fondest affection." Nothing could be more ex- 
pressive and beautiful. The comparison of science 
in those days of darkness, to a lamp in the shades of 
night, which, with difficulty, is kept burning until day 
dawn, is striking and elegant. But when it is com- 
pared to an infant child lingering upon the verge of 
death, and Christianity is represented as a fond moth- 
er watching over it, with all the strength of maternal 
feeling, until her own frame is exhausted by anxious 
care, yet even then, rather than relinguish her fond 
4* 



42 AN ANALYTICAL AND 

offspring, she stills holds it clasped in her dying em- 
brace, we feel a beauty in the simile, which words 
cannot express. 

The event of i sunset/ when the evening star alone 
is seen above the horizon, is, by W. G. Clark, thus 
beautifully expressed : 

" Then sundown 
Hung her curtain round, 
And pinned it with a single star." 

And Morning, by Thompson, thus : 

" The meek eyed morn appears, mother of dews, 
At first faint glimmering in the dappled east; 
Till, far o'er ether spreads the widening glow ; 
And from before the lustre of her face, 
White break the clouds away. With quickened step, 
Brown night retires ; young day pours in apace, 
And opens all the lawny prospects wide. 
The dripping rock, the mountain's misty top, 
Swell on the sight, and brighten with the dawn." 

Analogical figures are the essence of poetry, and 
the spice of prose. 

"As the tempest brings calm, as the hoar frost that springs, 

As the dawning disperses in day, 
So the sun and the shade of vicissitude, flings 

A beautiful light on our way. 
Life's briar and roses — its gladness and gloom, 

Do they vanish together? Oh, no ! 
The flowrets we pluck, and condense their perfume, 

The weeds, to the desert we throw. 
Like the bee, thoughts fly o'er the field of the past, 

Finding sweets wheresover they roam ! 
They wander through sunshine and storm, and at last 

Stow naught but the honey at home." 

John Bowring, Esq. 

" Then the earth shook and trembled ; the foundations also 
of the hills moved and were shaken, because he was wroth. 
There went up a smoke out of his nostrils, and fire out of his 
mouth devoured ; coals were kindled by it. He bowed the 
heavens also, and came down : and darkness was under his 



PHILOSOPHICAL GRAMMAR. 43 

feet. And he rode upon a cherub and did fly ; yea he did fly 
upon the wings of the wind. He made darkness his secret 
place : his pavilion round about him were dark waters and 
thick clouds of the skies. At the brightness that was before 
him, his thick clouds passed, hailstones and coals of fire. The 
Lord also thundered in the heavens, and the Highest gave his 
voice; hailstones and coals of fire. Yea he sent out his ar- 
rows, and scattered them; and he shot out lightnings and dis- 
comfited them. Then the channels of waters were seen, and 
the foundations of the world were discovered, at thy rebuke, 
O Lord, at the blast of the breath of thy nostrils." Ps. 18. 

" But if no danger is to be apprehended while the thunder 
of heaven rolls at a distance, believe me, when it collects over 
our heads, we may be fatally convinced, that a well-spent life 
is the only conductor that can avert the bolt." Kikwan. 

But we shall treat of figurative language more fully 
in the sequel. 

Owing to analogy, the same word or phrase comes 
to mean several different things, and those too, which 
have no resemblance: and this constitutes an impor- 
tant idiom of language. 

We say a certain color is green ; we call corn and 
other vegetables when not ripe, green ; we call an 
awkward, inexperienced person green; and we say 
paint that is not dry, is green, &x. Now a paint 
that is green, and a green paint, that is, a paint that 
is not dry, and a paint of a green color, have no re- 
semblance ; nor is a person that is green analogous 
to a green color : nor need green corn be of a green 
color, any more than ripe corn ■ for the kernel is 
scarce ever of a green color, whether ripe or green. 
But plants that are juicy or succulent, are usually of 
a green color, and when they become ripe and dry, 
the color often changes ; hence green often means, 
moist, succulent, without having any reference to its 
proper signification of color. Accordingly we find 
that some green plants are white, or brown, or red ; 
and so of other things. Hence you see that the 
same term is applied to different things which are 



44 AN ANALYTICAL AND 

analogous, but the analogy may not, and often 
does not, consist in the particular quality indicated 
by the name, but in something usually found in con- 
nection ; as in most of the above cases, the resem- 
blance is not in the quality, color, but in the atten- 
dant circumstance of succulency. When the quality 
named is usually connected with severed attendant 
circumstances, the analogous things to which the 
same term is applied, may be exceedingly numerous 
and very various. For, one thing may take the name 
from its resemblance to one of the attendant circum- 
stances, and another from another, and so on. There 
are numerous cases to illustrate this, but I will men- 
tion only one. 

Mouth is the aperture in the head of an animal, 
between the lips, by which he utters his voice, and re- 
ceives his food. From resemblance in form, the en- 
trance or opening of a cavern, well, or vessel, is call- 
ed its mouth ; and because the mouth of a vessel, is 
that by which its contents are discharged, so the part 
of a river, where its waters are discharged, is called 
its mouth. And as the mouth is the instrument by 
which we speak, so a person acting as spokesman for 
others, is called their mouth, (Ex. 4 : 16.) The term 
is also put for a person ; as '' The mouth of the just, 
bringeth forth wisdom.' ' The mouth of the foolish, 
is near destruction/ ' Out of the abundance of the 
heart, the mouth speaketh.' It is also used for the 
words uttered, (Job 19 : 16,) and for the particular 
things spoken; viz. for testimony; Deut. 17: 6, 7; 
for desires, necessities, Ps. 103 : 5 ; for force of argu- 
ment, Luke 21 : 15 ; for boasting, vaunting, Judges 
9 : 28; and for reproaches, calumnies, Job 5 : 15, 16. 
To mouth, means to utter with a voice affectedly big 
or swelling ; to make mouths, to distort the mouth ; 
and hence, to pout, to deride or treat disdainfully. 
To shut the mouth is to close it, or to keep silent. 
To stop the mouth signifies to confound, silence, put 



PHILOSOPHICAL GRAMMAR. 45 

to shame. To open not the mouth is not to speak. 
(Is. 53 : 7.) And to open the mouth wide signifies to 
ask great blessings, &,c. &c. 

When a stone or other hard body has a jagged, un- 
even surface, we call it rough ; and when the surface 
of water is uneven, we call it rough ; and when a 
voice is loud and harsh, we say it is a rough voice ; 
and we say that a person who is rude and coarse in 
his behavior, is rough in manners. Now, wherein is 
the analogy of these things ? The term probably 
was first applied to a hard, uneven, substance as a 
stone. Now if you look at a stone, it looks rough, 
and if you draw your hand across it, it feels rough. 
So if you look at water when it is agitated, it looks 
rough, but if you feel of it, it does not feel rough ; 
yet we call it rough, because it resembles the stone in 
looks. Again, when we draw our hand across a 
rough body like a stone, it produces an unpleasant 
sensation ; so if a person speaks to us, in a harsh 
voice, or behaves towards us in a rude, coarse man- 
ner, it makes us feel unpleasantly. Hence, a voice 
or manner is called rough, because, like the stone, it 
produces an unpleasant feeling. But you will see 
that there is no resemblance between rough manners 
or voice, and rough water. For if one looks rough, 
the other does not ; and if the one produces a rough 
feeling, the other does not. To be analogous, they 
both should look alike, or both should produce upon 
us, a similar feeling. 

And here, I am led to remark that, " we derive our 
knowledge of the external universe, from our senses ; 
hence, by marshalling under each of our five senses 
all the information that the sense reveals to us, our 
knowledge of the external universe becomes divided 
into five classes. Every information that is revealed 
to us by hearing, is called a sound ; every information 
that is revealed to us by seeing, a sight ; every infor- 
mation that is revealed to us by feeling, a feel ; every 



46 AN ANALYTICAL AND 

information that is revealed to us by smelling, a smell ; 
every information that is revealed to us by tasting, a 
taste."* 

Some things are known to us as sights only : as a 
rainbow, the sun, moon, stars, &c. ; some only as 
feels: as air, wind, cold, heat, &c. But usually our 
knowledge of a thing is obtained by means of two 
or more of our senses : as, for instance, glass, we can 
see it, we can feel it ; but we cannot smell it, nor 
taste it, nor hear it. The term glass, therefore, 
names only a sight and a feel. The same may be 
said of gold, silver, marble, quartz, &c. Flour, salt, 
water, &c. we can see, feel, and taste, but cannot hear 
or smell them ; therefore they are names of a sight, a 
feel, and a taste. Again, we can see, feel, taste, and 
smell an orange, an apple, tobacco, cheese, bread, &,c. 
but can gain no knowledge of them, by the sense of 
hearing ; these, therefore, are names of a sight, a 
feel, a taste, and a smell. 

These facts, which we shall have occasion to use 
as we proceed, have been ment'oned here, that you 
may be better enabled to detect the point wherein the 
analogy of particular things consists. For, two or 
more things may be analogous in respect to sight 
only ; or in respect to feel, or taste, or smell alone; 
or they may be analogous in respect to two or more 
of these, at the same time, either separately or com- 
bined. In the case of roughness, mentioned above, 
the stone is an object of feel and of sight ; the water 
is also an object of feel and sight, but the two are 
analogous in sight only. But suppose the water to 
be frozen in its rough state, the two would then be 
analogous in both sight and feel ; that is, they both 
would look rough, and feel rough. They may, not- 
withstanding, differ very essentially in other respects. 
The question is not whether the two things are alike 

* A. B. Johnson's Essay on Language. 



PHILOSOPHICAL GRAMMAR. 47 

throughout, but whether they agree in that single 
point, so that we may with propriety apply the term 
rough to both. And we find that they do. 

" Water is fluid, air is fluid, quicksilver, light, 
blood, electricity, lightning, ether, magnetism, fused 
iron are all fluid. The word is correctly applied, for 
they possess the homogeneity which justifies the ap- 
plication to them, of the word fluid. 7 ' 

" A thought strikes my mind, a project strikes my 
imagination, a sound strikes my ear, a light strikes 
my eye, an odor strikes my olfactory nerves, a stone 
strikes my hand, the wind strikes my face, lightning 
strikes a house, a hat strikes my fancy, a pain strikes 
my shoulder. These are only a few instances of the 
word, strike. We discover in the objects referred to, 
a sufficient conformity to make the word strike ap- 
propriate to them all." 

Again, " a thread passes through the eye of a 
needle, a bullet passes through a board, light and 
colors pass through solid crystal, sound passes through 
a block of stone, electricity passes through a bar of 
iron, a thought passes through the mind, a pain passes 
through our head, a bird passes through the air, and 
perspiration passes through the pores of your hand. 
These expressions refer to diverse existences, yet 
they possess a sufficient analogy or homogeneity to 
make the phrase, ' pass through,' applicable to them 
all." 

" My hand is in my glove, the moon is in the sky, 
hardness is in iron, heat is in the fire, sweetness is in 
sugar, color is in grass. The word in is employed 
differently in each of the above cases. When I say 
my hand is in my glove, the ' in' names a feel ; when 
I say the moon is in the sky, the ' in' names a sight ; 
and when 1 say, heat is in the fire, the - in' names a 
feel, which is different from the feel to which I refer 
when I say my hand is in my glove." 

" A perfect language should, perhaps, not use one 



48 AN ANALYTICAL AND 

word, to express so many different sensible revelations. 
It should possess a different word for each. Such, 
however, is not the nature of our language. We ap- 
ply a word to numerous cases which we deem homo- 
geneous or analogous." And, indeed, this may be 
considered, upon the whole, an excellence rather than 
a defect. Imperfect beings as we are, a perfect lan- 
guage would not be so well adapted to our use as 
that which we now enjoy. A language founded upon 
analogy, is more brief and more expressive, though 
less precise, than one founded upon arbitrary princi- 
ples. And, in a vehicle of communication, for com- 
mon use, brevity and expressiveness are the highest 
points of excellence; and it is only in nice subtle 
disquisitions, that we require the precision of arbitra- 
ry signs. Hence, language would be based upon 
analogy for the reason that it would be better adapted 
to the wants and capacity of those forming and using 
it. For mankind have ever found it easier to com- 
municate a new truth, by comparing it to something 
already known, than by inventing for it a new term, 
which itself would require an explanation. And 
further; we have but one means of acquiring new 
truths, and we have but one means of communicating 
them. We can acquire them, only by experience, 
that is, by consciousness, or one of the five senses 
mentioned above ; and we can communicate them, 
only by analog!/. For instance, a blind person can 
obtain no idea of color; because color is an object 
of sight, and a blind person being destitute of the 
sense of seeing, cannot obtain a knowledge of what 
is known only by that sense.* A person destitute of 
the sense of feeling, if we may suppose such, could 
never know any thing about cold, or heat, or pain, be- 
cause they are names of feels, and can be known only 

* l A blind person being asked what idea he had of the color 
violet, said he thought it resembled the sound of a bugle.' 



PHILOSOPHICAL GRAMMAR. 49 

through the sense of feeling. We know nothing 
about what thinking is, except from our own con- 
sciousness. On the other hand, let a person be in 
the full possession of all his faculties, we should find 
it impossible, except by analogy, to impart to him 
a knowledge of that of which he had no experience. 
For instance, if a person never had tasted salt, you 
could not convey to him any idea of the taste, for 
there is nothing to which you could compare it that 
would give any conception of it. You might weary 
yourself in saying that it was saline, or brackish, or 
this, or that, but to him it would all amount to this, 
c salt is salt.' So of any thing else. But if he had 
tasted salt, and you then should tell him that sea-water 
was salt, he would at once have an idea of its taste, 
though he never had tasted it. 

Hence, you see, language is of necessity founded 
upon analogy. That language, in consequence of 
this principle, is more brief and expressive, you will 
easily perceive. 

When we say, " Washington was the father of his 
country," we, by this brief sentence, convey that 
which pages, and even volumes of other words cannot 
express. All a father's love, providence, and watch- 
ful care rises up to our minds, instantaneously, upon 
its mention. Or, if we say, ' Arnold was a Judas,' in- 
stantly, we conceive of all the treachery, cupidity and 
baseness of the ancient traitor. 

But not to multiply instances, I will refer you back 
to the case cited from Pres. Wayland, for an illustra- 
tion of expressiveness; and for brevity, to what was 
said respecting ' in,' ' strike,' * fluid,' ' pass through/ 
simply adding that, was it not for the use of analogy, 
we should be obliged to apply a distinct and arbitrary 
name to every different taste, every different sight, 
every different feel, every different smell, every 
different sound, and every different consciousness ; 
which I need not say would be impossible. Thus 
5 



50 AN ANALYTICAL AND 

you may perceive that our language, though it has 
some defects, is in the main, the best possible. 

The chief defect in an analogical language, is indefi- 
niteness, want of precision. The indefiniteness arises 
from ihe analogy of the objects named not being 
clearly understood, or, rather, from that which con- 
stitutes the analogy being liable to be combined with 
connected circumstances that form no part of the 
analogy. 

If we say, two and two make four, or four times four 
are sixteen, or that the whole of a thing is greater than 
a part, or that the three angles of a triangle are equal 
to two right angles, it is impossible to mistake our 
meaning ; for there is nothing with which the simple 
idea conveyed tyy the language can be associated so 
as to produce confusion. But if a person acquainted 
with the phrase, ' pass through/ only as applied to a 
thread's passing through the eye of a needle, or a bul- 
let's passing through a board, should be told that light 
and colors pass through solid crystal, he would con- 
ceive that the crystal was perforated, like the needle, 
or that, like the bullet, light and colors made a pas- 
sage for themselves, in passing through. And from 
the mistake into which his associations had led him 
in regard to the meaning of pass through, he would, 
upon being shown a piece of crystal through which 
light was said to have passed, deny the fact, saying 
that there was no hole through which it could have 
passed. 

Again, if he was acquainted with the term - fluid', 
only as applied to water, and should be informed that 
magnetism was a fluid, he would at once imagine 
that magnetism was in appearance similar to water; 
and if you proceeded further, explaining to him the 
properties of magnetism, first, he would be confused 
and utterly at a loss to comprehend you, and next, he 
would positively deny that it was a fluid. And this, 
because he did not understand fully the property which 



PHILOSOPHICAL GRAMMAR. 51 

constitutes fluidity, and from not abstracting it from 
the attendant circumstances with which he had been 
accustomed to find it connected. 

So, again, if a person knowing the term ■ green/ on- 
ly in its proper signification, as the name of a color, 
should be told that varnish just put on was green, he 
would deny if, and warmly engage in refuting so pre- 
posterous a statement. And both parties after having 
tried zealously, but in vain, to convince the other of 
the falsity of his position, would, undoubtedly, separ- 
ate in a passion. And this is precisely the case with 
a greater portion of the controversies that afflict the 
world and disgrace the disputants. 

In entering upon an argument, the first thing to be 
done, is to settle the meaning of terms ; to determine 
whether a word is to be used in its abstract, or in its 
analogical sense ; and if in the analogical, to point out 
to what particular thing, it is to be considered analo- 
gous ; and not only show the points wherein it agrees, 
but wherein it differs from the said thing. If persons 
would thus be careful to understand what they were 
going to dispute about, in nine cases out often, by the 
time the terms were settled, the controversy would be at 
an end. For in matters of fact, if persons can agree as 
to the meaning of terms, they will agree as to the rest. 

The ambiguity of language is very extensive, and we 
shall have occasion from time to time as we proceed, 
to further point it out. 

III. The third order of analogy in language is, we 
have said, the analogy of one word to another in struc- 
ture and meaning. 

The words in modern languages, and especially the 
English, are mostly composed of two or more ancient 
words blended together in form, but each retaining its 
distinct signification. Hence, so far as they are anal-> 
ogous in syllabic formation, they are analogous in sig- 
nification. A few examples only will be necessary, 
for illustration. 



52 AN ANALYTICAL AND 

Such words as wooden, golden, linen, woolen, braz- 
en, &c. have a like termination of en and a like signi- 
fication of made of, composed of. Those words that 
have the like termination ive, have the like signifi- 
cation of ability, poiver to do, or doing ; as, creative, 
executive, legislative, indicative, &c. Another sort of 
words, terminating in ful or ous, alike denote abun- 
dance; as plentiful, bountiful, merciful, bounteous, 
ponderous, silicious, &c And so other words that 
have a correspondent syllable, whether at the begin- 
ning, middle or end, have a signification, in so far, 
correspondent. This analogy, however, does not al- 
ways hold, for owing to the carelessness of writers, it 
has been exceedingly preverted, much to the injury of 
language. But, where the component parts of words 
are longer, the analogy is more obvious, and the sig- 
nification invariably correspondent : as geology, as- 
trology, zoology, geography, biography, cosmography, 
barometer, thermometer, gaseometer, serostatics, pneu- 
matics, hydrostatics, &c. Slc. 

We come now to treat more particularly, of the 
meaning or import of words, and the manner of their 
use. 

But first, we will again revert to the influence 
which natural language has upon them. Tones and 
inflections of voice, are not, as many suppose, proper- 
ties of spoken, or written language, but belong to the 
gestic ; for they existed before words were, and are 
common to brutes that have no words. Now, a little 
observation will show you, that a great part of the ex- 
pressiveness and meaning of words, depend upon the 
tone and inflection of voice with which they are ut- 
tered. For instance, if we utter the monosyllable no, 
without emotion, it has its proper signification of ne- 
gation. But we may utter it so as to ask a question ; 
or by looks and tone of voice we may make it, equiva- 
lent to a positive command. In like manner, and with 
like ease, we may turn it into an humble supplication, 



PHILOSOPHICAL GRAMMAR. 53 

or convert it into a mark of surprise. And thus we 
may do with any word in our language.* In confir- 
mation of this, I may appeal to your own observation 
and experience, or refer you to what has been said re- 
specting the Chinese. And if you think that is not 
sufficient, turn to the introductory chapter of some 
work on the 'art of reading/ and count the different ways 
in which the simple question, " Do you ride to town 
to day V is asked. Or, better, observe for a time, 
the varied accents, the significant motions, and ex- 
pressive looks which persons in conversation employ; 
witness the difference in effect, of the same word 
when coming from the lips of a lifeless drone, and 
when uttered by some energetic spirit ; see, if the 
meaning of a word is the same when accompanied by 
a look of withering scorn, as when attended with a 
placid smile! But if you still doubt, ask some Wal- 
pole who has sat under the sarcasm of a Pitt, or felt 
the thunder-bolts of a Brougham. 

But to return. It is a truism, to say that words 
mean that for which they stand; but it leads us di- 
rectly to the question, for what do they stand? 

Suppose a person unacquainted with words, wished 
to communicate to his companions the fact respect- 
ing two men who were a little distant, that one of them 
had struck the other. He would first adopt some means 
to gain attention, then point to the man who struck, 

Various significations of i Pooh. r — c Pooh V said Lady Del- 
mour, turning away her head. Now, that pooh is a very signi- 
ficant word. On the lips of a man of business it denotes con- 
tempt for romance ; on the Jips of a politician, it rebukes a the- 
ory. With that monosyllable a philosopher massacres a fallacy; 
by those four letters a rich man gets rid of a beggar. But in 
the rosy mouth of a woman, the harshness vanishes, the disdain 
becomes encouragement. ' Fooh V says the lady, when you 
tell her she is handsome ; but she smiles when she says it. 
With the same reply she receives your protestation of love, and 
blushes as she receives. With men it is the sternest, with wo- 
man the softest exclamation in the language. 

BuLwers Godolphin. 

5* 



54 AN ANALYTICAL AND 

then imitate the action of striking, and then point to 
the man who was struck. Now here are three or four 
several particulars, each of which, upon Ihe formation 
of words, would require to be indicated ; the pointing, 
the action, the persons concerned in the action, and 
perhaps the means the man employed to fix attention. 

As men would naturally form words, first, to repre- 
sent those things, the most necessary to be represen- 
ted, and after that, those the most easy to be repre- 
sented, we may reasonably conclude that words would 
first be formed to name objects, next, to name actions 
connected with those objects, next, to represent or 
correspond to pointing, and lastly, when necessary, to 
perform the office of gaining the attention. For, in 
the above case, which in this respect may be consid- 
ered the representative of all other cases, if the men 
were out of sight, the communicator would be unable 
to make his fact known, unless he had some means of 
designating them ; but he could imitate the act of 
striking, as well when the men were absent, as when 
present, and thus be able to succeed, if he had a 
word or words to signify the men only. Conse- 
quently his first word, whatever it may be, would be 
equivalent to our word, man. His next word would 
be equivalent to our word, struck. He then would 
have a sign for the objects, and a sign for the action 
connected with them : as ' Man struck man/ As the 
objects in this case are alike, one sign, ' man/ an- 
swers for both ; but if they were different things, as 
man and a horse, two signs would be required instead 
of one, yet the case would not be otherwise altered. 
Hence, for illustration, we may substitute names or 
signs of other objects and other actions ; as Man shot 
bird, Man killed snake, Dog bit horse, &c. 

Though these expressions appear so naked and 
simple, and sound to our ears so strange, that, to 
some, it may seem the result of imagination merely, 
to assert that this was ever a current mode of expres- 



PHILOSOPHICAL GRAMMAR. 55 

sion, yet we know that it was so, or at least, that it is 
so at the present day, among rude, ignorant people. 

Next in the order of formation, would be words to 
supply the place of pointing. Several analogous 
things having one name appropriated to them in com- 
mon, it would be necessary, when speaking of any 
one in particular, to have some means of pointing it 
out. If the objects spoken of were in sight, the act 
of pointing would be sufficient; but when they were 
not, words would have to be invented for the purpose. 
Words correspond to pointing, either directly or 
indirectly. Of the former, are such as, the, this, 
that, there, they, he, she, it, I, so, such, &,c. Of the 
latter, are words descriptive of the objects, to which, 
they are applied ; such as, large, small, round, square, 
short, long, white, red, black, green, heavy, hollow, 
and the like. Words of this kind correspond to 
pointing, inasmuch as they serve to designate the par- 
ticular thing spoken of. W T ords representative of ac- 
tions, are more easily formed than those to perform 
the part of pointing. The reason is, the latter re- 
quire greater discrimination and effort of the mind 
than the former. We can name things without hav- 
ing much, if any understanding of their nature. We 
can call a certain thing a stone, or a tree, without 
knowing scarce any of its properties or qualities; but 
to point out some particular stone, or tree, we must 
use a term that will distinguish it from others. But 
for that, it is indispensable that we have a knowledge 
of the properties and qualities, not of that individual 
only, but of many others. An oak tree differs mani- 
festly from an elm, and an elm from a pine, and a 
pine from a poplar, yet it would require a long pro- 
cess of observation, abstraction and comparison, be- 
fore the terms oak, e^m, pine, <&c. could come to be 
applied. It is easy to call certain things stones, but 
before we can call some hard stones, and others soft 
stones, we must first know what constitutes hardness 



56 AN ANALYTICAL AND 

and softness, a thing which is very difficult. It is 
perfectly easy and natural to say, water roars, flies 
buzz, sheep bleat, but, to point out a particular sheep 
or fly, is a thing so difficult that, no single word in 
language, will do it. To say, green fly, brown fly, 
large fly, does not accomplish the purpose ; or to say, 
this fly, or that fly, is equally vain, unless we, at the 
same time, perform the act of pointing. 

It may seem a little remarkable that though we 
have words that correspond to pointing, yet we have 
none that are equivalent to it. Pointing determines 
definitely what person or thing is meant ; but if we 
say, the man, or this man, or that man, it is not 
known any more precisely, what man is meant, than 
if we say simply man. In all cases, when we use the 
words which most nearly correspond to pointing, such 
as, the, this, that, he, she, it, &c. we likewise have 
to perform the act of pointing, unless some thing 
previously said or subsequently added, determines the 
particular thing referred to. • That mart; what man 
is meant may be determined by looking or pointing 
towards him, or by something previously said ; or 
words may be added expressly for the purpose : as 
6 That man with a blue coat '; or if more words should 
be necessary, ■ That man with a blue coat and drab 
hat.' If that even did not distinguish the individual 
from others, still more words would be necessary, 
( That tall man dark complexion, with a blue coat, 
drab hat and white handkerchief on.' 

Open almost any book, in any place, and you may 
see the truth of the above, exemplified. 

" That writer would deserve the fame of a public 
benefactor," (what writer ?) "who could exhibit the 
character of Hamilton, with the truth and force that 
all who intimately knew him conceived it." 

" Yes, Athenians, I repeat it" (what ?) " you, your- 
selves are the contrivers of your own ruin." 

" They came to the highlands." Who came 1 and 
what highlands? 



PHILOSOPHICAL GRAMMAR. 57 

Words which correspond to pointing form a very 
numerous, and notwithstanding the above apparent 
defect, a very important class of words. 

"With respect to words invented to perform the of- 
fice of gaining attention, it may be said that, few if 
any are formed expressly for that use, because they 
are not necessary ; other words or other means being 
used for that purpose. Frequently no special means 
are nesessary ; and when there is, the most common 
method is to address the person by name. Yet there 
are a few words that appear to be of this character ; 
as dyes, hear, hail, halloo, alio?/, fyc. 

It has, without doubt, already been observed, that 
words, in their use, are of two kinds, significative 
and definitive. 

Significative words are such as signify a certain 
thing independently of any thing else. Definitive 
words refer to some particular thing, for the purpose 
of pointing it out, or making known some circum- 
stance respecting it. Of the former kind, first, are 
names of objects. ' A four legged animal with split 
hoofs, covered with wool, and chewing the cud/ is 
called a sheep ; which name is always significant of 
such an animal. A large plant having a firm woody 
stem springing from woody roots and spreading above 
into branches which terminate in leaves, is called a 
tree ; and this name is always significant of a like 
thing. A large stream of water, flowing from the 
highlands to the ocean, is named a river ; and this 
term, likewise, always signifies a similar thing. And 
so all names are significant of the object to which 
they are applied, insomuch that, whenever the name 
is mentioned, the object signified is known without en- 
tering into a detail of its distinctive properties. 

Second, the names of actions are significative. To 
love signifies to exercise a certain affection; to hate % a 



58 AN ANALYTICAL AND 

contrary affection. To hill means, to deprive of life, 
and the term always signifies the same, by whatever 
agent, or with whatever instrument, the act may be 
performed. So all names of actions, like names of ob- 
jects, are always significant of a certain thing, inde- 
pendently of anything else. 

But definitive words, instead of directing the mind 
to that for which they stand, transfer their significa- 
tion to something else, for the purpose of designation. 
If we mention the names, sheep, tree, or river, the 
name, at once, suggests to us the kind, or general 
characteristics of the object intended ; but it does not 
make known any particulars respecting it. It may be 
a white or black sheep ; a horned or hornless sheep ; 
it may be an oak an elm a pine or a chestnut tree ; it 
may be a large or small tree, tall or low, &,c. A river 
may be long or short, deep or shallow, navigable or 
fordable. We may love or hate ardently, intensely, 
moderately , slightly, wisely, or rashly, &c. The words 
in italic, and such like, are employed to define the par- 
ticulars of that to which they refer. They usually 
refer as above, to names of objects or actions. 

The significative words are sometimes distinguished 
by the term primary , and the definitive, by secondary, 
in allusion to their relative importance and order of 
formation. 

To prevent mistake, it may be proper to remark, 
that definitive words often are significative ; as white 
and black, above, signify a certain quality we call col- 
or ; horned, oak, short, &c. signify a certain pro- 
perty ; navigable and fordable, a certain state or 
condition ; ardently, intensely, -&c. degree or manner. 

But, it will be borne in mind, that we were 
speaking of the use of words. And we have seen that, 
while some words are significative only, others, though 
they are significative, yet their use is to refer or trans- 
fer their signification to something else for the pur- 
pose of designation, hence are definitive. 



PHILOSOPHICAL GRAMMAR. 59 

In speaking of words, we have considered them as 
of three kinds only: names of objects, names of ac- 
tions, and words to supply the place of pointing, that 
is, definitive words. These indeed are the three grand 
divisions. But there are a few words which oriorinal- 
Iv were used purely as definitive, but have now be- 
come, in customary use, significative. Such are 7". ice, 
they, thou, he. her. it, &c. As they are of a peculiar 
nature, and very important, they are separated into a 
class by themselves. 

Again, there are other words, such as to. at. of, by. 
icith, &c. which vsere formerly of those classes, but 
have at length become appropriated to a distinct and 
peculiar use. hence constitute a class by themselves. 
making five classes : and to these may be added, those 
words used in exclamatory expressions : making in all. 
six classes of words, as we shall see when we come to 
the subject of classification. 

Words in respect to their impartation of meaning, 
are emissive at trahsmissive. A thing is emissive when 
it sends forth something from within itself; and 
transmissive when it permits something extraneous 
to pass through it. The sun. or a lamp, or a tire 
emits light and heat; glass transmits them. In the 
former, light an' ne from the things themselves 

as the source : but in the latter, they come not from 
the glass, but from some other body. 

In like manner, some words send forth a mean Dg 
which comes from them as the source, while others 
onlv permit the meaning coming from other words, 
pass through them. Such words as man, house, 
mountain, well, ill, black, happy, calmly, r \c, 

have an inherent meaning which they emit or impart. 
But such as the. this, these, those, so. as. such, who, 
which, it, &c. have no inherent meaning, they merely 
transmit the meaning of other words. It may be ask- 
ed, what is the use of words that have no meaning ! 
The question may. with equal propriety, be asked. 



60 AN ANALYTICAL AND 

what is the use of glass that does not impart light but 
only transmits it? But glass is an exceedingly useful 
article, and relatively, transmissive words are equally 
useful. 

But if glass cannot emit heat, it can create it ; for, 
if it is of a certain construction, it will concentrate the 
rays of the sun, and cause an intense heat, where 
otherwise there would be only moderate warmth. 
So, transmissive words, though, of themselves, they 
have no meaning, yet they have the power of con- 
centrating to a focus the meaning of many other 
words, and pouring it, with increased effect, upon 
some single object. Thus — " The clear conception, 
out-running the deductions of logic, the high purpose, 
the firm resolve, the dauntless spirit speaking on the 
tongue, beaming from the eye, informing every fea- 
ture and urging the whole man onward, right onward, 
to his object, this, this is eloquence : or rather it is 
something greater and higher than all eloquence— it 
is action, noble, sublime, god-like action." — Webster. 
In this sentence, the this concentrates the force of 
all the preceding words, and pours it upon eloquence. 
" It is not fit that the land of the Pilgrims should 
bear the shame longer" (of the slave traffic). " I 
hear the sound of the hammer, I see the smoke of 
the furnaces, where manacles and fetters are still 
forged for human limbs. I see the visages of those 
who, by stealth and at midnight, labor in this work of 
hell, foul and dark as may become the artificers of such 
instruments of misery and torture. Let that spot be 
purified, or let it cease to be New England." — Web- 
ster. The force of all the preceding words is 
brought to a focus upon spot, by the concentrative 
power of that. 

A common burning-glass, by converging the rays of 
the sun, will set wood on fire ; but by converging the 
rays from a lamp or a fire, will produce no perceptible 
effect. The effect depends upon the power of that 



PHILOSOPHICAL GRAMMAR. 61 

which is transmitted, and not upon the lens. So the 
effect of transmissive words, depends upon the power of 
those whose force is transfused into them. In the above 
extracts, there are many transmissive words besides 
this and that ; but their effect is comparatively, mild. 
In the last one, beginning at the parenthesis they stand 
in the following order ; I, the, the, I, the, the, where, 
I, the, those, who, this, as, the, such, that, it. Some 
having more, and some less effect. In the following 
sentence, ' Solomon built the temple,' the effect of 
the is very slight. But when the prophet Nathan came 
to David, and told him of an enormous and inhuman 
transaction that had occurred, and by artful narration 
had wrought up his feelings to the highest pitch of 
abhorrence and detestation of the deed, when he 
brought all its aggravations to a focus by ' Thou art 
the man/ David withered under its scorching stroke.* 

" In heaven there is nothing that defileth, or is un- 
clean. All that remains without." Baxter. " For God 
so loved the world, that he gave his only begotten Son, 
that whosoever believeth in him, should not perish, 
but have everlasting life." The importance of the 
truth conveyed through so, is infinite; and can never 
be fully comprehended, until our undying souls have 
entered eternity. 

We come now to notice some other particulars in 
language. 

( Language was instituted as a vehicle 
Language!^ \ f° r tne interchange of thoughts and feel- 

f ings. Growing out of necessity, and 
having its origin in nature, we naturally and not in 
vain, expect to find it wisely adapted to the end de- 
signed. In a medium for communication, the two 
main points to be consulted are precision and brevity. 

* See remarks on the ' Article,' in the Preface. 
6 



62 AN ANALYTICAL AND 

The first thing is to make our thoughts known ; the 
next is to do it in the most concise manner possible. 
And when we look at our language as it is, we cannot 
but be impressed with the prominence of these traits. 
Of precision, it is not our purpose, at present, to 
speak Brevity, as involved in elliptical language, will 
be briefly considered. 

It being the dictate both of necessity and nature, to 
use no more words than are absolutely necessary to ex- 
press clearly what we wish,we, therefore, find that when 
any connected or collateral circumstance or means 
serves to make known the intended meaning, those 
words which otherwise would be necessary, are univer- 
sally omitted. In such cases, the language is said to 
be elliptical, and the omission is called an ellipse. 

" That same day, three thousand ( ) were added to 
the Lord." There being no danger of mistake, the 
word persons, is omitted, for the sake of brevity. 

" Some ( ) were in favor of one thing and some 
( ) of another ( )." If this was written out in full, 
it would be, Some of the persons were in favor of one 
thing, and some of the persons were in favor of 
another thing. 

All the tedious labor and unpleasant monotony 
arising from the insertion of needless words, is, by 
ellipsis, entirely avoided without any inconvenience. 
The titles of books, chapters, subjects, &c. are ellip- 
tical expressions usually stript of every thing but the 
simple name ; yet they are readily understood, without 
the verbose insertion of words, which the mind sup- 
plies for itself, with the quickness of instantaneous 
thought. '.For sale here/ This sentence, when 
taken by itself, is completely senseless ; but when 
written upon a block of anthracite coal lying by the 
side of a store, or written beneath an advertisement 
tacked upon the wall, becomes perfectly intelligible 
and very expressive. The connected circumstances 
suggest at once, its meaning and application. 



PHILOSOPHICAL GRAMMAR. 63 

" The power of delicacy, is chiefly seen in discerning 
the true merit of a work ; the power of correctness 
(is chiefly seen) in rejecting false merit." 

" Delicacy leans more (than correctness does) to 
feeling ; correctness (leans) more (than delicacy does) 
to reason and judgment. " 

" The Lord reigneth, let the earth rejoice." The 
Lord reigneth, therefore let the earth rejoice ; or let 
the earth rejoice, because the Lord reigneth. 

" Ask the hero, ask the statesman, whose wisdom 
you have been accustomed to revere, and he will tell 
you." Who is meant by ' the hero,' ' the statesman,' 
and to whom the ' you,' refers, and what it is ' he will 
tell you,' is not made known by the sentence, nor, in- 
deed, is it told by the words of the whole discourse; 
yet the mind, by referring back and forth to different 
parts, and taking into consideration the circumstances 
under which it was spoken, gathers the true meaning 
without difficulty, and the whole operation is instan- 
taneously performed. 

There is scarcely a sentence in language, but what 
is elliptical, or that is not modified and explained by 
others with which it is in connection. The mind is 
constantly referring back and forward, to this, and to 
that, collecting, comparing, and combining ; and it 
needs not but brief hints, to enable it to catch the 
whole truth. 

It is no part of words to make known that which 
the mind can obtain without. To express by words 
what the mind can supply for itself, is like getting out 
of a rail-road car to go a-foot, because you are in a 
hurry. Yet for our bodies to be always borne ( on the 
wings of the red-hot wind;' 6 driven on by heated air,' 
will not answer many of the purposes of life, to accom- 
plish which, 

" We're doomed on foot to go, 
Or jog o'er dislocated ways, 
A dozen miles a day." 



64 AN ANALYTICAL AND 

So, our thoughts are not always permitted to fly 
with a speed, compared with which, u the tempest 
itself lags behind," but are obliged to get into verbal 
go-carts to transport themselves. But thoughts dis- 
dain to use their vehicles, words, except when, and so 
far as they are compelled by the nature of the case ; 
hence originates elliptical language, by which the 
mind skips along, like an ostrich, half running and 
half flying. Words arranged in sentences, are not 
like a continuous pavement, but like stepping stones 
placed at suitable distances, for the mind in passing, 
to step from one to another. This leads us to our 
next particular, viz. abruptness. 

We had occasion, on a previous page, (54,) to re- 
mark the nakedness and apparent stiffness of such ex- 
pressions, as, Man killed snake, Dog bit horse, &x. 
But upon analyzing language, and looking at it more 
closely, it will be perceived that in reality, most of our 
expressions are as abrupt as those, and that it is cus- 
tom, principally, which renders them seemingly smooth 
and flowing. We say, Man eats food ; William 
gathered straw-berries ; Thomas carried news-papers ; 
John rides post ; It rains, &c. without noticing any- 
thing stiff or unpleasant; yet they are as truly so as 
the others, custom only making the difference. 

' A man killed a snake' is thought to be not only a 
softer, but a more full expression than, man killed 
snake. But it is neither softer nor more full. There 
is not a single iota added to the idea of the latter, by 
the use of a. It is true that, by the insertion of a, we 
protract the measure, and render it more accordant 
with our dronish spirits and dull comprehension, but 
do not render it more harmonious to our ears ; which 
will be perceived by laying stress upon the a; A man 
killed a snake. Tt is true, some words are harsh and 
difficult to utter, on account of the particular combi- 
nation of their letters, but such exceptions do not ap- 
ply to the present case, as we are speaking of abrupt- 



PHILOSOPHICAL GRAMMAR. 65 

ness rather than harshness ; and of thought, rather than 
sound. 

Take the expressions, ' Shoes for sale here,' ' Re- 
ward of merit/ ' William rode from New York to Bos- 
ton.' 

An impression too commonly prevails, that these 
sentences, and their like, contain one idea only, or if 
they contain different ideas, that the words are of 
such a nature as to blend them all in one. But if we 
analyze them, we shall see that each word contains 
a distinct idea, and that the different ideas are not 
blended together by the words but by the mind. We 
have said previously that to, at, of , for, from, &c. are 
modified words, taken from the three grand divisions ; 
and these sentences will serve to illustrate it. 

For means cause; by cause, is included motive, 
purpose, reason. Now, if we substitute cause for for 
in the first sentence, we shall get a true insight into 
its nature. The here properly should be transposed : 
as • Shoes here cause sale,' i. e. Shoes are here, the 
cause of their being here, is sale. The sentence has 
exactly the same meaning, and is as perfect in the one 
case as the other, but the vail which custom has thrown 
over the usual form being removed by the change, 
we see how abrupt is the transition from one word to 
another. The mind goes by hitches or steps; yet 
familiarity would render it smooth and flowing as the 
other. 

Of means offspring, taken in its widest sense; any- 
thing that springs or proceeds from another, whether 
by extraction, abstraction, consequence or result. 
Making the substitution, in the second sentence, we 
have, Reward offspring merit. Here are three names, 
embodying three distinct ideas, which may or may not 
be blended together, just as the mind sees fit. And 
the case is precisely the same, if we say ' Reward of 
merit ;' except that when we use of we always do blend 
6* 



66 AN ANALYTICAL AND 

them together ; and this constitutes the only difference 
between of and a name. 

From means beginning; to means end. Making 
the substitution, in the third sentence, we have, Wil- 
liam rode beginning New York end Boston. Here the 
mind is directed first to William, the object ; then to 
what William did, rode, the action ; next to the place 
where he begun his ride, New York ; and lastly where 
he ended his ride, Boston. Nothing is said about the 
middle, because, as a matter of consequence, if there 
is a beginning and end there must be a middle ; and as 
it is the length of the ride, and not the incidents of it, 
that concerns the narration, nothing need be said 
about the middle. For, if in comparing any extend- 
ed motion, with any known distance, we give the be- 
ginning and end, we give the whole distance. If New 
York is mentioned as the starting point and Boston as 
the goal, the mind, unavoidably, comprehends the in- 
tervening space. Is it said that ' William rode begin- 
ning New York end Boston' is an awkward and sense- 
less expression ? — Its awkwardness arises from our not 
being accustomed to use those words, in such a con- 
nection ; and as to its being senseless, it is as much 
so and no more than, William rode from New York 
to Boston. From and to differ from beginning and 
end, only in so far as that, when the former are used, 
we always unite the embodied ideas of the associated 
words, and in the latter we do not. And it is this 
peculiar use of for, from, to, at, of, with, by, &c. that 
caused their distinction into a separate class. But this 
familiar use of them does not alter the real nature of 
the case, but only blinds us to a perception of it. And 
although from custom, the words in the sentence, 
William rode from New York to Boston seem to flow 
together, there is, in reality, as great discretion, and 
as abrupt transition of the ideas as in the sentence, 
William rode beginning New York end Boston. In no 
case, have words the power of uniting ideas ; that is 
always an act of the mind. 



PHILOSOPHICAL GRAMMAR. 67 

So far as the union of ideas by ivords is concerned, 
words may all be separated by commas without any 
detriment : as shoes, here, cause, sale. The mind 
can group them all together again, if it pleases. 
And, indeed, many cases occur, where the words are 
separated, while the ideas are united by the mind : 

" How poor, how rich, how abject, how august, 
How complicate, how wonderful is man." 

Young. 
" If poets allure thee, think how Bacon shined 
The wisest, brightest, meanest, of mankind. 

Pope. 

As the transition from one word to another is ab- 
rupt ; so is it, likewise, from one sentence or part of 
sentence to another. The abruptness with which 
the following sentences commence, is strikingly ob- 
vious. 

" He begins generally with a regular exordium. 
His method is clear ; his arguments are arranged 
with great propriety. We find every thing in its 
proper place ; he never attempts to move, till he has 
endeavored to convince. No man knew the power 
and force of words, better than Cicero. He rolls 
them along with the greatest beauty and pomp. He 
is a great amplifier of every subject ; magnificent, 
and in his sentiments, highly moral." — Blair. 

It is commonly though erroneously supposed that, 
by throwing in between sentences, such words as and, 
but, except, wherefore, because, &c, we break the ab- 
ruptness and render the transition more easy. But 
that does not obviate the difficulty, as we shall see 
from analysis ; custom has blinded us to a perception 
of the truth. And means to add. Two and two 
make four. Two add two make four. Four shillings 
and sixpence, of some currency, make a dollar. 
Four shillings add sixpence make a dollar. Now, we 
will make the application. 

1. " But a certain Samaritan, as he journeyed, 



68 AN ANALYTICAL AND 

came where he was : and when he saw him, he had 
compassion on him — and went to him, and bound up 
his wounds, pouring in oil and wine, and set him on 
his own beast, and brought him to an inn, and took 
care of him. And, on the morrow, when he depart- 
ed, he took out two pence and gave them to the host 
and said unto him, 'take care of him : and whatso- 
ever thou spendest more, when I come again I will 
repay thee.' " 

2. " But a certain Samaritan as he journeyed, came 
where he was : add when he saw him, he had com- 
passion on him, add went to him, add bound up his 
wounds pouring in oil add wine, add set him on his 
own beast, add brought him to an inn, add took care of 
him. Add on the morrow when he departed, he took 
out two pence, add gave them to the host, add said 
unto him, ' take care of him : add whatsoever thou 
spendest more, when I come again I will repay thee/ " 

3. " But a certain Samaritan as he journeyed, 
came where he was : when he saw him he had com- 
passion on him — went to him, bound up his wounds 
pouring in oil and wine—set him on his own beast — 
brought him to an inn — took care of him. On the 
morrow, when he departed he took out two pence — 
gave them to the host — said ' take care of him : 
whatsoever thou spendest more, when I come again I 
will repay thee.' " 

Is the last example more abrupt and stiff than the 
preceding, and consequently than the first ? Plainly 
not. Custom will render even a harsh sound, not un- 
pleasant ; and although and from containing the let- 
ter n has a more liquid sound than add, yet if in read- 
ing, stress is laid upon it, it will sound nearly or 
quite as harsh as add. In order to balance familiarity 
against novelty, we in justice should, in reading these 
three examples, lay stress upon and in the first, touch 
add in the second lightly, and at the ellipse in the 
third, suspend the voice, a length of time, equal to 



PHILOSOPHICAL GRAMMAR. 69 

the pronouncing of and. If this should be done by 
a skillful reader, the second and third examples would 
then appear less abrupt and stiff than the first ; which 
plainly proves that the difference lies in familiarity. 
The remarks that have been made upon and, are ap- 
plicable to other words interposed between sentences 
or parts of sentences, consequently further remarks 
upon the subject are unnecessary. We have seen 
that words in sentences, as well as singly, are repre- 
sentatives of discrete ideas that are united or not, at 
the pleasure, and by act of the mind. Hence there 
is little truth or propriety in calling some words i con- 
junctions. 5 

Our next topic is the latitude of language. This 
subject leads us to an investigation of the principles 
by which language is governed, and to inquire how 
far and when a departure from custom and philosophic 
accuracy is admissible in language. 

We have said that lano-ua^e is intelligible from the 
uniformity of its use: and that in consequence of 
this uniformity, certain rules have been established, 
showing the principles upon which language is con- 
ducted. Now, as grammatical rules have no control 
over language, but are dependent upon it for their 
very existence, it is obvious that the same authority 
w r hich established them, can annul or chancre them 
at pleasure. 

Why we communicate our thoughts by one form of 
expression, and not by another, or by certain words, 
and not by others, is because men in general have, 
for certain reasons, determined that such and such 
words shall stand as representatives of such and such 
ideas or objects; and that such and such ideas shall 
be expressed in this or that form or manner. 

' Reputable, national, present usage' being the au- 
thority upon which the regulation of language de- 
pends, it follows that a departure from custom is ad- 
missible, whenever any new reason or motive arises to 



70 AN ANALYTICAL AND 

change the popular anil. In accordance with this 
principle, we find that many words formerly in use 
are now obsolete, that many new words are coming 
into use, and that some in use are being employed in 
a different manner from their first use. We have il- 
lustrations of this in the pronouns. We was origi- 
nally used in the plural only, it is now occasionally 
used in the singular. You, formerly plural, is now 
used irrespectively, either as singular or plural. Thou 
and Ye were formerly the sole representatives of the 
second person, but now they are almost superseded 
by You. Other words have undergone like changes. 
And however grammarians may cry out against any 
change, as being destructive of the principles of lan- 
guage (their theories rather,) the ' voice of the peo- 
ple/ will still prevail. 

A departure from philosophic accuracy is allowable 
in language. 1st. When the imperfection of our na- 
ture necessitates us to do it. 2nd. When language 
may, in consequence, be abbreviated, without causing 
a liability to mistake. 3d. When, though a liability 
to mistake should thereby be caused, yet the advan- 
tage gained by brevity, more than counterbalances 
that defect. The latter two of these points, are so 
obviously in accordance with the very nature and de- 
sign of language, that they need scarce any remarks. 
For, as has already been observed, brevity is, in lan- 
guage, an object of the first and highest consideration, 
and except in legal cases and the like, is ever para- 
mount to philosophic precision. It is on this princi- 
ple that we use, and justly too, the expressions, 'the 
sun rises and sets/ ' the sun and moon stood still/ 
' the pot boils/ 'he is driving plough/ &c. "The 
earth was without form and void." While this, per- 
haps is the most expressive language that could be 
used, and therefore perfectly admissible, it is plain to 
see that it is not philosophically correct, for nothing 
can exist without having some form. • Wind is air 



PHILOSOPHICAL GRAMMAR. 71 

put in motion.' The ' trade-winds, 5 it is said, blow 
from east to west. Now it is well known that, in the 
case of the ' trade winds/ it is not the air that is in 
motion, but the earth. Yet it is allowable to say, the 
6 trade winds' biota although it is absolutely no more 
correct than it would be to say, while riding along, 
that the trees and other fixed objects move in an op- 
posite direction. 

On the first point, it may be remarked, that man, 
being an imperfect being, and of limited powers of 
conception, his mind is not able, in many cases, to 
comprehend the exact truth. And language being a 
type of the mind, and partaking of its imperfections, 
oftentimes is not an exact expression of truth, but 
the nearest approximation to it, which the imper- 
fect mental powers of man permit him to make. 
For instance, it is said ' The earth revolves upon its 
axis daily. 5 This is admissible, but not strictly true; 
for the earth has no axis, upon which, it revolves. It 
is said that the axis is an imaginary line, but the 
earth turns on no imaginary line ; for if the line is 
imaginary how can the earth turn on it. Where 
there is nothing for it to turn upon, it can turn upon 
nothing. If it is said, that - axis 5 means simply the 
center of motion, around which ' it revolves; 5 it has 
no center of motion around which it revolves; for the 
earth is a solid, hence some part of it must be in the 
center of motion, therefore, it cannot be said of the 
earth as a whole, that it revolves around or upon any- 
thing as its axis. 

Again, Locke says, " Color and smell are produced 
by insensible particles operating on our senses. 55 It 
is easy to perceive the intended meaning of this pro- 
position, and as easy to see that it is not philosophi- 
cally true. For the meaning of insensible is, ' not 
affecting the senses/ therefore, if the particles are 
insensible they cannot affect the senses, and thereby 
produce color and smell. We speak of infinites and 



72 PHILOSOPHICAL GRAMMAR. 

infinitessimals, but how any thing can be infinite in 
the absolute sense, is beyond human conception. Yet 
it is admissible, on the principle for which we are 
contending, to use language in this way, whether 
strictly correct or not. On the same principle, it is 
perfectly justifiable to use the expressions, ( quite 
perfect/ ' very perfect/ ( more perfect/ ' most per- 
fect/ &c. Yet the conceited pedant will cry out 
against them, exclaiming, ' How can a thing that is 
perfect be more perfect or most perfect ?." But he for- 
gets that nothing on earth is absolutely perfect, (ex- 
cept himself). It is only relatively that this term or 
any other is compared. And the term perfect, as 
it is generally used, is as properly compared as 
white, black, or any other word. For white taken 
absolutely, means perfect ivhitencss ; for if it was any 
degree less than that, it would be only whitish, and 
not white. So of black, blue, or any other color, 
quality, or quantity. Hence, we maintain that lan- 
guage is and must be in accordance with the consti- 
tution of our beings, and not with any ideal perfec- 
tion. 



GRAMMAR. 
PART II. 

SENTENCES, PROPOSITIONS, AND CLAUSES. 

Grammar is the science of language ; or 
the explanation and application of the prin- 
ciples of speech.* 

Language is made up of sentences, 
A sentence is an assemblage of words, ex- 
pressing a complete sentiment, and followed 
by a full pause. 

A sentence is called a period, when regard is had 
to the structure only ; the attention being directed to 
the collocation of the icords, without reference to the 
idea. A sentence is called a proposition, when the 
mind is directed to the idea, without reference to the 
words. A sentence in its common acceptation, includes 
both the idea and the words, without especial refer- 
ence to either. 

The full treatment of periods belongs to rhetoric; 
of propositions to logic ; of sentences to grammar. 

But, while grammar mainly treats of sentences, it 
partially notices periods and propositions. 

Proposition, from propono, to propose, to 

* Applicable to written and spoken language only, 

7 



74 AN ANALYTICAL AND 

set or place before, means that which is plac- 
ed before the mind, for consideration. 

The difference between a sentence and a proposi- 
tion, may be seen by the following : 4 Thou shalt have 
no other gods before me. 5 ' Thou shalt have other 
gods before me.' By leaving out the little word/ no/ 
we do not materially alter the sentence, but we entire- 
ly change the proposition. The one proposition is, 
that we shall worship the true God ; the other, that we 
shall worship idols. 

■ Passion produces effects,' is a correct sentence and 
a true proposition. ' Passion produces excellent ef- 
fects/ is also a correct sentence, but a false proposi- 
tion. 

Sentences are long or short, correct or incorrect ; 
propositions are true or false, absurd or rational. 

A proposition is any number of words 
which collectively express some thought, as 
birds fly ; the wind blows ; not to advance 
is to go back. 

A sentence may consist of one proposition, 
or of two or more propositions connected to- 
gether, as ' Man is mortal, ' (i prop.) ' Life is 
short, but art is long,' (2 prop.) ; He is poor 
and always has been poor, though he might 
have been rich, 5 (3 prop.) 

A sentence consisting of one proposition, 
is called a simple sentence. 

A sentence consisting of two or more 
propositions, is called a compound sentence ; 
and the propositions of which it is compos- 
ed are called members, or clauses. 



PHILOSOPHICAL GRAMMAR. 75 

A proposition consists of a subject and pre- 
dicate. 

The subject of a proposition, is that of 
which something is affirmed or said. 

The predicate is that which is affirmed or 
said. 

Thus, ' Birds fly ;' <■ birds' is the subject, and ' fly' 
the predicate. * The wind blows;' * the wind' is the 
subject, and 6 blows' the predicate. ' Not to advance 
is to go back ;' ' not to advance' is the subject, and ' is 
to go back' the predicate ; because it is said of ' birds/ 
that they 4 fly,' and of the ' wind, ' that it ' blows,' &,c. 

Sometimes the subject is placed between parts of 
the predicate : as 'Of all vices profane swearing is 
the least excusable ;' ' Profane swearing' is the sub- 
ject, and the other words the predicate. Sometimes 
one proposition is contained within another : as ' In- 
temperance, a vice which is common, is very destructive 
in its effects.' 

Clauses thus thrown in are not always proposi- 
tions ; as ' Men, speaking perverse things, will arise 
among you;' because ' speaking perverse things' is 
not, by itself, a complete thought. But the following 
interjectional clauses are propositions. ' How many 
instances of injustice, oppression and cruelty are fur- 
nished by slavery ;' i. e. How many instances of in- 
justice are furnished by slavery, how many instances 
of oppression are furnished by slavery, and how 
many instances of cruelty are furnished by slavery. 
When propositions are thus abbreviated, they are call- 
ed elliptic propositions. See page 61. 

A clause is a distinct group of words 
having a mutual constructive connection and 
appendance. 

Clause is often taken in the general sense of member. 



76 AN ANALYTICAL AND 

" The passion for praise, which is so very vehe- 
ment in the fair sex, produces excellent effects in 
women of sense." In this sentence there are six 
clauses, or distinct groups of words ; as you will see 
upon its analysis and synthesis. 

Analysis is the separating of a thing into its component 
parts ore' r.^nts; and synthesis is there-construction of it 
from thcMj& elements. 

€ The passion produces excellent effects/ is, you 
see, one group of words, though separated in colloca- 
tion, yet united in construction.* ' The passion for 
praise, produces excellent effects;' is two clauses; 
c The passion for praise, ivhich is so very vehement, 
produces excellent effects ;' three clauses. ' The 
passion for praise, which is so very vehement in the 
fair sex produces excellent effects ;' four clauses. 
'The passion for praise which is so very vehement in 
the fair sex, produces excellent effects in tcomen ; 7 
five clauses. * The passion for praise, which is so 
very vehement in the fair sex, produces excellent 
effects in women of sense ;' six clauses, and the com- 
plete sentence. 

What is meant by i mutual constructive connection 
and appendance,' will be seen upon examining either 
of the clauses, especially the third ; for you will 



* Collocation has reference to the position which words 
occupy in a sentence. 

Construction has reference to the connection which words 
in a sentence have to each other, in respect to sense. 

"For forms of government, let fools contest ." Here in 
collocation, c let fools contest' comes last, whereas in construc- 
tion, it comes first ; as ' Let fools contest for forms of govern- 
ment.' 

u Condemned in business or in arts to drudge." l To 
drudge,' though last in collocation, in construction follows 
' condemned.' Condemned to drudge in business or in arts. 

When it is said that a word precedes or follows another, it is 
meant in construction; but when it is said to be placed before 
or placed after, position is meant. 



PHILOSOPHICAL GRAMMAR. 77 

perceive that they cannot be separated in construc- 
tion, without destroying the sense or sentence. For 
instance, if in the third clause, we omit some of the 
words, thus, ( The passion for praise, which — pro- 
duces excellent effects/ we destroy the sentence ; it 
leaves it incomplete. Or thus, ' The passion for praise 
which is — produces excellent effects,' it destroys the 
sense. Or thus, ' The passion for praise which is so very 
— produces excellent effects/ also destroys the sense. 
And if we leave them out at the beginning; as ■ The 
passion for praise, — so very vehement, produces excel- 
lent effects/ it will have a like effect if we do not, in our 
minds, supply the words wanting. If you attempt to 
separate one of the clauses, and attach part of it to 
one of the other clauses, and a part to another, the 
mutual connection will become exceedingly obvious. 
You will clearly perceive that the words are insepa- 
rable in construction, though in collocation they may, 
as in the first clause, be placed asunder. 

This sentence affords good illustrations of the dif- 
ference betwen a sentence, a proposition, and a clause. 
It is but one sentence, as it expresses but one complete 
sentiment. It contains two propositions, for it expresses 
two aggregate ideas. It contains six clauses, as we 
have seen, for there are six distinct groups of words 
which have a mutual connection with each other, and 
a mutual appendance to the other groups. 

The proposition which contains the es- 
sential part of a sentence, is called the main 
proposition ; and those appended to furnish 
some additional idea, are called appendant 
propositions. 

In this sentence, ' The passion for praise produ- 
ces excellent effects in women of sense/ is the main 
proposition ; for it contains the substance of the sen- 
timent advanced, and of itself would make a complete 

7# 



78 AN ANALYTICAL AND 

sentence. But another proposition is appended, for 
the purpose of expressing an additional idea, yet this 
addition does not alter the sentiment already advan- 
ced, nor does it add a new sentiment, and thus pro- 
duce two sentences. For, ' which is so very vehe- 
ment in the fair sex,' is not by itself a complete senti- 
ment, but only an additional idea ; consequently, is 
an appendant proposition. 

We will begin now with the base of the sentence, 
and rear the superstructure. 

Friend B. I will tell you my sentiment. ' Passion 
produces effects.' Undoubtedly. ' Passion produces 
excellent effects/ False. I say, f The passion produ- 
ces excellent effects.' What passion? * The passion 
for praise, produces excellent effects.' In whom? 
' The passion for praise, produces excellent effects, 
in women.' In all women ? ' No ;' * the passion for 
praise, produces excellent effects, in women of sense*' 
Do you mean any particular passion for praise ? ' I 
mean that,' ' which is so very vehement.' So very ve- 
hement in whom ? ' Which is so very vehement in 
the fair sex.' Well, what of it all ? ' I say that' 
' The passion for praise, which is so very vehement 
in the fair sex, produces excellent effects in women of 
sense.' Ah, that's your sentiment, is it! 

You will readily perceive the change of the pro- 
positions, upon the addition of each modifying clause. 
By the successive additions, there are no less than 
seven different propositions produced; yet when the 
sentence is completed, there are but two. You will 
also perceive from what has been said, that a propo- 
sition may be a sentence, or may not be ; and that a 
clause may be a proposition, or may not be. But, if 
a proposition was the same as a sentence, then there 
would be as many sentences as propositions ; or if a 
clause was the same as a proposition, then there would 
be as many propositions as clauses. But this you 



PHILOSOPHICAL GRAMMAR. 79 

perceive is not the case, therefore, a proposition dif- 
fers from a sentence, and a clause, from a proposition. 

A phrase is an idiomatic clause ; that is, 
several words customarily used in connec- 
tion, with a peculiar meaning attached to 
them ; as 

" I will that thou give me by and by, in a charger, 
the head of John the Baptist." 

" Or shrink myself almost to nothing at all" 
" Which, by the way, is nothing uncommon." 

When we wish to single out for consideration, a word or two 
in a sentence, we designate them by the term 'phrase.' 



WORDS. 

All sentences are composed of words. Words are 
not all alike; nor are they all entirely different from 
each other. They have many different forms 
and no two words are exactly alike in meaning; but 
we find that many words agree in the object of their 
use. Hence, they are divided into classes according 
to their rise* 

To illustrate the classification of words, we will 
compare them to animals. We give the term ' word't 
to the symbols of vocal sounds, by which we commu- 
nicate our ideas. - We apply the term, ' animal/ to all 
creatures endowed with life and the power of volun- 
tary motion. Now, these terms are very general, 
and include other terms under them. As the term, 
' animal' includes all living creatures, we have to di- 
vide animals, into several classes, in order to distin- 

* This is the only principle upon which words can properly be 
arranged in classes. 

t Word is the term for either a significant vocal sound, or the 
symbol of that sound. 



80 AN ANALYTICAL AND 

guish them. Animals that live in water, and have 
fins and scales, we call ' fish '; animals that have feath- 
ers, and fly, or have wings, we call ' fowls '; fourfoot- 
ed animals are called ' beasts '; those that creep are 
called * reptiles '; animals endowed with reason and the 
power of speech come under the term ' man/ &,c. 
Thus all animals are arranged in different classes, ac- 
cording to their distinguishing marks. So ?vords are 
divided into different classes, but not, like animals, 
according to their form, or quality, but according to 
their use. Some words are used to name things ; some 
are used to define, or describe things, and some to tell 
what things do, or what is said of things, &c. 

The number of words in our language is about sev- 
enty thousand, yet we have not but six classes of words 
technically called 'parts of speech.' 

1st. Those words used in naming things, such as, 
David, man, tree, river, air, &,c. are called 'names. 5 
In grammar, they are called ' nouns.' 

Noun means a name, and the term, ' noun,' is used instead of 
4 name,' in order to prevent any confusion of the word in its 
common use, with its grammatical use. We do not say, ' Da- 
vid is the noun of a person,' but i the name of a person.' But if 
we say c David is a noun,' we know what is meant ; it means 
that it is a name grammatically considered. 

When a word is used not in common language, but in the 
arts and sciences only, it is called a technical word. Sometimes 
a word that is used in common language is used in the arts or 
sciences with a different meaning. The two meanings are then 
distinguished by calling one of them, the technical meaning, 
and the other, the common meaning. For example, The common 
meaning of taste, is the power of ascertaining the quality of a 
thing by the tongue ; the technical meaning is the power of 
perceiving and relishing the beauties of nature and art. The 
names which are given to the 4 parts of speech,' are either tech- 
nical words, or have a technical use. 

Nouns form the largest and most important class of 
words. Names were the first proper words employed 
by man, (Gen. 2 : 19, 20.) and without them, we should 



PHILOSOPHICAL GRAMMAR. 



81 



not be able to hold conversation with one another, 
nor to express a single idea vocally. 

2nd. In speaking or writing, instead of often repeat- 
ing a name, we use another small word to denote the 
same thing. Instead of saying, ' Jane is John's sister, 
John loves Jane, and Jane loves John ; we say, 'Jane 
is John's sister ; he loves her and she loves Mm. 3 The 
words ' he,' ' her, 5 ' she/ ' him,' and other words that 
are used instead of nouns, are called pronouns. 

From 'pro' meaning /or, and i noun.' 

This class of words is small, containing about thir- 
ty or thirty-five words only. 

3d. In speaking of some particular thing, we often 
have to point it out more particularly than barely to 
call it by name. We then, for this purpose, use oth- 
er words to define what we mean : as, ' a good man' - a 
large man,' ' the black horse/ ' the bay horse,' ' two or 
three very large oak trees/ ' he was hurt badly, &>c. 
Words used to define others, are called definers* 

To define means to limit, to point out, or describe. Definer 
is that which defines. 

4th. We frequently speak of things, relatively, that 
is, in respect to something else. One thing may be 
situated, in relation to another, either, * above it/ or 
* below it/ ' in it/ ' without it/ ' near it/ ' by it,' ' from 
it/ ' over it,' &,c. The words ' above/ ' below/ ■ in/ 
&c. with others that denote the relation of one thing 
to another, are called relatives.i 

* They have been called adjectives, (i. e. joined to), because 
they are joined to the words they define. 

f They have been named prepositions, (pre before, and posi- 
tion), because they are usually placed before a noun. 



82 AN ANALYTICAL AND 

5th. Not any, nor all of the words which have been 
named, can be made to form a sentence ; because, 
they do not express any thing. Therefore when we 
wish to express any thing, either in speaking to, or of 
any person or thing, or in telling what another did, 
we use a different kind of words ; as ' David killed 
Goliah ;' ' Birds fly ;' ' go and get your book ;' ' will 
you bring some wood ;' ' I will ;' ' the letter is writ- 
ten ;' ' the birds are singing.' 

If we leave out such words from a sentence, we de- 
stroy the sense. 'David Goliah ' ' you some wood/ 
and as many more words as you have a mind to put 
together, would not make a sentence, or convey any 
meaning, without some expressing word. Hence, such 
words as do express what is said, constitute a class, 
and are called predicatives* 

To -predicate is to utter forth, to express, or declare. Predi- 
cate is some thing predicated, i. e. said or expressed. And 
predicative is the predicating word or words. 

In mentioning some of the classes of animals, man 
was included. Man is an animal, and all human be- 
ings come under the class, ' man ;' but sometimes, for 
greater distinction, we subdivide the class 'man' into 
smaller classes : as man, woman, child. Here though 
( woman 5 and ' child' or ' women and children' are 
terms for two smaller classes or subdivisions, they still 
come under the general class ' man.' In like manner 
the class of words called, ' predicatives,' is subdivided 
into two smaller classes, called nominal predicatives 
and predicals. 

The nominal predicatives, such as ' to go,' ' to do,' 
* to be,' ' to improve,' ' to have,' &,c. are so called, 
because they have the nature of nouns and predica- 

* The term verb has, by common usage, come to mean the 
same as predicative, hence, may be substituted for it. 



' PHILOSOPHICAL GRAMMAR. 83 

tives. They are formed by prefixing ' to' to a pure 
predicative. 

Predicals are derived from predicatives, usually by 
adding to them the termination ' d,' ' ed' or ' ing' : as 
walk ; walked, walking ; bathe ; bathed, bathing ; 
kill ; killed, killing. They possess the property of 
a predicative, together with that of a noun, or a de- 
finer.* 

Predical means belonging to, like, or derived from a predi- 
cative. 

The predicatives form a class of words next in 
size and importance to nouns. With nouns and pred- 
icatives together, without other words, we can con- 
verse with one another, but with either of them alone^ 
or with any other words we cannot. 

6th. The last, and least important class of words 
are exclamatives :t as O ! or Oh ! Ah ! Alas ! &,c. 

They are used by writers and speakers, to denote some emo- 
tion. They do not name or describe the emotion, nor do they 
express it ; they only denote that there is emotion, and Jeave 
it for the inflection of the voice, or something else to express 
that emotion. 

The above six classes comprehend all the words in 
our language. 

From the foregoing, we derive the following 

Abstract. 

Words are divided into six classes, called 
parts of speech ; viz. nouns, pronouns, de- 

- Fredicals have for this reason been called participles. 
-t This class of words have been called interjections , from the 
manner in which they are thrown into a sentence. 



84 AN ANALYTICAL AND 

finers, relatives, predicatives, and exclama- 
tives. 

From the predicatives two subdivisions 
are made : viz. nominal predicatives, and 
predicals. 

All the parts of speech take their name 
from their office. 

1. Nouns are words used to name things. 

2. Pronouns are words uniformly used 
instead of nouns, to denote the same thing. 

3. Definers are w 7 ords used to define oth- 
er words. 

4. Relatives are words used to show the 
relation of one thing to another. 

5. Predicatives are words used to predi- 
cate, i. e. to express some fact, command, 
or request. 

Nominal predicatives are a species of predicatives 
which partake of the nature of nouns and predicatives. 

Predicals are words derived from predicatives, and 
possess the property of a predicative, together with 
that of a noun or a definer. 

6. Exclamatives are words used to denote 
emotion. 

The old Nomenclature.* 

1. Articles — the two definers, a and the. 

2. Nouns — words used to name things. 

3. Pronouns — words used instead of nouns. 

* For remarks upon the 'parts of speech/ see notes under 
the respective classes. 



PHILOSOPHICAL GRAMMAR. 85 

4. Adjectives — words joined to nouns to define them. 

5. Verbs — words used to predicate. 

6. Adverbs — words joined to verbs to define them. 

7. Prepositions — words showing relation between 
things. 

8. Conjunctions — (some) words that connect sen- 
tences. 

9. Interjections — exclamatory words. 

Owing to the imperfect nature, and the latitude of 
language, often the same words are used irrespective- 
ly, in two or more classes; as we say, Va ioalk] or 
1 I ivalk ;' ' walk' being, in the one case a noun, and 
in the other a predicative. So, ' a fight] 'they 
fight ;' ballot, a vote, ballot, to vote ; sum, the amount, 
sum, to reckon up, &x. A red paint, red, a showy 
color ; — red in the one case is a definer, in the other 
a noun. And so of other words and other classes. 
In such cases, the rule of naming them according to 
their use, holds. When they have the use of predi- 
catives, they are to be called predicatives, and when 
of nouns, nouns, and when of definers, definers, &c. 
But when words commonly belonging to one class are 
only occasionally used in another, they may be denom- 
inated by applying to them their common name, and 
telling their present use. For example, ' The Par- 
sons family ;' 'The Smith boys ;' ' Connecticut militia ;' 
1 Ohio men/ Parsons, Smith, &,c, may be denomi- 
nated nouns used as definers. ' Providence rewards 
the good, but punishes the bad.' l The wicked flee 
when no man pursueth, but the righteous are as bold 
as a lion.' Bad, good, wicked, &c. are definers used 
as nouns* 

If the definer in the case of an ellipse is not preceded by a or 
the, it is not l a definer used as a noun ;' but it is referred to the 
noun which it defines, or is disposed of by saying, ' it is a defi- 
ner parsed as a noun, the noun to which it refers being omitted.' 

* An error is prevalent with some authors, of calling definers 

8 



86 AN ANALYTICAL AND 

In ascertaining to what class a word belongs, the 
thing to be sought, is, What is its use ? Is it to name, 
to define, to predicate, or to show relation ? & c. 
Having determined which, the class is ascertained. 

When predicatives are used in the manner of com- 
manding; as, 'Go and get your hat;' 'Give me a 

substitutes, when the noun or proposition which they define is 
omitted. 

" Adjectives are often used as substitutes for the names of 
men and things which they describe by their qualities ; as, few 
were present ; the wise are respected ; the bravest are not al- 
ways victorious.'' Webster's Grammar, Rule 14. 

Now it must be evident that such definers are not pronouns 
or substitutes as stated, for if they are, then they stand for some 
noun, and when the noun for which they stand is used, they 
themselves will not be needed. But that is not the case. 
What nouns are the above used instead of? None. And be- 
sides, when such definers are used, the noun also must be sup- 
plied, or else there will be no sense. c There were only feio 
there.' Unless the noun is supplied, there is no sense in the 
proposition., for we do not know whether is meant a few men, a 
few birds, a few cattle, a feio sticks, or a few stones. ' You may 
take this, and 1 will take that.' This and that what ? The an- 
swer to this question must be known before there can be any 
sense to the expression. From these and other examples, it is 
plain that the definer is not suhstituted for any thing ; because 
the noun and definer both must be either expressed, or under- 
stood. 

A like error prevails respecting words of other classes also, 
and especially the auxiliary pi*edicatives : as i I shall not see 
the man before his departure, but James will. 1 Here will is said 
to be a substitute for the whole clause in italics ; but what is 
more obviously false. It is no more a substitute for a clause 
than you is in the following. c I can walk a mile as quick as 
you.'' But who will pretend that you is a substitute for 4 can 
walk a mile.' They both must be used at the same time. 

Says Webster — u In every case where the antecedent word 
or sentence is not obvious, so that the mind instantly applies the 
substitute to its principal, the use of a substitute is a fault." 
This discloses plainly the fallacy of calling definers or auxilia- 
ries, substitutes, showing that in all such cases the mind sup- 
plies what is not expressed. He would have uttered the truth 
if he had said that when the omission of a noun or clause 
after a definer occasions obscurity, the ellipse is not admissible. 



PHILOSOPHICAL GRAMMAR. 87 

book ;' ' Do let me alone ;' ' Let me have it ;' they 
are distinguished by being called imperative predica- 
tives, or briefly, imperatives. 

Imperative does not mean merely commanding from official 
authority, but from any other authority, as imperious necessity, 
and the like. Hence urgent entreaty and supplication are 
clothed in the language of command. 

Some definers, as wherefore, therefore, however, 
moreover, likewise, &/C. seem to stand for a whole 
clause, and are used to define clauses instead of 
words ; hence they are called clausal definers. 

Words, of whatever class they may be, which im- 
ply the connection of one proposition with another, 
are denominated connectives;* as, " Blessed is the 

* For excluding conjunctions as a c part of speech,' and em- 
ploying the term connective, as it is used in rhetoric, the follow- 
ing are our reasons. 

" A conjunction is a part of speech that is chiefly used to 
connect sentences; so as out of two to make one sentence." 
This definition, given by Murray, embodies, essentially, the 
commonly received opinions upon the subject. But let us look 
into the truth of it. Take a case ; " 1 will go if he will ac- 
company me." This is a plain case, and perhaps easily dis- 
posed of by an opponent. But we will suggest an inquiry or 
two. Are here tioo sentences united into one? If so, what 
constitutes a sentence ? If a proposition makes a sentence, 
then there are tivo sentences as much after their connection, as 
before ; for the two propositions still remain distinct. If a pro- 
position does not make a sentence, then the one sentence is not 
made of two. Is it said, that the sentence might be separated 
into its propositions, and thus become two ; as, ' I will go,' 'he 
will accompany me ?' The reply is, the speaker never said 
thus; the truth of the latter proposition he did not know nor 
declare. c l will go, and he will accompany me ;' — if simply 
connecting two propositions together makes them one sen- 
tence, then should not this sentence be the same as the other ? 
For the two propositions, or sentences, as our opponent has it, 
are the very same in both cases, and are connected in the same 
order; must we not then conclude that the two sentences are 
the same ? Yet they are not. But take another case. " I rest 
then upon this argument;" then is here a conjunction, says 



88 AN ANALYTICAL AND 

man ivho feareth the Lord, and keepeth his command- 
ments. JJ " A true aristocracy is not a separate in- 

Murray. What two sentences does then connect into one ? 
Does our opponent say that the sentence, 1 1 rest upon this ar- 
gument,' is connected by then, to another not expressed ? Ad- 
mit it; but are the two afterwards one f Take the following : 
" The trees went forth on a time to anoint a king over 
them; And they said to the olive-tree, Reign thou over us. 
But the olive-tree said to them, Should I leave my fatness, 
with which by me they honor God and man, and go to be pro- 
moted over the trees ? And the trees said to the fig-tree, Come 
thou and reign over us. But the fig-tree said to them, Should I 
forsake my sweetness, and my good fruit, and go to be pro- 
moted over the trees? Then said the trees to the vine, Come 
thou, and reign over us. And the vine said to them, Should I 
leave my wine, which cheereth God and man, and go to be 
promoted over the trees ? And then said all the trees to the 
bramble, Come thou and reign over us. And the bramble said 
to the trees, If in truth ye anoint me king over you, then come, 
and put your trust in my shadow : and if nut, let fire come 
out of the bramble, and devour the cedars of Lebanon." What 
grammarian has the audacity to say that this is but one sentence ? 
yet it must be said, if the above definition is correct. In this 
extract there are thirty propositions, and consequently thirty 
sentences are made one! Procul, O procul ! este profani ! 

But it is not because conjunctions have not been rightly de- 
fined, that we reject the term, but because their purpose is not 
to connect. Startling as this proposition may be, we think it 
fully sustained by the following. We admit that it is true, in 
one sense, that conjunctions do connect ; but the same is true 
of verbs, pronouns, prepositions, and adverbs ; Hence if the 
bare fact that the words connect, is sufficient to authorize some 
words that connect, being called conjunctions, it is sufficient to 
authorize all words that connect, being called conjunctions. 
Hence if a part only of the words that connect, are called con- 
junctions, it must be because the sole or chief purpose of those 
is to connect. But if to connect is their sole purpose, then one 
conjunction is as good as a hundred; and all the conjunctions 
except and, may be excluded from the language. But let us see ; 
" Rome was enslaved because Cesar was ambitious.'' Will and 
supply the place of because f No. u Though he was often re- 
proved, yet he did not reform." Here are two conjunctions, so 
called, but are they needed to connect f Query — what does 
though connect ? 

Mr. Harris in his ' Hermes,' ' a philosophical inquiry concern- 
ing universal grammar,' gives the following definition which 



PHILOSOPHICAL GRAMMAR. 89 

terest in the state, or separable from it. It is an es- 
sential integrant part of any large body rightly consti- 

he adopts from Aristotle " Now the definition of a conjunction 
is as follows — a part of speech, void of signification itself, but 
so formed as to help signification, by making two or more sig- 
nificant sentences to be one significant sentence." 

Now, if conjunctions are l void of signification,' then their 
sole purpose must be to connect ; and consequently it makes 
no difference what one we use to connect any two sentences. 
But substitute and for yet in the above sentence ; " Though he 
was often reproved and he did not reform." We see at once 
that the sense is gone; but why ? And is allowed by all to con- 
nect the most effectually of any of the conjunctions, hence, 
should well supply the place of yet; but it does not. How can 
this difficulty be removed, upon the ground that conjunctions 
are devoid of a signification, or that their chief purpose is to con- 
nect ? But take the following I 

" The moon intervenes therefore the sun is in eclipse." 
"The moon intervenes if the sun is in eclipse." 
" The moon intervenes or the sun is in eclipse." 
" The moon intervenes and the sun is in eclipse." 
"The moon intervenes though ttie sun is in eclipse." 
"The moon intervenes yet the sun is in eclipse." 
• " The moon intervenes while the sun is in eclipse." 
" The moon intervenes because the sun is in eclipse." 
" The moon intervenes when the sun is in eclipse.' 
M The sun is in eclipse because the moon intervenes. '' 
If any one, after a consideration of these several propositions, 
can say that conjunctions are ' void of signification,' or that their 
chief purpose is to connect, he is welcome to his reasoning 
powers. (But do not, for the world tell any one that there are 
adverbs among them, figuring, with all the eclat of conjunc- 
tions.) 

If our opponent still insists that conjunctions do connect, 
again we admit it ; but so do other words. 

Murray says, "the conjunction copulative serves to connect 
or to continue a sentence by expressing an addition, a supposi- 
tion, a cause, &c." Prepositions connect words by showing 
relation between them. Is there not then, as much reason for 
calling the latter conjunctions, as the former? We hive seen, 
above, Va^t adverbs connect as effectually and in as good style as 
conjunctions. And pronouns, according to the confession of 
our opponents, serve to connect sentences, as well as conjunc- 
tions. Says Murray, "A relative pronoun possesses the force 
both of a pronoun and a connective. Nay, the union by relatives 
is rather closer, than that by mere conjunctions. The latter may 
form two or more sentences into one; but by the former, sever 
o* 



90 AN ANALYTICAL AND 

tuted." # " I certainly have very good wishes for the 
place of my birth. But the sphere of my duties is 
my true country." 

al sentences may incorporate in one and the same clause of a 
sentence. Thus, tl thou seest a man, and he is called Peter," 
is a sentence consisting of two distinct clauses, united by the 
copulative and; but " the man whom thou seest is called Peter," 
is a sentence of one clause, and not less comprehensive than 
the other." 

To this the testimony of other grammarians corresponds. 
The following is the language of Mr. Harris. " Light is a body, 
and it moves with great celerity. If in the place of and it, we 
substitute that or which, saying, Light is a body which moves 
with great celerity, the sentence still retains its unity and per- 
fection, and becomes, if possible still more compact than before." 
Now what conclusion can we draw from such language ? Eith- 
er that pronouns are conjunctions, or that some words are call- 
ed conjunctions not because they connect. Is it said in reply, 
that other words that connect, have another use which deter- 
mines their classification? Admit that, and it is all we wish ; 
for it is on that very principle that we have placed the words 
called conjunctions, under other classes according to their res- 
pective uses ; and we have seen that they have uses besides to 
connect. But does not the reply tacitly admit, what is probably 
the truth, that conjunctions were so called because, not knowing 
their true natures, they knew not what else to do with them. 

We have said enough to convince the candid, and too much 
to be lost on the prejudiced. But we cannot leave the subject 
without saying a few words respecting disjunctive conjunctions. 
Ludicrous as is this combination of terms, yet it is not as much 
so, as the reasoning upon it. In the c Hermes' we have the 
following. " The difference between these (copulative and con- 
tinuative conjunctions) is this : — The copulative does no more 
than barely couple sentences ; and is therefore applicable to all 
subjects whose natures are not incompatible. Continuatives, on 
the contrary, by a more intimate connection, consolidate sen- 
tences into one continuous whole, and therefore are applicable 
only to subjects which have an essential coincidence." 

" If we say every number is even or odd— every proposition 
true or false— nothing seems to disjoin more strongly than the 
disjunctive, because no things are in nature more incompatible 
than the subjects" What reasoning ! A thing is powerfully dis- 
junctiie, because something else does the work of disjoining! 
or, it is very strongly disjunctive, because it does not unite what 

* Newman's Rhetoric, p. 147. 



PHILOSOPHICAL GRAMMAR. 91 



NOUNS. 

A noun is a name : as James, man, air, 
mountain, vice. 

Names or nouns are either general, or 
particular. 

Genus a class of objects having the same essential proper- 
ties. General, belonging to a genus, or the individuals of a 
genus. 

So called because they particle or single out the individual, 
from others of the like kind. 

N. B. Individual means a single object, whether person or 
thing. 

A general noun is a name common to all 
individuals of the same sort, or genus : as 
man, tree, ship, iron. 

A particular noun is a name applied par- 
ticularly to an individual : as William, Con- 
necticut, Homer, America. 

cannot be united ! Vague ideas. u But if we say, That object 
is a triangle or figure contained under three right lines— the or 
in this case hardly seems to disjoin, or indeed to do more than 
distinctly to express the thing first by its name and then by its 
definition. So if we say, That figure is a sphere or a globe or a 
ball, the disjunctive in this case tends no farther to disjoin 
than as it distinguishes the several names which belong to the 
same thing." Why call it disjunctive then ? Are such the 
philosophical conclusions of a philosophical inquiry, by a philo- 
sophical mind? Does not the disjunction in all cases lie in the 
nature of things and not in the conjunction? When we say, It 
is round or spherical; it is black or white — we mean that it is 
the one or the other ; and in the first case the two things being 
alike, it is consequently both ; but in the latter, the two things 
being opposites, it consequently cannot be both, but only one of 
the two. And this distinction is in the nature of the things, 
and not in or. The first case is on the principle that two things 
being equal to each other, are respectively equal to the third ; 
and the latter is the converse of it. Or always denotes one of 
two things ; and if both are included, it is by induction from the 
nature of things, and not from a change in or. 



92 AN ANALYTICAL AND 

Particular nouns may become general, by using a 
or the before them : as He was the Cicero of his age. 
The twelve Cesars. The Smiths. Washington was a 
Fabius ; Arnold a Judas. 

The attributes of nouns are number, per- 
son, gender and case. 

Attribute signifies the thing bestowed upon or assigned to 
another. 

Number. 

Number is the form of the noun which 
denotes whether it represents a single object 
or more : as man, men ; fly, flies. 

There are two numbers ; the singular 
and plural. 

The singular number denotes not but 
one : as boy. 

The plural number implies more than 
one : as boys. 

Some nouns are used only in the singular 
form : as, wheat, pitch, gold, pride, &c. 

Others only in the plural form : as scis- 
sors, shears, lungs, bellows. 

Some nouns have no number ; the form 
being the same whether implying one, or 
more : as sheep, deer, swine. 

Formation of plurals. 

Words ending with i, s, z, x, y not preceded by a 
vowel, sh, ch not like k, o not preceded by a vowel 
nor sounded like oo, their plural regularly is formed 



PHILOSOPHICAL GRAMMAR. 93 

by the addition of es, as Alkali, Alkalies; Glass, 
Glasses; Box, Boxes : Copy, Copies; Bush, Bushes ; 
Church, Churches ; Hero, Heroes. But there are 
exceptions to this, Canto, Cantos; Solo, Solos :Quar- 
to, Quartos. 

Words ending with any other letter, with y preced- 
ed by a vowel, ch like k, o preceded by a vowel or 
sounded like oo, are regularly made plural by the 
addition of s only: as, Pampa, Pampas; Lamb, 
Lambs; Arithmetic, Arithmetics; Land, Lands; 
Horse, Horses ; Life, Lives ; Hoe, Hoes ; Trough, 
Troughs; Flask, Flasks: Ball, Balls; Drum, 
Drums; Fan, Fans; Cameo, Cameos; Nuncio, 
Nuncios; Cuckoo, Cuckoos : Two, Twos. 

When f is the last consonant in a word, it is changed 
to v in the plural ; as Wife, Wives. If y preceded 
by a consonant ends the word in the singular, it is 
changed to i in the plural : as Fly, Flies ; Holy, Ho- 
lies. 

Words are irregularly made plural, by the chang- 
ing of letters, as man, men ; mouse, mice ; foot, feet ; 
goose, geese ; by adding e??, as ox, oxen ; by adding 
ren, as child, children ; by adding x, as beau, beaux ; 
by changing i of the last syllable into e, as crisis, cri- 
ses ; by changing on to a, as phenomenon, phenomena. 

Some words have both a regular and irregular plu- 
ral ; as brother, brothers or brethren : die, dies or 
dice ; penny, pennies, or pence ; calx, calxes, or calces: 
calyx, calyxes, or calyces ; focus, focuses, or foci ; pea, 
peas, or pease ; cherub, cherubs, or cherubim, or cher- 
ubims : serapb, seraphs, or seraphim, or seraphims. 
The plural of letters and numbers, has an apostrophe, 
d's. 

Person. 

The term person is applied to the distino 



94 AN ANALYTICAL AND 

tion between the person speaking, spoken 
to, and spoken of. 

When the person speaking introduces his 
own name, it is said to be of the first per- 
son : as i, Paul, the prisoner of Jesus 
Christ. 

The name of the person spoken to is of 
the second person : as William lay aside 
jour book. 

The name of the person or thing spoken 
of is of the third person : William is here. 
Fish swim. 

Gender. 

Gender is that property of nouns which 
indicates a distinction of sex. 

Hence nouns are divided into three kinds, 
masculine, feminine and neuter. 

Masculine, pertaining to a male, feminine, to a female, neu- 
ter, neither. 

A Masculine noun is a name denoting a 
male, as man, horse, ox, king, &e. 

A feminine noun is a name denoting a fe- 
male, as woman, queen, hen, cow, &c. 

A neuter noun is a name that does not 
indicate either a male or female : as tree, 
book, virtue, victim, companion, friend, 
servant, parent, &c. 

There are three different ways of indicating the sex. 

First, by special words; as man, woman; husband, 

wife ; brother, sister ; king, queen; boy, girl ; buck, doe. 



PHILOSOPHICAL GRAMMAR. 95 

Second, by adding ess, a contraction of the He- 
brew cssa, a female, to the masculine noun suitably 
modified; as prophet, prophetess; actor, actress ; elec- 
tor, electress; governor, governess. Sometimes, in- 
stead of 655 by adding ix\ or ine, or dropping er ; execu- 
tor, executrix ; hero, heroine ; widower, widow. 

Third, by prefixing to a neuter noun, a word of de- 
terminate gender: as man-servant, maid-servant; 
male-child, female-child; he-goat, she-goat. 

In figurative language, things without sex, are rep- 
resented, either by masculine or feminine nouns, as 
the conceived analogy may direct. (See Blair's Rhe- 
toric, page 84.) 

Case. 

Case is the condition or situation in which 
a noun is, in respect to some other word or 
words. 

Case means condition, situation, circumstance. 

There are four cases, Subjective, Objec- 
tive, Relative, and Independent. 

The Subjective case, is the state of the 
noun when any thing is predicated of it : as 
Men die. Animals move and breathe. 

The Objective case is the state of the noun 
when it follows a relative or predicative ; 
as, I went to Boston. He was at home. 
He ordered James to stop. John ran a race. 
John ran the horses. They slept a sleep. 
He was offered an offering. He offered an 
offering unto God. 

The noun in the objective case after a predicative, may be 



96 PHILOSOPHICAL GRAMMAR. 

either the name of the action or the name of the result, or the 
name of the object, as he run a race- He made a pen. He 
caught a fish, in the last example, ; fish' is the object upon 
which the action 'caught' terminates; and is therefore, in 
the objective case proper. In the second example, i pen' is not 
the object of the action, but the name of the result, or that 
produced by the action. But the action must have had some 
object, or there would have been no result. The object of the 
action was a quill, and the result a pen. Therefore * pen' is 
in the objective case, both because it is in the situation of the 
objective case, and because it implies an object. In the first 
example, 4 race' is not the name of the object, nor of the result 
of the action, but is merely the name of the action, and does 
not in the least like ' pen' imply an object, therefore it is in the 
objective case merely on account of its position. 

Webster is a statesman. John was a blacksmith. 
Henry will be president. Here, statesman, black- 
smith, and president, are not in the objective case; 
for though they are placed after the predicative, they 
do not follow it. They only serve to explain the 
other noun, just as we say, John the Baptist was be- 
headed ; or Herod beheaded John the Baptist, So, 
Webster, a statesman is ; John, a blacksmith was ; 
Henry, president will be ; John and Baptist in the 
first example, are both in the subjective case; in the 
second, both are in the objective case, for John was 
beheaded ; the Baptist was beheaded. Or, Herod 
beheaded John ; Herod beheaded the Baptist. Be- 
cause, they both being one, if one was beheaded, the 
other was ; therefore John and Baptist must be in the 
same case. The same remark applies to the other 
examples. John was ; a blacksmith was. John, a 
blacksmith was. John was a blacksmith. 

Hence the rule : A noun explaining another noun 
representing the same thing, is in the same case. Ap- 
ply it to other examples. John ran a race. We can- 
not convert this sentence, because ' a race' represents 
a different thing from John. It is not predicated that 
a race ran John ; but it is predicated of John, that he 
ran a race, not that a race ran him. They slept a 



PHILOSOPHICAL GRAMMAR. 97 

sleep ; not a sleep slept they. This can never be the 
construction, though in poetry it is often the colloca- 
tion of the words. 

The relative case is the state of the noun 
when its form indicates a relation between 
the objects represented by itself and a fol- 
lowing noun ; as James* book ; virtues re- 
ward ; metis and boys* hats for sale ; boys' 
clothes cut and made. 

The relative case supersedes the use of a relative ; as Virtue's 
reward, is equivalent to Reward of virtue. Men's and boy's 
hats, to Hats for men and boys. Boys' clothes, to Clothes for 
boys. It is not true that this case always or most frequently 
denotes possession. Virtue does not possess the reward. And 
if the men and boys possess the hats, the merchant has no right 
to sell them ; and how can ' boys' possess clothes that are not 
yet cut and made. 

A noun in the relative case, is always terminated 
with an apostrophy and the sound of 5. If a word 
ends with $', or its equivalent in sound, an apostrophy 
only is added ; but if it does not, an apostrophy and 
the letter s are both added ; BoswelFs life of John- 
son ; John's book ; Pope's letters ; On eagles' wings ; 
for righteousness' sake ; " Tis patience' province to 
endure ;" c To what is the wax' cohesion and plasticity 
owing?' Thomas' bravery; the church's prosperity. 
Not as Mr. Webster says, " Thomas's bravery ; the 
church's prosperity, pronounced as if written Tiiom- 
asis bravery ; the churchis prosperity," for such a 
practice would not only violate the general rule, but 
would destroy all regularity. Such a corruption 
makes one think of the boy, who, finding it not easy 
to pronounce the word lasts, when speaking of his 
father's horse, said ' He shall have hay as long as hay 
tastes. 1 He that says ' Thomasis bravery' ' Edwardsis 
address' is qualified to say hay lastes. We might as 
9 



98 AN ANALYTICAL AND 

well say — eaglesis wings — right eon snes sis sake as 
Thomasis bravery — churchis prosperity. Ease of pro- 
nunciation will not justify it, for it is as easy to say 
Thomas' bravery, as it is righteousness' sake. Bet- 
ter to improve elocution than to corrupt grammar. 

The Independent case is the state of the 
noun when it has no constructive connection 
in a proposition ; as James : Harriet has re- 
ceived a present. Holy Bible : Chapter 1st. 

John, you get me a book. James, will you bring some 
wood. I shall punish you, James. Here, John and James are 
not in the Independent case, but in the same case with you. 



PRONOUNS. 

Pronouns are words used instead of 
nouns : as John studies hard, and he learns 
fast. The tree is dead, cut it down. The 
pronoun he is used instead of John ; and it 
is used instead of ' the tree.' 

Pronouns were originally definers ; but from the nature of the 
case, it not being necessary to repeat the noun after them, they 
have come now to be equivalent to both a noun and a de- 
finer.* 

Pronouns have number, person, gender and case ;f 

* " No noun properly so called, implies its own presence. It is 
therefore to ascertain such presence that the pronoun is taken 
in aid ; and hence it is that it becomes equivalent to pointing 
or indicating by the finger." Harris' Hermes, 
t Mr. Webster (as do some other grammarians) discards the pos- 
sessive or relative case of the pronoun ; but on scarce any sub- 
ject do we consider him more unsound than he is in his reasonings 
upon this. We will adduce his remarks and some of the ex- 
amples he has cited. He says " That mine, thine, his, yours, 



PHILOSOPHICAL GRAMMAR. 99 

and these terms, when applied to pronouns, mean the 
same as when applied to nouns. To avoid repetition 

hers, and theirs, do not constitute a possessive case is demon- 
strable ; for they are constantly used as the nominatives to 
verbs and as the objectives after verbs and prepositions, as in 
the following passages. 1. Whether it could perform its 
operations of thinking and memory out of a body organized 
as ours is. 2. You may imagine what kind of faith theirs 
was. 3. The reason is that his subject is generally things; 
theirs on the contrary is persons. 4. Having good works 
enough of your own besides to ensure yours and their immor- 
tality. 5. Your lot and mine in this respect have been very dif- 
ferent. It is," he says " needless to multiply proofs. We ob- 
serve these pretended possessives uniformly used as nominatives 
or objectives. To say that in these passages, ours, theirs, 
and mine, form a possessive case, is to make the possessive 
perform the office of a nominative case to verbs and an objective 
case after verbs and prepositions — a manifest solecism." 

In reply, we in the first place deny that 4 these possessives 
are used as nominatives or objectives,' and out of his own 
mouth will we prove it. In the second place we shall show that 
they are real not pretended possessives. He says, (Rule 1.) 
" The verb must agree with its nominative in number and 
person." 

Now does he not condemn or contradict himself when he 
says ours in the first example is nominative to is ; theirs in the 
second to was, and in the third, to is? plural pronouns nomina- 
tive case to singular verbs ! Again, pronouns are in the same 
case that the noun for which they stand would be in the same 
place. In the first example ours is substituted for man's, l out 
of a body organized as mans is.' Here, according to his own 
testimony, man's is in both the possessive and the nominative 
case, which he says is ' a manifest solecism V 

In the second place these pronouns are in the possessive (or 
relative) case He asks in a triumphant tone " Is the last ex- 
ample an evidence that mine is in the possessive case." In the 
same tone vve reply, Yes, for if it is not in the possessive case 
relating to lot understood, then it is in the nominative case and 
means a mine. i Your lot and mine {of ore) in^his respect have 
been very different.' But that is not the meaning, it means 
your lot and mine lot have been very different. Is it said that 
we do not use mine as mine lot; Very well, what of that ? We 
do not say a eel, a oyster, an log, an man ; but does that prove 
that a and an are not essentially the same ? We change an 
into a before a consonant for the sake of euphony or ease of 
utterance ; for the same reason we change her into hers, your 
into yours, their into theirs, <&c. when the noun is omitted. We 



100 AN ANALYTICAL AND 

it is here remarked, that whatever is said of nouns ap- 
plies also to pronouns, unless something indicates to 
the contrary. 

do not, it is true, say — your lot and mine lot, nor, your lot and 
my, but your lot and mine, or your lot and my lot. Yet that 
mine and my are essentially the same and in the same case is 
evident; for they are often used in alike manner. { Mine an- 
swer to them that do examine me is this.' '•My answer would 
be a blow.' 4 My son forget not my law but let thine heart 
keep my commandments.' 4 Bind them about thy neck; write 
them upon the table of thine heart.' Again, these pronouns are 
in the relative or possessive case because they indicate a relation 
between the objects represented by themselves and a following 
noun. It is in vain to say there is no noun understood, or that 
they are substituted for the noun understood. That there is a 
noun understood is manifest, not only from the fact that the 
verb takes its number from the noun understood, but because 
there is no sense unless a noun is supplied. True we do not 
use the same form of the pronoun when the noun is inserted as 
when not, but that does not change the nature of the case, 4 My 
and yours are kin'; what sense does this make ? none at all. 
4 My sword and yours are kin ;' this makes sense, but what are 
the things that are kin ? my sword and your dog ; no, but it is 
4 my sword and your sword ' The thing once mentioned must 
be understood as the thing referred to ; or if not, then the noun 
referred to must be inserted. ' My house and your store are 
alike.' It will not do to omit store and say 4 my house and 
yours are alike,' because the noun once mentioned is always un- 
derstood in such a case. * My house and yours' would be 4 my 
house and your house, not store. 

It is said that yours, theirs, &c. are substitutes for the noun 
understood, this we deny ; " pronouns or substitutes must agree 
with the names they represent in number, gender and person." 
(W's. Gr. Rule JO) Now if in the first example 4 a body organ- 
ized as ours is,' ours is a substitute for body, then a plural pro- 
noun is a substitute for a singular noun, which cannot be. 
f What kind of faith theirs was ;' theirs is plural while faith is 
singular. 

Again, these pronouns cannot be substitutes for the following 
noun, because they have an office of their own to perform at the 
same time ; and as in military, so in language, one cannot do 
duty for himself and be a substitute for another at the same 
time. Besides, the same is true in regard to nouns in the rela- 
tive case, as in regard to pronouns. In the example 4 a body or- 
ganized as ours is,' if ours is a substitute, then man 's would be, 
m 4 a body organized as man's is ;' a position which is not tena- 



PHILOSOPHICAL GRAMMAR. 



101 



First. 



Second. ■ 



Sin. X. 


Plural. 


It, 


They, 


Its, 


Their,Theirs, 


It. 


Them. 



Person. Case, Singular. Plural. 

(Sub. I, We, 

I Rel. My, Mine, Ours, Our, 

( Obj. Me. Us. 

' Sub. Thou,* You, Ye, You, 

Rel. Thy, Thine, Your, Your,Yours, 

Yours, 
Obj. Thee, You. You. 

Sin. M. Sin. F. 

(Sub. He, She, 
Third. { Rel. His, Her,Hers, 
( Obj. Him. Her. 

All per- ( Sub - Who > 
sons and < Rel. Whose, 
numbers. ( Obj. Whom. 

One, other, and another, are sometimes pronouns, 
and are varied like nouns : as one, one's, oned ; 
other, other's, or others', others. Another Another's. 

Self is sometimes joined to the pronouns to denote 
emphasis; they are then varied like nouns, and have 
the same case that a noun would in the same situation, 

ble. Neither mans nor ours can be a substitute for man's body 
or our body, unless it can be proved that a thing is greater than 
itself. To conclude ; a correct explanation of the idiom is that 
the sense, euphony and ease of utterance require that the pro- 
noun in such cases should have the suspensive quantity ; and 
the termination is changed to favor this prolonged utterance. 
In confirmation of this, it may be observed, that when the pro- 
noun of the relative case ends with a smooth flowing sound it 
is not changed ; as thine, mine, whose, <&c. The same is true 
of nouns; we say 'conscience' sake,' not 4 conscience's sake,' 
" eagle's wings ' not l eagles's wings.' Further, mine and 
thine are the true possessives from which by abridgment my and 
thy have been formed for the sake of euphony, an additional 
evidence that s is added to their, your, &c. for the sake of 
sound and not sense. 

* Thou, thy, thine, thee and ye are not used in familiar 
language, but are called the solemn style, because used only in 
discourse. 

9* 



102 AN ANALYTICAL AND 

no regard being paid to the case of the pronoun com- 
bined. Myself, himself, itself, yourself, your- 
selves, themselves, ourselves. They are used in the 
subjective and objective cases, but never in the rela- 
tive. 

Definers that are not varied like pronouns are not 
called pronouns if their noun is omitted, but ' definers 
parsed as nouns, the noun being omitted.' 

" Every object which presents itself to the senses or intel- 
lect, is either then perceived for the first time, or else is rec- 
ognized as having been perceived before. In the former case 
it is called an object of the first knowledge or acquaintance ; in 
the latter it is called an object of the second knowledge or ac- 
quaintance. Now as all conversation passes between particu- 
lars, or individuals, these will often happen to be reciprocally, 
objects of the first knowledge or acquaintance; that is to say, 
till that instant unacquainted with each other. What then is to 
be done ? How shall the speaker address the other, when he 
knows not his name? or how explain himself by his own name 
of which the other is ignorant ? Nouns, as they have been 
described, cannot answer the purpose. The first expedient 
upon this occasion seems to have been pointing or indication by 
the finger or hand, some traces of which are still to be observ- 
ed, as a part of that action which naturally attends our speak- 
ing. But the authors of language were not content with this. 
They invented a race of words to supply this pointing ; which 
words, as they always stood for substantives or nouns, were 
characterized by the name of pronouns. 

These also they distinguished into three several sorts, calling 
them pronouns of the first, the second, and the third person, 
with a view to certain distinctions which may be explained as 
follows. Suppose the parties conversing to be wholly unac- 
quainted, neither name nor countenance on either side, known, 
and the subject of the conversation, to be the speaker himself. 
Here to supply the place of pointing by a word of equal power 
they furnished the speaker with the pronoun I. I write, I say, 
I desire, &e. and as the speaker is always principal with respect 
to his own discourse, this they called for that reason, the pro- 
noun of the first person. Again, suppose the subject of the con- 
versation to be the party addressed. Here for similar reasons they 
invented the pronoun thou. Thou writest, Thou walkedst, 
&c. and as the party addressed is next in dignity to the speaker, 
or at least comes next with reference to the discourse ; this 
pronoun they therefore called the pronoun of the second person. 
Lastly ,suppose the subject of the conversation neither the speak- 
er nor the party addressed, but some third object, different from 



PHILOSOPHICAL GRAMMAR. 103 

Wtk. Here they provided another pronoun. He, She or It, 
which in distinction to the two former, was called the pronoun 
of the third person. 

And thus it was that pronouns came to be distinguished by 
their respective persons. 

As to number the pronoun of each person has it. I has the 
plural we, because there may be many speakers at once of the 
same sentiment; as well as one, who, including himself, speaks 
the sentiment of many. Thou has the plural you, because a 
speech may be spoken to many as well as to one. he has the 
plural they, because the subject of discourse is often many 
at once. 

But though all these pronouns have number, it does not ap- 
pear either in Greek, or Latin or any modern language, that those 
of the first and seeond person carry the distinctions of sex. 
The reason seems to be, that the speaker and hearer being gen- 
erally present to each other, it would have been superfluous to 
have marked by art a distinction which from nature and even 
dress was commonly apparent on both sides. But this does not 
hold with respect to the third person, of whose character and 
distinctions (including sex among the rest) we often know no 
more than what we learn from the discourse. And hence it is 
that in most languages the third person has its genders and that 
even English (which allows its adjectives (definers) no genders 
at all) has in this pronoun the triple distinction of He, She, and 
It. 

The utility of this distinction may be better found in suppos- 
ing it away. Suppose, for example, we should read in history 
these — He caused him to destroy him — and that we were to be 
informed that the He which is here thrice repeated, stood each 
time for something different, that is to say, for a man, for a wo- 
man and for a city, whose names were Alexander, Thais and 
Fersepolis. Taking the pronoun in this manner divested of its 
genders how would it appear which was destroyed ; w 7 hich was 
the destroyer; and which the cause that moved to the des- 
truction? But there are not such doubts when we hear the 
genders distinguished ; when instead of the ambiguous sentence 
He caused him to destroy him, we are told with the proper dis- 
tinctions, that she caused him to destroy it. Then we know 
with certainty what before we could not, that the promoter was 
the woman ; that her instrument was the hero ; and that the 
subject of their cruelty was the unfortunate city." Harris' Her- 
mes, p. 214. 

REMARKS. 

Grammarians in their lists of personal pronouns 
have included the pronoun ' if which is never applied 



104 AN ANALYTICAL AND 

to persons, and omitted ' who l which is always applied 
to persons, (whose excepted,) can they tell why ? 

The Relative pronouns, so called, are who, which, 
and that. These Relatives are also called interroga- 
tives because they are used in asking questions. Is it 
advisable to burden the scholar with t?vo techni- 
cal terms for only three words/ Besides, this and 
that, these and those, and many other words are 
used in asking questions ; should not they also be call- 
ed interrogatives ? 

" The Distributive pronouns are each, every and 
either." Another technical term for three words only ! 

Murray calls ' some, 1 'any,' ' one 1 ' other, 1 (' all 1 and 
e such 1 ) "Indefinite pronouns, because they express 
their subjects in an indefinite or general manner. " 
Webster calls them " Definitive pronouns, because 
they limit the signification of the noun to which they 
refer. " Now as these are directly contrary, one or the 
other of these learned gentlemen must be in the wrong. 
Can Murray name any thing more definite than aZ/and 
such ? Or can Mr. Webster find any thing more in- 
definite than some and any 1 Besides, is not his de- 
finition either useless or incorrect ? for do not all pro- 
nouns limit the signification of the noun to which they 
refer ? 

" The Demonstrative pronouns are this and that, 
these and those. 11 This class of pronouns compre- 
hends four words, and they are all adjectives I (or 
definers.) 

For further remarks upon the pronouns see the fol- 
lowing, from The Scholar's Quarterly Journal, by 
Emerson Davis, A. M. 

" Murray divides pronouns into three classes, per- 
sonal, relative, and adjective. The distinguishing 
character of a pronoun is that it is used instead of a 
noun. Those which are used instead of the names of 
persons are called personal pronouns. It is never 
used instead of a person's name, and is not therefore 



PHILOSOPHICAL GRAMMAR. 105 

a personal pronoun ; they is often referred to things 
and is not personal. If it be said there are other rea- 
sons for calling some words personal, other difficulties 
arise equally objectionable. Some pronouns are call- 
ed relative, because they relate to a word going before 
called the antecedent; and so do all pronouns relate 
to a word or phrase going before which may be called 
their antecedents. What is the difference then be- 
tween a personal and relative pronoun? Writers 
upon English grammar have not told us. There seems 
to be good reason, therefore, for adopting the opinion 
of Cardell, and naming this class of words, pronouns 
simply. The term Adjective pronoun is no less ob- 
jectionable. Give me that book. That is called an 
adjective pronoun, and must therefore have the pro- 
perty of an adjective and a pronoun. It has the pro- 
perty of a pronoun so far as it is used instead of a noun. 
What noun then is that, in the above sentence, used 
instead of? Why not call this class of words adjec- 
tives ?" 

We will mention only one thing more, and which 
may be called the beauty of the scheme. Murray, and 
others, not only divide the pronouns into the several 
classes above named, but they apply several names to 
each class : as ' Indefinite adjective pronouns ;• * De- 
monstrative adjective pronouns ;' * Interrogative rela- 
tive pronouns', &c. Now as these terms are very 
euphonic, let us see if we cannot unite more of 
them, especially since the classes of words to which 
they are applied are so very large ! containing two 
and three words! They surely should be duly repre- 
sented. * What do you want V ' What, when used 
in asking questions is an interrogative relative pro- 
noun/ This is called a demonstrative adjective pro- 
noun. Now substituting this for what (to which 
there can be no objection,) as ' This, do you want V 



106 AN ANALYTICAL AND 

we have This an interrogative relative demonstrative 
adjective pronoun ! 

By consulting Webster we might get one more title 
as he calls this an article. Surely the little word this 
with all these titles strung to it, must feel as proud 
as some modern literary gentlemen with their one 
and twenty initials. 



DEFINERS.* 

Definers are words used to define other 
words : as, A red coat. The black horse. 
Birds fly swiftly. 

Define is to limit, point out, or describe. 

* It will be seen and objected, that we have classed c articles' 
' adjectives' and 'adverbs' all under the term ' definers;' thus 
breaking up a long established and well founded distinction of 
the parts of speech. To this we reply that the distinction, 
though long established, is not well founded. In support of 
this we advance the following. 

' Articles' we reject because their use is precisely like that of 
other definers, and because we can find no sufficient reason for 
making or retaining them a distinct class of words. And in re- 
jecting them as a l part of speech' we think we cannot justly 
be charged with taking unwarranted liberty, so long as Webster 
and Cardell (as good authority as can be produced) both ex- 
clude them. The following are Webster's remarks. u Jin or a 
and the are never employed as substitutes, but are constantly 
attached to some name or an equivalent word ; and from their 
peculiar use have obtained the distinctive appellation of articles. 
But definitive is a more significant and appropriate term, as they 
are definitive attributes^ and have, grammatically considered, 
jectives we can by no means approve. To be an attribute, the 
adjective must be inherent in the noun, or adherent to it. But 
it is neither; for the adjective is frequently not joined to a 
noun ; as, Cast steel knives. Russia iron stoves. Five thou- 
sand men. 

t Webster's use of the term attribute, as a substitute for ad- 



PHILOSOPHICAL GRAMMAR. 107 

Definers denoting quantity or quality, signify it in 
different degrees, which are called degrees of compar- 

the like use of this, that, some, none, any, &c." — Webster's 
Grammar. For this very same reason, and we think a suffi- 
cient one, we have called them definers ; which is preferable to 
the term definitive, which is an adjective rather than a noun. 
And further, it saves making a distinct part of speech of two 
words. 

In respect to adjectives and adverbs; we advocate their being 
called definers because they have the same use, and that to de- 
fine ; we reject the terms adverb and adjective, because they 
either include too little, or too much. If they are called adjec- 
tives because they qualify nouns, and adverbs because they 
qualify verbs, then if they qualified neither a noun nor a verb, 
as is often the case, they could not be called either adjectives 
or adverbs ; but another term would be necessary. But if to 
avoid this difficulty, the terms are extended so as to embrace 
those words not strictly included by them, it gives rise to 
another objection equally insurmountable ; for where shall we 
place the dividing line ? We may as well seek for the * philoso- 
pher's stone' which never has nor can be found. And why ? 
Because their use is the same ; and whether we call them adjec- 
tives or adverbs, they alike are joined to nouns, to verbs and to 
one another, indiscriminately. In support of this we will give 
a few examples, and for others refer to Webster's Grammar, 
Rules 18th, 19th, and 20th. 

" Godly man." "He conducts badly." "The heat feels 
uncomfortable." " It is uncomfortable weather." il A hard 
apple." " He struck hard." "It is pleasant to hear the birds 
sing." " It is pleasant weather." " James is sick." " He is 
a very sick man." "I am well." "He is patient." In this 
last example patient is considered an adjective ; but well in the 
one preceding is called an adverb ; can there be any reason 
given for making such a distinction ? " Much grass," here 
much is called an adjective. " Much more grass," here much 
is called an adverb ; is there any justification of it? " Very 
little more wood ;" are these adjectives, or adverbs ? and why, 
or why not? Very is never joined either to a verb or noun 
(except in such elliptic expressions as, " He is the very man" 
" for He is the very same man,") what class then shall very be 
put into ? In the same dilemma are firstly, secondly, yes, no, 
amen, &c. " Slow tolls the village clock, deep mourns the tur- 
tle." " He spoke short and quick." "Let us write slow and 
exact." Adjectives in the dualistic and superlative degrees are 
used to qualify verbs; as, " Her smiles amid the blushes lovelier 
show." " But mercy first and last shall brightest shine." What 



108 AN ANALYTICAL AND 

ison ; as when we say paper is white but snow is whiter. 
They both are white, but one is so in a greater 
degree than the other. Quantity and quality may be 
expressed in many different degrees, but there are 
not but four regular degrees of comparison : as 
blackish, black, blacker, blackest. The other degrees, 
called the variable degrees, are indicated by the sen- 
tence ; or by joining two or more comparing words : 
as * somewhat black/ ' exceedingly black/ ' snow is 
very much whiter than paper.' 

The regular degrees only are named. 
They are the subpositive, positive, dualistic 
and superlative. The subpositive degree 
denotes the quantity or quality in a partial 
or subordinate degree. Whitish, reddish, 
roughish. 

The Positive degree simply denotes the 
quality without excess or deficiency : as 
large, small. 

The Dualistic degree denotes an excess 
of the quality in one thing above it in 
another : as larger, smaller, whiter, blacker. 



shall we call these, adjectives, or adverbs, or adjective-adverbs ? 
These are some of the difficulties that attend the distinction of 
these words into two classes. But call them definers, and all diffi- 
culties disappear. And we would inquire what objection there can 
be to calling them definers, except that it would interfere with 
the obstinate prejudice of some ? Some grammarians, to remove 
the objections, have called them qualifiers and modifiers, but 
they might as well have called them adjectives and adjectives, 
for the terms are so nearly synonymous that were they inter- 
changed, it would make no material difference. There is no 
part of grammar that causes learners more difficulty than to 
tell adjectives from adverbs ; and this is not to be wondered at 
so long as Grammarians cannot tell the difference. 



PHILOSOPHICAL GRAMMAR. 109 

The Superlative degree denotes that the 
quality in the one thing exceeds it in any of 
the other things compared : as largest, 
smallest, blackest, whitest. 

When two things only are compared, the dualistic 
decree must always be used : and it may be used when 
more than two things are compared, if there are but 
two degrees of comparison. George is the tallest 
man in the company, but I have seen many men tall- 
er than he. 

The superlative degree must never be used when 
there are not more than two things compared ; yet it 
may be used when there are not but two degrees of 
comparison. They are all tall, but James is the 
tallest* 

The degrees of comparison are all used relatiue 7 y, that is, we 
say a thing is black only in relation to a thing that is not 
black ; and a thing can be blackish or blacker only in reference 
to a thing that is black. 

The degrees of comparison being made relatively, the dualis- 
tic degree may exceed absolutely the superlative degree. Ten 
is a greater number than two ; and of the numbers two, four, 
and six, six is the greatest. Here we see that the greater num- 
ber ten exceeds the greatest number six. Solomon was the 
icisest man that ever lived. Solon was the wisest man that 
ever lived in Greece, Here the same definer is used and in 
the same degree ; yet there may be a great difference between 
the wisdom of the two men. The degree of the latter is varied 
by the clause ' in Greece.' 

Brackish, little brackish, quite brackish. Nearly perfect, 
quite perfect, perfect, quite perfect, very perfect, more perfect, 
most perfect. Blackish, somewhat blackish, little blackish, 
little black, rather black, very black, much more black, real 
black, extremely exceedingly perfectly black, little blacker, 
much blacker, very much blacker, blackest, little the blackest, 
much the blackest, the very blackest possible. These will 
serve as specimens of the. variable degrees which are almost 
infinite in variety. 

The degrees of regular comparison are formed in 
three ways. 

10 



110 AN ANALYTICAL AND 

1st. By adding to the positive ish for the subpos- 
itive ; r or cr for the dualistic ; st or est for the su- 
perlative. P. Black; S-P. blackish; D. blacker; S. 
blackest. 

2nd. By placing more before the positive to form 
the dualistic, and most for the superlative ; the sub- 
positive is wanting. P. handsome ; D. more hand- 
some; S. most handsome. 

3d. By a change of words. P. good ; D. better ; 
S. best. P. bad ; D. worse ; S. worst. P. much ; 
D. more; S. most. 

Some words, as you see, do not take the subpositive 
degree. 

Some definers from their natures are not compared ; 
as omnipotent, eternal, supreme, causeless, change- 
less, this, that, which, and numerals, as one, two, 
three, first, second, third, &x. 

Many definers may be used together, either defining 
one another, or referring directly to the noun. A 
little old white man. These all refer to man. A very 
deep blue colored silk ribbon. Very defines deep ; 
deep, blue; and blue colored; a, colored, and silk, 
define ribbon. 

The following is a list of a few definers that have 
heretofore been improperly classed among other parts 
of speech. The first half of them are principally 
clausal definers. 

Wherefore, therefore, whereof, wherein, herein, 
whereby, thereby, thereof, therein, heretofore, hith- 
erto, hereafter, already, otherwise, however, moreover, 
instead, because, likewise, also, else, yea, nay, yes, 
no, amen, anon, namely, surely, why, where, there, 
whence, thence, when, then, here, hence, while, nev- 
er, so, as, rather, than, not, more, much, either, nei- 
ther, or, nor ; and most, if not all of those formerly 
called adverbs. 



PHILOSOPHICAL GRAMMAR. Ill 



Remarks on the Articles, 
Additional to the note on definers, page 106. 

The two definers an or a and the, have hitherto been separa- 
ted from the other definers, and made a distinct class. But 
their use is the same of the other definers and the definitions 
of them as given by grammarians is as applicable to others as 
to them. 

"An article is a word prefixed to nouns to point them out, 
and to show how far their significations extends." The use of 
all definers is, Ho show how far the signification of other words 
extends ;' hence, there is no difference between thern. It is said 
that articles are prefixed to nouns ; but that is not always the 
case ; as * The sooner you do it the better.' 

" An or a is called the indefinite article,' because it is used to 
point out one single thing of a kind, in other respects indetermi- 
nate ; as Give me a book." This is the common definition; 
but what does it mean? what is it that is indeterminate? is it 
the book or the kind of book, or is it the article itself? Any- 
one examining this definition will find it an indefinite article 
truly ! How can that which is pointed out be indeterminate ? 
But it is indeterminate \ in other respects ;' than what ? To de- 
cide this we must ascertain in what respects it is determinate, 
*.t is said that " it is used to point out one single thing ;" hence, 
its use cannot be to show that one or single thing is meant for 
that is predetermined. It must mean then that it points out a 
thing, in other respects indeterminate ; that is, in other respects 
than the pointing out. Give me a book — is book a thing inde- 
terminate, uncertain or unknown, except when pointed out by 
a? How does a point it out and make it determinate? Let 
those decide who can see through a mill stone. What is meant 
by point out ? Harris in his Hermes says, " A leaves the indi- 
viduals unascertained, whereas the article the ascertains the in- 
dividual also." The only conclusion we can draw is that, A 
points out a thing, that is, leaves it unascertained ! 

Lowth, in his grammar, says " A determines it to be one sin- 
gle thing of the kind, leaving it still uncertain which." When 
Lowth commenced his Grammar, thus, " A short introduction 
to English Grammar," did he mean to be understood according 
to his rule, that he wrote one introduction of the kind, but it was 
uncertain which? " A battle between the English and Ameri- 
cans was fought at Lexington in 1775." Is it uncertain or in- 
determinate what battle is meant? If it is said other words de- 
termine that, the reply is, how then does a point it out ? and 
how can it be said that battle is in other respects indeterminate ? 



112 AN ANALYTICAL ANI> 

Does a point out one single thing of a kind ? c A horse likes 
grain' — does this mean one single horse ? does it not rather 
mean all horses generally ? If pointing out 4 a single thing of 
a kind without determining which' constitutes a an ' article,' 
are not some, one, any, &c. entitled to the same name for the 
same reason ? 

Grammarians say that, " a becomes an belore a vowel, or 
silent A;" but the truth is a never becomes an, but an becomes 
a. For an or ane is the original Saxon word ; it means one, 
and the n is dropped before consonants for the sake of euphony. 

" The is called the definite article ; because it points out what 
particular thing of the kind is meant; as Give me the book." 
Substitute this or that ? as, Give me this book. — Hand me that 
book. Do not this, and that, point out a particular book, as 
much as the does ? Are they not then deserving of the same 
title ? ' The christian expects the coming of his Lord.' Is 
any particular christian meant ? * How long will it be ere you 
will exclaim, The summer is past, the harvest is ended, and my 
soul is not saved?' Is the the in this sentence a definite arti- 
cle ? Says Cardell — " The least definite of all defining adjec- 
tives, is the word the. It is of general use where it is not nec- 
essary to be very specific, or a sufficient idea of the thing exists, 
to answer the purpose of ordinary communication ; as a person 
at evening says, u The stars appear to night." How many, or 
what stars appear, must depend on something more definite to 
explain. l The wind blows.' ' The camel is a beast of burden/ 
' The wolves were heard howling in the woods.'' " New York 
was evacuated by the British army, and re-occupied by the 
Americans, Nov. 25th, 1783."— Gr. p. 40. 

What has been said, will show the errors, and absurdities 
into which grammarians have run, for the want of due reflect 
tion, 



PHILOSOPHICAL GRAMMAR. 113 



RELATIVES.* 

Relatives are words used to show the re- 
lation of one thing to another : such as above, 
below, to, from, with, &c. 

" There must be two sides to a relation ; we never 
use the word above without speaking of something as 
being above, and it must be above something else as a 
matter of course, whether it is barely above the ground, 
or 'above these heavens to us invisible or dimly seen.' — 
CardelL " Thou shalt not make unto thee any grav- 
en image, or any likeness of any thing that is in heav- 
en above ( ), or that is in the earth beneath ( ), or that 
is in the water under the earth." 

An action, or circumstance may constitute one side 
of the relation : as " I see clearly through this day's 
business." " My Lords, you seem impatient for the 
sacrifice." 

The noun which precedes or follows a relative, is 
frequently omitted : as I shot (the shot) above the 
mark. I threw (the ball) over his head. Peter went 
in (the house.) He walked to ( ) and fro ( ) up ( ) 
and down the earth. Lift your axe up ( ). The bail 
is up a great distance in the air. How came it up 

* That the term c relative' is more appropriately applied 
to this class of words, than to that to which it has hitherto 
been, is obvious. It is necessary to a perfect definition, that 
it perfectly distinguishes the thing defined from every thing 
else. But the term ' preposition' is as applicable to the words 
called l articles' and 4 adjectives,' as to those called ( prepositions.' 
For the adjectives are generally, and the articles ahcays placed 
before the noun to which they refer. And by many writers, 
the preposition more frequently than the adjective is placed 
after its noun. The term relative, as heretofore used, is 
equally applicable to all pronouns as to those to which it has 
been applied. (See remarks on the pronouns, p. 103.) The ap- 
plication of the term to the class of words to which it is here 
given, is not only appropriate, but ensures uniformity of princi- 
ple in naming the different parts of speech. 

10* 



114 AN ANALYTICAL AND 

is up a great distance in the air. How came it up 
there ? I threw it up ( ). ' Come to/ ' heave to/ 
' cast up/ ' bear on.' " Hence, if our thoughts have 
nothing to act upon ( ), they act upon ourselves." 

" I told the man who is painting my house to put on a good 
coat of white lead." Every person of ordinary sense under- 
stands that the workman was to put the paint on the house. 

If we speak of a man's taking his hat off, or putting his boots 
on, there is no need of being very particular about objective 
words. Children will readily find them, if books and teachers 
will allow them to use their reason ; and they are not likely to 
mistake in supposing that the man takes his hat off his feet, or 
puts his boots on his head. There is no need, therefore, of " ad- 
verb conjunctions,'' or u postpositive prepositions,'' to explain 
this prevailing structure in expressing the relation of things. 
It is the business of grammar rightly conducted, to teach two 
things : first, the complete and undisguised construction of words 
in a sentence, and second, how far it is allowable to abridge or 
modify this structure in practice." Cardell. 

The relative is frequently omitted before nouns of 
time and place : as He came ( ) home. He came ( ) 
here. He ran ( ) a mile. He staid ( ) hour. 

The relative is frequently placed between a predica- 
tive and its object, its own objective case being omit- 
ted : Put on ( ) your hat ; take off your coat ; that is, 
Put your hat on your head; take your coat of your 
bach. 

Two or more relatives are frequently placed togeth- 
er : as " All the region round about Jordan." " And 
the cloud was taken up from over the tabernacle." 
" Aaron's sons shall sprinkle the blood round about 
upon the altar." 

The relatives are a species of definers, and often 
used as such : — When we say a thing is fore or aft 
the mast \ fore and aft are relatives; but when we 
say the fore end, or aft end of a thing, they are defin- 
ers. l The dog followed after his master :' here after 
is a relative. ' He was asleep in the after part of the 
ship / here it is a definer. 

After is the dualistic degree of aft. 



PHILOSOPHICAL GRAMMAR. 



115 



He was at the house ; he was near the house ; 
at and near are relatives. So, John went near the 
fire, James went nearer ( ), but William went the 
nearest ( ). Here near has three degrees of com- 
parison, yet is a relative. John was in near connec- 
tion with the fire, James was in a nearer connection, 
but William was in the nearest connection. Here 
near has the same degrees of comparison, but is a 
definer. 

" Up, upper, uppermost, are definers in three degrees 
of comparison, as much as high, higher, highest, and 
the difference in their meaning is very slight. So we 
have in, inner, inmost ; out, outer, outmost, or utmost. 
The relatives, like definers, are compared by adding 
definers or other relatives ; as very far above or be- 
yond, directly against, entirely through, exactly over ; 
the child was close by or very near its mother." 

Car dell. 



The following list contains nearly all the relatives 
in our language, with their primary signification. 



About, around, near. 
Above, over, higher. 
Across, over from side to side. 
Aboard, on or in (a ship ) 

4ft' ] behind, later. 
After, 5 

Against, opposite, meeting. 
Aloft, on high, up. 
Along, by the length, length- 
wise. 
Amid, ) in the middle, 
Amidst, ) among. 

Among, > united or mingled 
Amongst, ) with. 

Around, ) encircling, encom- 
Round, 5 passing. 

Astride, straddling. 
At, by, near to, in. 
Athwart, across, transverse. 
Before, in front, preceding. 



Behind, in the rear, remaining. 
Beloiv, lower, farther down. 
Beneath, under, lower. 
Beside, at the side. 
Besides, more than. 
Between. } . *.- 

Betwixt, J intermediate. 

Beyond, at a distance, farther 
off. 

By, being, near, contiguous. 

Down, off an elevation. 

Ere, before. 

For, cause, purpose. 

From, beginning, offspring, or- 
igin, source. 

In, surrounded. 

Into, termination in. 

Like, resembling. 

JYio-h S a ^ most » not f ar °ff- 



116 



AN ANALYTICAL AND 



Of, procession from origin, 
object. 

Off, awajv removed from. 

On, contiguity with an up- 
per surface. 

Ocer, above, upon, across. 

Opjwsite, in front, facing, ad- 
verse. 

Out, not within, exterior. 

Round, encircling. 

Since, after, later, seeing. 

To, end, termination. 

Th "5 passage internal 

iiL j, > from side to side 

Through, i . . , 

° ' 3 or end to end. 



Throughout, completely, 

through. 
Under, beneath, below. 
Underneath, under, having 

something above. 
Up, top, above. 
Upon, on top. 
Unlike, not resembling. 
Unto, even, to. 
Until, ) : 
Till, J to, even to. 

With, being in connection. 
Within, in, interior, internal. 
Without, not in connection, ex- 
terior. 
Worth, equal to in value. 



PREDICATIVES.* 

A Predicative is a word used to predicate 
i. e. to express some fact command or re- 
quest, as They go. Go. Will you go ? 

Predicatives are the predicating words expressing whatever 
is said or predicated, in whatever form or manner. 



* It is with much reluctance that we lay aside terms which 
have been so long established and so interwoven into our lan- 
guage, as those of verbs and participles. But we have done it 
not from a love of change for novelty's sake, but for imperious 
reasons. These reasons are too many and lengthy to be stated 
here ; and we trust many of them, without enumeration, will 
be manifest to the candid investigator. The common use of the 
word ' verb,' conveys no idea of its technical use. The only 
recommendation the term has, is its brevity. But it is said that 
verbs should be so called by way of eminence, because they are 
the most important. But that is a mistake ; nouns or names, 
must be allowed the precedence both in time and importance. 

The terms ' affirmer' and l asserter' are too specific. We 
could wish for a shorter term than the one we have chosen, but 
our language does not afford one that will signify the simple 
and general idea to express. Besides, the term we have selected, 



PHILOSOPHICAL GRAMMAR. 117 

not only conveys the desired idea, with philosophic accuracy, 
but also affords a happy facility in appropriately naming the 
two species or subdivisions, the nominal predicative and predi- 
cate. That these distinctions should be made, and should hold 
the rank we have assigned them, we think must be obvious to 
any one. For the words embraced in them are plainly too dif- 
ferent from the genuine predicatives, to hold an equal rank and 
title with them, and too like them to have their claim to rela- 
tionship rejected. Well then, allowing them their proper rank, 
what titles shall we give them ? We need not spend time to 
prove that the term l participle' is very objectionable and should 
be rejected 

The verb in the 'infinitive mode' should not be so called, 
because the distinctions of i mode' are not necessary, and be- 
cause its distinction from other verbs does not depend upon the 
i infinitive' manner of its use, but upon its very nature, and 
should be named accordingly. As it partakes of the nature of 
both l verb' and * noun,' and as the former predominates, it 
should not be called a l verbal noun' nor the ' noun's verb,' but 
a ' noun verb,' or as our term exactly expresses it, a l nominal 
predicative.' 

Divisions of the Predicatives. 

The predicatives have generally been divided into three 
kinds: the Active or Transitive ; the Neuter or Intransitive; 
and the Passive or Receptive. Let us consider these distinc- 
tions. Of the defects of the definitions, which different gram- 
marians have given to these terms, it is not our purpose now to 
speak. We intend only to consider the general distinctions 
according to the obvious ideas of grammarians in making them; 
viz., that the Transitive verb denotes action performed by its 
subject, and terminating upon something else as the object; as 
James struck William. Cesar conquered Pompey. 

The Intransitive verb denotes action performed by or in its 
subject, and not affecting any other object : as We are, They 
live, We run, He walks. 

The Receptive verb denotes action not performed by its sub- 
ject, but by something else, and which terminates upon the 
subject or object : as, John is convinced, James was struck. 

We will first consider what the difference is between the first 
two. 4 James struck William ;' here the verb is said to be 
transitive. 'James struck at William but did not hit him,' 
here it is called intransitive. We run, (intransitive ) We run 
our horses, (transitive.) The horses run themselves, (intransi- 
tive.) Birds fly, (intransitive.) Boys fly their kites, (transi- 
tive.) Ttie rope-dancer stands upon a rope, (intransitive.) 
The farmer stands his grain up in the field, (transitive.) He 



118 AN ANALYTICAL AND 

set his bundle down, (transitive,) and sat down upon it, (intrans- 
itive.) Having set things in order, (transitive,) he set out from 
home, (intransitive.) They set the armies in array, (transitive.) 
He set himself in opposition to the will of God, (intransitive.) 

Can any scholar perceive, or any grammarians tell the differ- 
ence between the verbs in each of these couplets ? Can any 
one explain why one should be transitive and the other intrans- 
itive ? Will not the one take if necessary an object after it, as 
readily as the other? We say yes. Is there any difference 
in their nature ? We hesitate not to positively say no. The 
verb is precisely the same whether we say, I We run the horses' 
or l The horses run themselves.' The action is the same, the 
object is the same, and the actor is the same. And as to the cause, 
if it is the horses in the one case and the persons in the other, 
it does not alter the verb at all. The horses must in both cases 
be acquiescent, for no person can cause a horse to run, if the 
horse will not run. And besides, if persons cause a horse to 
run there is always something that causes the persons to cause 
the horse to run, so that there can be nothing in the cause, 
which alters the nature of the verb. For, it is immaterial to 
the verb or action, whether the horse is induced to perform the 
act of running by something which he desires, or by something 
that he hates, as a whipping ; or in other words, whether he acts 
in obedience to his own will alone, or in obedience to his will 
controlled by the will of another. The case is the same with 
all the other verbs. There is no difference in the verb 
whether a man sets an army in opposition ; or sets his own 
will in opposition ; or sets himself in opposition ; or wheth- 
er some one sets him in opposition. But perhaps some 
will say that in the example 'He sets himself,' &c the verb 
is transitive. If so, then all the above verbs are transitive 
and should be so denominated. From the foregoing we 
may see that there is no difference in the nature of the verbs. 
Perhaps it will be said that the distinction is not in the nature, 
but in the use of the verbs ; and that when the object is omitted 
the verb is intransitive, and when not, it is transitive. If this 
is true, then all verbs are both transitive and intransitive. We 
say ' Cesar conquered Pompey ;' l he saw the Pyramids.' Cesar 
says l ls720,' ^conquered.' 'James struck William;' James 
struck at William. They walk their horses, their horses walk. 
Run a race, Sleep a sleep, &c. and so on. Some pretend that 
the distinction lies in the form of the verb. Say Murray, Smith, 
&c. " In the phrases, To dream a dream, To live a life, To 
run a race, To walk the horse, To dance the child, — the verbs 
certainly assume a transitive form, and may not improperly be 
denominated transitive verbs." But any verb may take after 
it the name of the actaVm, and thus all verbs would be transitive. 
They say the verb assumes a transitive form. But what was 



PHILOSOPHICAL GRAMMAR. 119 

its form before ? has it changed its form in the least ? Certain- 
ly not. It is precisely the same with or without the objective 
case. How then can a person not destitute of reason or con- 
science, say that a thing has assumed another form when it 
has not changed its form one iota ! But others deny that such 
verbs are transitive, because the noun after them is not the ob- 
ject of the action, but the name of it, and hence do not come un- 
der the definition of a transitive verb. Grant it, and what 
follows ? It is allowed that such verbs as the following are 
transitive ; Write a letter, Make a pen, Build a house, Make a 
cart, &c. They certainly come under the definition of a trans- 
itive verb, for they express action which terminates upon some 
object. But if a verb that does not take after it a noun denoting 
the object is not transitive, then these verbs are not. For a ' pen' 
or a i cart,' is not the object of the act of making ; because we 
cannot make a thing that is already made. But is it said that 
'these nouns denote the result of the action, and that a verb which 
represents the action as producing an effect or result must be 
transitive ?' Grant it. The same reasoning will prove that the 
verbs in ■ Live a life, Run a race, Dream a dream,' &c. are 
transitive ; for l life,' ' rsce,' 4 dream,' &c. are the result of the 
several actions denoted by the verbs. — Will not a consideration 
of the above convince any one that there is no difference be- 
tween transitive and intransitive verbs. That they are alike in 
nature, form, and use ; that we irrespectively insert or omit the 
object after them, not according to their being transitive or in- 
transitive, but according as the nature of the case may require. 
That when we say, c birds fly,' we omit the object, not because 
there is anything in the verb that prevents its insertion, but be- 
cause it is not necessary. And when we say ' Boys fly,' we in- 
sert the object, not because the verb requires it, but because if 
not inserted we should not know whether it is meant that Boys 
fly their kites ; or fly (themselves) to the assistance of their 
comrades; or, fly (themselves) about like a top. 

We will now consider the Passive or Receptive verb. 
Some grammarians use one of these term? and some the other ; 
but it is evident that neither of them is sufficient to cover the 
whole ground to which they are applied. For instance, in 
He was enraged, I am forced to go, He was compelled to 
to submit, &c. the verb cannot properly come under the term 
passive; and if the term receptive is substituted, then such 
verbs as in He is dead, He was learned, They were en- 
camped, She was seated, I am resolved, &c. do not come 
under that term any more than He is dying, He was learning, 
They were encamping, She was sitting, &c. So that which- 
ever term is adopted, it proves inadequate to the purpose de- 
signed. 

But wherein does the Passive or Receptive verb differ from 



120 AN ANALYTICAL AND 

the Transitive or Intransitive ? 1. She sits by her little sister, 
(I.) 2. She is seated by her little sister, (R.) 3. He became enraged 
by his treatment, (1.) 4. He was enraged by his treatment, (R.) 
5. Two men had engaged in argument, (I .) 6. Two men were en- 
gaged in argument, (R.) 7. He stands condemned, (I.) 8. He is 
condemned, (R.) 10. He is, (I.) 11. He is dead, (R). Jn the first 
and second examples the two verbs denote the very same act, 
performed by the very same person. Now, who can tell why 
the second should not be called intransitive- as much as the 
first ; or why the first is not as much passive as the second? 
It is an impossibility for a person to be both passive and not 
passive at the same time. Therefore if one of the verbs is 
passive they both are ; and if one is not neither of them is. 
Again, which of them is receptive, and which not? » She' in 
both cases performed the act herself and did not receive any 
effect from any extraneous cause. Is then either of the verbs 
receptive ? if so, why ? As the act is precisely the same in 
both cases, then if one verb is receptive the other is, and if one 
is not the other is not ; because it would be false to say she 
received an action, and did not receive it, at the same time, in 
the fifth and sixth examples why is one passive or receptive 
and the other not, the same thing being expressed by both ? 
And in the seventh and ninth, why is not c stand condemned' 
as much passive as ' is condemned'? A thing and its opposite 
both cannot be true at once, therefore if the same action is ex- 
pressed by two verbs having the same l subject;' that subject 
cannot be the agent and not the agent, nor be the ohject and 
not the object; consequently if 'were engaged' is passive or 
receptive, then ' had engaged' is passive or receptive. And if 
4 had engaged' is passive or receptive, men any intransitive 
verb may be passive or receptive. But if i had engaged' is not 
passive or receptive, then l were engaged' is not. In the tenth 
and eleventh examples c is dead' is no more receptive than c is' 
and as to its being passive, a dead man is no more passive than 
a stone l is'. So in Prepare to meet thy God ; Be prepared to 
meet death ; let him who can, tell the difference. 

Let us now see how the case stands between the transitive 
and receptive. Does the difference consist in the one's taking 
an object after it and the other not ?— They offered him a thou- 
sand dollar salary, (T.) He was offered a thousand dollar sal- 
ary, (R.) (You have asked neios of me.) fc You have asked me 
news a hundred times' — Pope, (T.) He was asked the news a 
hundred times, (R.) Several persons offered him money, (T.) 
He was offered money by several persons, (R.) — From these and 
other similar instances, we see they alike will take the objective 
case after them when necessary. But is it said that the differ- 
ence consists in the subject of the verbs being the agent in 
the one case and not in the other ?— The army had encamped. 



PHILOSOPHICAL GRAMMAR. 121 

(I.) The army were encamped, (R.) He had gone, (1.) He 
was gone, (R.) He was enlisted in the cause, (R.) He had 
enlisted himself and others in the cause, (T.) He engaged in 
the pursuit, (I.) He was engaged in the pursuit, (R.) — From 
such instances we see that the subject of receptive verbs, alike 
with others, may be the agent. 

Perhaps it may be said that the distinction lies in the form of 
the verb. But what manifest distinction is there between the 
form of c has gone' and ' was gone :' ' has convinced' and ' was 
convinced ;' ' will be going' and ' will be gone ?' There is a 
difference, but is it very obvious to an inexperienced person ? 
And besides, such verbs as ' is dead,' * be prepared,' ' was gone,' 
* were engaged,' ' is seated,' &c. have the passive or receptive 
form, yet, as we have shown, are not passive nor receptive 
verbs. How then can the form be a distinguishing mark ? 

From the foregoing remarks, we think it must be manifest to 
every one that the transitive and intransitive verbs being alike 
in nature, alike in form, and alike in use, they are to all intents 
and purposes alike ; and there being no real difference between 
them, none should be made by grammarians. And that kind 
of verbs called passive, many of them not being passive, should 
not therefore have the term ; and if the term receptive is sub- 
stituted, many of them not being receptive, the name is not 
appropriate. And besides, many of them agreeing with other 
verbs in their taking an object after them ; and their subject 
being the agent ; and some of them having the receptive form 
being not receptive, the reasons for distinguishing them from 
others by denominating them either passive or receptive, seem 
to be insufficient for making such a distinction. If one verb 
denotes ' passiveness' or ' the receiving of an action,' and anoth- 
er does not, the difference consists not in the verb but in the 
nature of the case. For, He was suffering, He has suffered, 
indicate 'passion,' 'suffering' or 'receiving an action,' as much 
as He was suffered.* To me it appears to be clear that there 
is no essential distinction between the verbs ; and if there is 
not, then the distinction hitherto made should be rejected, and 
not retained to the embarrassment of the learner. 

* 'The youth was consuming by a slow malady.' 'The 
Martyr was burning at the stake when he cried out.' ' He was 
wasting away with consumption.' Are not these verbs ' pass? 
ive' or 'receptive' if there are any in language? 

For further remarks upon the verb, see the extract from, 
Cardell's Grammar, in the sequel. 



11 



122 AN ANALYTICAL AND 



Tense. 

The only attribute of predicatives is 
tense* 

If a predicative expressed the fact only, it would 
have but one simple form. But in addition to the fact , 
it expresses the time when the fact occured, and 
sometimes several other ideas also. 

* Number, Person and Mode. 

There are many, who, without examining the subject, will de- 
cry the omission from predicatives, of the attributes, Number, 
Person and Mode. But while it has been no object with us to 
make unnecessary innovations, it has been equally remote from 
our purpose to gain the favor of the ignorant and the prejudiced 
by adherence to l the accustomed track,' at the expense of truth 
and utility. The reasons for the omission are briefly given in 
the notes ; and to the intelligent and unprejudiced, after a candid 
consideration of the subject, we are willing to submit the ques- 
tion, and will cheerfuly abide their decision. 

Number and Person. 

If as grammarians state ' The nominative case governs the 
verb in number and person,' then the verb must undergo some 
change to correspond to different numbers and persons of its 
nominative case. But that that is true as a general thing we 
deny. We admit that it is so in some cases, but those are ex- 
ceptions and not the rule, and as such we have pointed them 
out, (p. 140.) The correctness of this position may be seen from 
examples. I will go. You will go. He will go. We will go. 
You will go. They will go. I had written. You had written. 
He had written. We had written. You had written. They 
had written. 1 wrote. You wrote. He wrote. We wrote. 
You wrote. They wrote, &c. These and the majority of pred- 
icatives undergo no alteration whatever to correspond with the 
number and person of their nominative, or to denote those prop- 
erties of themselves. Hence it cannot be said that they have 
number and person. Says Murray, in his Grammar:— "In 
philosophical strictness, both number and person might be en- 
tirely excluded from every verb, They are in fact the prop- 



PHILOSOPHICAL GRAMMAR. 123 

Therefore to represent a thing as past, or as present, 
or as yet to come, we use different/br/rcs of the predi- 



erties of substantives, not a part of the essence of the verb." 
To this every lover of propriety must say, amen. 

Modes. 

In an elementary treatise no technical distinctions should be 
made which are not both essential and clear. Hence, the dis- 
tinction in Grammar of Modes being neither essential nor clear, 
has in this work been omitted. That the distinction is not 
clear is manifest both from an examination of the subject, and 
from the acknowledged fact that u Scarcely two authors agree 
in the number and denomination of the modes." — Webster's 
Grammar. 

We deem it scarcely necessary to advance arguments to show 
that the distinctions of potential, subjunctive and interrogative 
mode are indefinite and false. To a reflecting mind no reason- 
ing is needed to prove that there is no essential difference of 
mode between I may, can, or must go, and I do, will, or shall 
go. Says Webster, " The forms of expression, I can go, we 
may ride, he must obey, are really declaratory, and properly be- 
long to the Indicative (Declarative.) They declare the power 
liberty, or necessity of an action, instead of the action itself." 

" Mode" is said to be " the particular form of the predicative, 
showing the manner in which the being, action, or passion is 
represented." Jtf ut no person can with propriety, or reason, say 
there is any difference in the form, or manner, of those predi- 
catives classed under the potential, and indicative modes. The 
only difference consists in the meaning of the auxiliaries, and if 
the distinction of modes is to be founded on the meaning, then 
there will be as many modes as there are auxiliaries. 

Mr. Webster rejects the potential, while he retains the sub- 
junctive mode ; but the latter is even more absurd than the 
former. The 'subjunctive' or 'conditional' mode, is so called, 
because it is said to represent a thing under a condition, suppo- 
sition, contingency, &c.,but we are told at the same time, and 
by the same authors, that the supposition, or contingency is not 
expressed by the verb, but by some contingent, or conditional 
word which "precedes it, and which they say is no part of the verb 9 
but a conjunction ! Now what consistency or reason is there in 
saying that a thing is so because it possesses a certain property, 
and in the same breath denying that it does possess that prop- 
erty ! 

Grammarians say, " The Conditional, or Subjunctive mode 
is the same as the Indicative, with some preceding word ex. 



124 AN ANALYTICAL AND 

cative : as I wrote, I write, I shall write. This is the 
most pure, simple, and perfect form of the predica- 

pressing condition, supposition, or contingency." What then 
is the difference in the verb f Mr. Webster rightly says, " The 
correct construction of the subjunctive mode, is precisely the 
same as the indicative." Why then does he have any subjunc- 
tive mode ? Why make a distinction where there is none ?* 
Another thing which heightens the absurdity of the distinction, 
is that the verb said to be in the subjunctive mode, is not the 
one that is under the condition or contingency. For instance, 
Philip says to the Eunuch who requested to be baptized, "If 
thou believest with all thine heart thou mayest." The predi- 
cative believest, although it follows if, is not, as grammarians 
assert, the one that is under the condition or contingency, but 
it is mayest. Consequently if there is any truth in the sub- 
junctive mode, then mayest be baptized, and not believest, should 
be in that mode. Philip told him that he icould baptize him 
upon condition that he believed with all his heart, but there was 
no contingency respecting his belief, for the Eunuch says pos- 
itively 1 1 believe that Jesus Christ is the Son of God.' So with 
all other predicatives that follow conjunctions, and are put in 
the subjunctive mode. The condition, or contingency is never 
in the proposition which follows the conjunction, but always 
in the one which precedes it. " If he mounts now, we are gone." 
c 1 shall do it, if 1 am able.' ' I shall do it,'— this I do not 
assert positively, but upon the supposition, or condition that 
* I am able.' 

There is more ground for an Interrogative mode, but as that 
form or manner of predicating is not confined to interrogation, 
the distinction is not sufficiently clear and necessary for to 
warrant its use. 

If any distinction of modes is made, the only rational and 
defensible division of them is into the three, declarative, im- 
perative, and indefinite, i e. unlimited. But the 'indefinite 
mode' is not necessary because the distinction in such predica- 

* "What we denominate the Subjunctive mode, is resolvable 
into the Indicative." Webster's Dissertations, page 187. 

" The Indicative is employed to express conditional ideas 
more frequently than the Subjunctive, even by the best English 
writers." Ibid. p. 245. 

" There is no Subjunctive mode ; in strictness of speech all 
sentences are resolvable into distinct declaratory phrases." 
Ibid. p. 4 <>73. 

Is it not a wonder that Mr. Webster after such declarations 
should have in his Grammar a subjunctive mode ? 



PHILOSOPHICAL GRAMMAR. 125 

tive, which we have. It expresses simply the fact 
and the time when. If in addition we wish to show 
whether the action is finished or unfinished, we 
superadd that idea to the former by using another 
form of the predicative : as, He it writing ; which 
not only declares the fact and the time, but also de- 
notes that the act of writing is not completed. It is 
written, denotes that the act is completed. This latter 
form is used also to denote a different thing. If we 
say ' The cloth is damaged, 1 our purpose is not to 
show whether the act is finished or unfinished, but 
to signify what state the cloth is in. So that this 
form has a double use. In the one case it denotes 
the state of the action, in the other the state of the 
subject. Thus predicatives denote the time and the 
state of the action, or the state of the subject at that 
time. And if time was considered no more definite- 
ly than as past, present, and future, these distinctions 
of the predicatives would be all that would be neces- 
sary. But there is another distinction. Now is not pre- 
sent time, but only a point in present time. To say ' I 
have written' conveys the idea that the act is done 
before the point now. But to say ' I write/ conveys 
no such idea. It denotes present time without refer- 
ing to any particular point in time. 

As now is a point of time in the present, so we 
may assume any point in past or in future time. ' I 
had written/ bears the same relation to some point in 
past time, that C I have written/ does to the point noiv 

tives, of mode, is sufficiently designated by giving them as we 
ought their appropriate specific name, and this is done by call- 
ing them 4 nominal predicatives.' We then have only the two 
modes, declarative and imperative. But predicatives of the 
latter mode are sufficiently distinguished from those of the 
common or declarative mode by calling them simply, c impera- 
tives.' Hence we say that the attribute of ' mode' is not nec- 
essary therefore should not be used. In respect to it we may 
ask — l cui bono f what valuable purpose will be gained by its 
use ? what detriment will arise from its disuse ? 

11* 



126 AN ANALYTICAL AND 

in 'present time ; and \ He will have written/ corres- 
ponds in like manner to some point in future time. 
This form of the predicative represents the action as 
performed before the specified point either in past, 
present, or future time. Predicatives of this form 
add only the idea of priority to the distinctions men- 
tioned above; as He wrote, He had written the day 
before. ' He was writing' when I saw him, denotes 
that he was then performing the action ; but * He had 
been writing when I saw him,' denotes that he was 
performing the act before I saw him, and also implies 
that it was but just before, a little previous. 

From the above, you see that the predicatives con- 
vey the idea of time, and of the state of the action, or 
the subject with regard to time. Tense is the techni- 
cal term for time; but the forms of the predicative to 
denote time, and those to denote the state of the ac- 
tion or subject are so closely allied, that they both are 
included under one and the same term. Hence : 

Tense is the form of the predicative which 
denotes time and the state of its action or 
subject. 

The divisions of time are three, past pre- 
sent and future. 

The points of time that may be assumed 
in these divisions are three ; one in each. 

The divisions and points of time togeth- 
er, are therefore six. The particular ideas 
to which the mind may be directed, at or 
in each of these points and divisions are 
also three. Hence there are eighteen tenses. 



PHILOSOPHICAL GRAMMAR. 



127 



Presents 



Future. 



f Wrote, past tense perfect. 
| Was written , past tense duple. 
p J Was writing, past tense pending. 

Had written, prior past tense perfect. 

Had been written, prior past tense duple. 
\_Had been writing, prior past tense pending. 

f Write, present tense perfect. 

Is written, present tense duple. 

Is writing, present tense pending. 

Has written, prior present tense perfect. 

Has been written, prior present tense duple. 
C Has been writing, prior present tense pending. 

£ Will write, future tense perfect. 
Will be written, future tense duple. 
Will be writing, future tense pending. 
Will have written, prior future tense perfect. 
Will have been written, prior future tense 

duple. 
Will have been writing, prior future tense 
pending. 

The signification of each tense is indicated suffi- 
ciently clear by its name. 

Duple means twofold. Pending means continuing, not 
ended. Prior means before ; (and in this case, before the spe- 
cified point of time.) 

The perfect tenses express completed action, and in 
the most perfect manner, both as it respects the time 
and the action. 

The duple tenses have a twofold use. 

The prior tenses, are so clearly connected with 
their specified point of time, that they cannot be 
separated from it by the intervention of another point 
of time, nor by any circumstance which causes a re- 
version of idea ; nor can they be used to express what 
occurs at or after the specified point of time. Hence, 
arises another division of the tenses, which is preferable 



I 



128 AN ANALYTICAL AND 

to the preceding, in point of simplicity, but inferior 
to it in philosophical precision. 

From the fact that all the prior tenses are limited 
by the designated point of time, and that all the oth- 
ers are not limited, by anything, the tenses have been 
named accordingly ; those limited being called definite, 
and those unlimited indefinite* And as an action 
may be limited or unlimited at any past time, or at the 
present, or at the future, we have consequently six 
tenses ; two to denote the state of the action in past 
time, two for the present, and two for the future. 

Wrote, 

Past tense indefinite. 



Wrote, \ 

Was written, > 
Was Writing, j 



Had written, \ 

Had been written, > Past tense definite. 

Had been writing, ) 

*Mr. Webster uses the terms definite and indefinite, as refer- 
ring to the time, and as meaning true, precise, certain, or the 
contrary. But the truth is, the true meaning of the terms is, 
limited and unlimited; and as no predicative denotes the pre- 
cise time, they cannot properly be applied to the time of an ac- 
tion, but to the limitation of an action. It is not the time that 
is limited, but the action. To show the correctness of this, take 
two examples : c I write this line, better than the preceed- 
ing. I am reading Cicero.' Mr. Webster says that write is in 
the present tense indefinite, and am reading present tense defi- 
nite ; but who does not see, that the former is more definite than 
the latter, for the former sentence indicates that I am now engag- 
ed in the act of writing, but the latter does not necessarily imply 
that I have a book in my hand, and am actually engaged in 
reading; but simply means that I have commenced (perhaps 
months ago) reading Cicero, and have not yet finished reading 
him. Hence, his use of the terms is incorrect. 1 1 teas standing 
at the door when the procession passed.' 1 1 stood at the door 
when the procession passed.' The former of these he calls indefi- 
nite and the latter definite. But it is plain that the one is as definite 
or indefinite as the other. The difference between them (if any 
besides form) is, that one predicates the act as momentary with- 
out reference to duration, while the other implies duration in 
the act. Perfect and imperfect would be more appropriate terms 
to express the intended idea. 



PHILOSOPHICAL GRAMMAR. 1*29 



Write, \ 

Is written. > Present tense indefinite. 

Is writing. J 

Has written. \ 

Has been written, > Present tense definite. 

Has been writing, ) 

Will write, \ 

Will be written, - Future tense indefinite. 

Will be writing, j 

Will have written. \ 

Will have been written, [ Future tense definite. 

Will have been writing, j 

Have, ha*, ox had, always helps compose a prior or 
definite tense, but not the others. 

No predicative denotes the precise time. The form 
of the predicative shows whether time past, present, 
or future, is meant : but the precise time is always 
indicated by other words in the sentence, or by some 
attendant circumstance.* 



* Ten si. 

u Tense being" the distinction of time, might seem to admit 
of only the past, present and future : but to mark it more ac- 
curately, it is made to consist of six variations." Murray. 

' ; Tnere are six tenses, modifications or combinations of the 
verbs to express time. Each of these is divided into two 
forms, for the purpose of distinguishing the definite or precise 
time from the indefinite." Webster. 

These definitions of ■ tense' we deem essentially false in two 
particulars. First, ; tense ' is not merely 'the distinction of time' 
or 'modifications or combinations' of the verb to express time 
only. 'I started before twelve o'clock." I had started before 
twelve. Here are tico tenses, yet not but one time and one act. 
'The President icill have signed the bill before that.' ' Tne 



130 AN ANALYTICAL AND 

Time. 

In order clearly to understand the subject of tense, it is ne- 
cessary to consider that of time. 

Time I define to be limited ideal extension, relating to exist- 
ence. Eternity is unlimited ideal extension, relating to exist- 

bill will be, signed before that. 5 * He has published the book.' 
1 The book is published.' ' 1 wrote from two till four.' ' I was 
writing from two till four. ' In each of these couplets there are 
two distinct tenses, while the time is one and the same. But 
how can this be if 'tense 1 is only the ' distinction of time?' 
But further, 'the distinctions of time can be only three, hence, 
there cannot be six tenses to express time,' or to markit more ac- 
curately, nor, secondly, is the number of tenses increased be- 
yond six, or even three, 'for the -purpose of distinguishing the 
definite or precise time from the indefinite. 

That no predicative ? expresses the true or certain time of ac- 
tion or being' is so obvious that it is a wonder and an astonish- 
ment that any should have made the assertion. 'He died;' when ? 
this morning, yesterday, the day before, last year, or before the 
flood ? ' I rise;' when ? at noon, or midnight, or in the morn- 
ing, or daily at four o'clock? I am taking lessons. He had 
been writing, s He will be writing ;' when ? at what particular 
time ? What 'precise,' Hrue' or 'certain' time do these predicatives 
express? do we not have to depend upon the context to know 
the precise time, the when? and yet they are not only predica- 
tives, but are in the definite tenses, so called. Truly " the in- 
quisitive scholar may naturally ask, as Murray says, l what ne- 
cessity there is for adverbs of time when verbs are provided 
with tenses to show that circumstance.' c The answer is,' he 
says c though tenses may be sufficient to denote the greater dis- 
tinctions of time, yet to denote them all by the tenses would 
be a perplexity without end. What a variety of forms must be 
given to the verb, to denote yesterday, to-day, to-morrow, for. 
merly, lately, just now, now, immediately, presently, soon, here- 
after, fyc. It was this consideration that made the adverbs of 
time necessary over and above the tenses /' " Yet we are told that 
tense denotes the precise time ! To reconcile the two, must be 
the depth of philosophy. It is beyond our metaphysics — we 
cannot soar so low ! 

Having multiplied the number of the tenses to what some 
and perhaps many will call an unwarrantable extreme, it may 
perhaps be necessary to make a few remarks upon the subject. 
And if in so doing, the theories of other authors should be treat- 
ed with considerable freedom, it will not be to detract from the 
merit of such authors, or harshly accuse them of blindness. 
But it may tend to show more fully the justness of our own 
scheme, to point out the defects in others. The subject of 



PHILOSOPHICAL GRAMMAR. 131 

ence. Time to man, is as long as the world exists. Time to 
the inhabitants of other planets, is as long as their world may 

of ' tenses' has to grammarians been one of difficulty, and one 
upon which a diversity of opinions and theories have been ad- 
vanced. The wavering of opinion upon a subject so important 
convinced us that the truth had been seen only through a glass 
darkly ; that it arose from a want of a clear conception of what 
constitutes tense. Therefore we made it the subject of a long 
and thorough investigation, and the result of that inves- 
tigation was the scheme we have given, and which we believe 
to be supported by both philosophical and philological truth. 
It appears to us that the two prime errors upon the subject have 
been these — first, that tense marks only the distinctions of time; 
second, that it marks the precise time. Both of which are im- 
portant mistakes, for much is involved in tense besides time, 
and no tense marks the precise time. The number of the 
tenses has with different authors varied from three to twelve. 
The division of the tenses to correspond to the three divisions 
of time is founded upon a most obvious natural distinction. 
But every one who knows anything of language, knows that 
there are more than three tenses. The paucity of the division 
when compared with fact in language, like Egyptian darkness, 
is so palpable as to be felt. We need no argument to convince 
us of its deficiency because our perceptive faculties detect it at 
once. The next most natural distinction is into six tenses. 
This distinction is not only obvious, but is in accordance with 
fact in language. But while this has been a common division 
of the tenses, the distinctions have hitherto been made upon 
false principles, and the names which have been applied to 
them could not have been more exceptionable. Probably no 
one will attempt to defend the nomenclature of Murray ^ not 
one term in which, except the present, but whose use is too ab- 
surd to be in the least justified or tolerated. Other and better 
terms have been employed by some authors, yet we have seen 
none who made the divisions and applied terms according to 
what we conceive to be the only true principle (for six tenses) 
viz. the limitation or non limitation of the act as predicated. 

Mr. Harris, and Mr. Webster, make twelve tenses. To do 
justice to those authors as well as ourselves, we shall present a 
synopsis of the tenses as given by each. 



Harris'. 

C Write. Aorist of the present. 

< Wrote. Aorist of the past. 

( Shall write. Aorist of the future. 



132 AN ANALYTICAL AND 

exist. Time to God, is eternity. When we inhabitants of 
earth, speak of time, we mean the ' ideal extension' from the 

C Am intending (to write.) Inceptive present. 
1 Am writing. Middle or extended present. 
( Have written. Completive present. 

C Was beginning (to write.) Inceptive past. 
? Was writing. Middle or extended past. 
( Had done writing. Completive past. 

( Shall be beginning (to write.) Inceptive future. 
} Shall be writing. Middle or extended future. 
(Shall have done writing. Completive future. 

Harris' distinctions of the tenses are philosophical, but not phi- 
lological, for unfortunately they do not accord with fact, (in lan- 
guage.) In order to make his distinctions apply, he has to 
make a tense for the purpose, none of the kind being found 
in language. His distinctions are founded upon this princi- 
ple, that we speak of an action without reference to duration, 
or with reference to it. And everything that has duration has 
a beginning, middle, and end. Therefore the divisions of time 
being three, and the divisions with respect to duration, four, 
there would be twelve tenses. But in his scheme a number of 
tenses are omitted ; and there is, in language, no form of the 
predicative which denotes the beginning of an action. For 
such purpose we join a nominal predicative to pure predicatives : 
as, I am intending to write. But as, to write does not form the 
tense, this distinction is not philological, consequently, howev- 
er beautiful it may be, it must fall. 

Webster's. 

Write, present tense indefinite. 

Am writing, present tense definite. 

Wrote, past tense indefinite. 

Was writing, past tense definite. 

Has written, perfect tense indefinite. 

Has been writing, perfect tense definite. 

Had written, prior past indefinite. 

Had been writing, prior past definite. 

Will write, future tense indefinite. 

Will be writing, future tense definite. 

Will have written, prior future tense indefinite. 

Will have been writing, prior future tense definite. 

To the above scheme, beautiful as it is, there are several im- 
portant objections. He uses the terms definite, and indefinite, 



PHILOSOPHICAL GRAMMAR. 133 

creation to the final destruction of our world ; unless we desig- 
nate some specific division of time, such as years, days, hours, 

not to denote the limitation, or non limitation of the act, but to 
specify the particular time of the act, erroneously supposing 
that the predicative marked the precise time. But even if the 
terms meant what he intends, he makes a false application of 
them, and thereby destroys the value of his scheme. For in 
fact, there is not the distinction of precision, or want of precision, 
between those he calls definite, and those he calls indefinite. 
To show this, we will adduce some examples in addition to 
those already given, (p. 129.) 

First, the present tense, tread, I write, I attend, (indefinite.) 
I am reading * I am attending, (definite.) I read one hour each 
day. I write this line better than the other. I attend church 
at the Center. I am reading the Bible by course. [ am attend- 
ing lectures on Astronomy. Are the latter predicatives any 
more definite than the former ? What is the difference in 'pre- 
cision, between 1 take lessons in drawing, and 1 am taking les- 
sons in drawing ? does the latter any more mark the true or 
certain time ? 1 do not see it. 

Past tense. The man teas hung at four o'clock yesterday. 
The ship sailed at six this morning. I was writing at the time. 
Wherein is the last example more definite than the preceding ? 
The same may be said of all his tenses. 

He has left it for the scholar to conjecture whether the tense 
of ' passive verbs' is definite or indefinite. 

Why does he apply to the l prior present' tenses the term 
4 perfect ?' he has not told us, and probably no good reason can 
be given. 

We will now state the reasons for our scheme. 

Although all facts require time for their occurrence, yet they 
may be predicated either as with or without duration ; as abiding 
or as momentary. If we say, I was writing, 1 am writing, I 
shall be writing, we represent the action as abiding or pending 
at the time mentioned, whether past, present, or future. Hence 
the propriety of the term pending. And we have only to prefix 
the epithet, past, present or future, to indicate when it was 
pending, But if we say, 1 wrote, 1 icrite, 1 shall write, no regard 
is had to duration, the bare fact is mentioned as of momentary 
occurrence in one of the divisions of time. As this form de- 
notes completed action in the most simple and complete manner 
in which any fact can be predicated, we see the propriety of 
their being called 4 perfect' tenses. To which it is necessary 
to prefix the appropriate epithets of time. Again, if we say, 
It was written, It is written, It will be written, we find that 
both of the above particulars are involved in the expression. 
For if we say, The book of Revelations was written by John, 

12 



134 AN ANALYTICAL AND 

* the time of a man's life,' &c. The general divisions of time are 
into past, present, and future. Past time is time past or gone 

we speak of the act of writing, and predicate it without reference 
to duration, as much as if we had said John wrote the book of 
Revelations. But in the sentence i The inscription upon the 
Cross was written, and Pilate would not recall it,' we represent 
the writing to be remaining in or pending in that state in which 
the act of writing had left it. * Hence, as these tenses have a 
double use, they are properly called duple tenses. Again, a 
fact may be predicated as limited or as not limited. The fact 
He icrote has the unrestricted range of all past time; and He 
will write is unrestricted in all future time. And as present 
time is a compound of both past and future, He writes is 
unrestricted, not only in all past and future time but 
in all eternity. For we say with strict propriety, truth 
is eternal, for it always was and ahvays will he immutable 
and everlasting. And this fact must always be predi- 
cated in the present tense, for it always did and always will be 
on both sides of noio. Opposed to this unlimited manner of 
predicating, is that of assuming a certain point in the divisions 
of time, and predicating the fact in respect to that point ; as He 
had written, He has written, He will have written. The as- 
sumed point in present time must be now, but in the past and fu- 
ture it may be at any time we please, whether distant from now 
one day, or a week, or a month, or a year, or a thousand years ; 
as He had written when I saw him, whether yesterday, or the 
day before, or years ago. So, He will have written before I 
shall see him. A thing which grammarians have not noticed is, 
that although we may specify a certain time, yet it is not time, 
but a point in respect to which the fact is predicated. We can- 
not use this form to predicate a fact as occurring on any day, 
without specifying some point before which it on thatday did or 
will occur : as He had dined yesterday at or before one o'clock. 
He will have dined to-morrow by one o'clock. But not He had 
dined yesterday, or He will have dined to-morrow, when no re- 
ference is had to a particular point of time. Yet we say He 
has dined to-day, because the point noio is alw T ays understood. 
This form cannot be used to predicate a fact that occurs at or 
after the assumed point. We cannot say, They had raised the 
building while I was there, unless there is a point after that, un- 
derstood. Nor they had raised the building after 1 was there. 
But we can say The building icas raised ivhile or after I was 
there. 

* It may be seen more clearly from these examples : ' The 
crarment is torn ;' ? The paper was soiled ;' l The book is blot- 
ted.' 



PHILOSOPHICAL GRAMMAR. 135 

by ; future time is time not yet come ; but what is present 
time ? Present means ' being before one,' being now in view ; 
and present time is generally denned to be, u time now 
existing ; not past, Dor future*." But what is c time now exist- 
ing ?' "Both time, and existence, imply duration and extension ; 
but now does not. .Xow is not time, but a point in time. How 
then can anything have existence, i. e. extension, in that which 
has no extension ? Xow is only an imaginary point, or bound, 
between two portions of time, and consequently cannot be any 
part of time. 

" A point is the bound of every finite line ; and a now or in- 
stant, of every finite time. But although they are bounds, they 
are neither of them parts, neither the point of any line, nor the 
now or instant of any time." Harris Hermes. 

u lt is evident that a noic or instant, is no more a part of 
time, than points are of a line. The parts indeed of one line 
are two other lines."' Natur. A use. L. IV. c. 17. 

" A now is no part of time ; for a part is able to measure 
the whole, and the whole is necessarily made up of its parts ; 
but time doth not appear to be made up of nows. ,: ibid. c. 14. 
" x<Vs every now, or instant always exists in time, and without 
being time is time's bound ; the bound of completion to the past 
and the bound of commencement to the future ;" for all time 
previous to the point now, is necessarily past time, and all time 
subsequent to it, is necessarily future ; therefore we see that all 
time is either past, or future. " For if all time is transient as 
well as continuous, it cannot like a line be present all together, 
but part will necessarily be gone, and a part be coming." For, 
even the smallest division ol time has extension, which a point 
has not ; therefore a moment even is too large to stand at once 
upon the point now. And as that part of a moment which 
has not yet come to the point now must be future, it conse- 
quently cannot be present ; and that part which has already 
crossed the point is past, it therefore cannot be present. We 
therefore come to the conclusion that philosophically and strictly 
there is no such thing as time present. But, it will be said that 
* this is nonsense, for we do have present time and every one 
knows it and knows what is meant by it' I grant that we 
have present time, or, what we call present time ; but that 
i every one' or that many t know what is meant by it,' 1 very 
much doubt. If 1 did not, I should not spend so much time 

And as we cannot use this form to predicate the fact as occur- 
ring at, or after, the assumed point, but always as having oc- 
curred previous, they are called prior tenses. 

To each of the prior tenses also the terms c perfect,' c duple,' 
s.nd i pending,' together with those indicating time, are neces- 
sarily and justly applied. 



136 AN ANALYTICAL AND 

upon the subject. Let us therefore see what we mean by pres- 
ent time. We say, ' The present century,' ' the present year/ 
1 the present month,' ' the present week,' ' the present hour,' 
'the present minute,' ' the present moment,' &c. Now it is 
plain that the whole century cannot be present, be 'time now? ex- 
isting ;' nor can the month, nor the week, nor the day, nor the 
hour ; and we have proved that even a whole moment cannot 
be present all at once. 

What then do we mean by the present year, the present day, 
&c. ? Time we have seen is extension limited, A year is the 
time or extension from the point of commencement of a revo- 
lution of the earth around the sun, to another point which is the 
point of completion. A day is either the extension from the 
point midnight to another midnight, or between the two bounds 
sun-rising and sun-setting. 

On the last day of a year, when it is nearly drawn to close ; 
when its sun has already set, and the wheels of time have borne 
us on to the midnight hour; when the last hour and the last 
moment of that hour has come, then it is that one moment we 
are in one year, and the next moment in another ; and the point 
which separates those two moments, is the end of the one year, 
and the beginning of the other. And that year which a moment 
before was present to us, is now past, and that which in the 
previous moment was to us future is now present. And why ? 
Simply because, carrying with us, as we always do, the point 
now, the moment we step from within the precincts of one year, 
to within the confines of another, we make that past which be- 
fore was present, and that present which before was future. 
Hence you see that time is not present as most suppose, be- 
cause it is at the point now, but because it lies on both sides of 
it. We therefore define present time to be time which contains 
zcithin it the point now. And ' the present year' 'the present 
day,' ' hour,' &c. is such a specific portion of time denoted by 
* year,' ' day,' &c. as contains within it the point now. And 
whatever time lies wholly on the side prior to now is past time, 
and that which lies all on the side subsequent to now is future 
time. Or, in other words, whatever takes its rise with the point 
now and extends subsequently is future ; and whatever may 
have been antecedent if it ends with now, is past. As all time 
must be on one side or the other of the point noiv, therefore 
present time is only a compound of past and future time* 

The above view of time will, it is thought, throw much light 
upon the subject of ' tenses,' and remove many of the difhcul- 

*'I have heretofore risen at five o'clock,' this fact lies on 
the side prior to now. ' And 1 shall hereafter rise at five,' this 
fact is subsequent to now. We compound these two facts by 
using the present tense, I rise at five every morning. 



PHILOSOPHICAL GRAMMAR. 137 

ties under wlaich grammarians have labored, especially in re- 
gard to the * imperatives,' and what Murray calls the 'perfect 
tense.' 



Use of the Tenses. 

The Present tense is frequently used to express a 
general truth, or, in other words, to denote not that 
the fact occurs at the present, but that it is true ; 
as, Man is mortal. Truth is eternal. I am taking 
lessons in music. " The secret which the murderer 
possesses, soon comes to possess him ; and like the 
evil spirits of which we read, it overcomes him, and 
hads him whithersoever it will. He feels it beating 
at his heart, rising to his throat, and demanding dis- 
closure. He thinks the whole world sees it in his 
face, reads it in his eyes, and almost hears its work- 
ings in the very silence of his thoughts. It has be- 
come his master." 

It is also used in speaking of an author, in refer- 
ence to his works that are extant, though he may be 
dead ; as, " Homer hurries us with a commanding 
impetuosity : Virgil leads us with an attractive ma- 
jesty. Homer scatters with a generous profusion: 
Virgil bestows with a careful magnificence. Homer, 
like the Nile, pours out his riches with a sudden over- 
flow : Virgil, like a river in its banks, with a constant 
stream." 

When a writer wishes to transport the mind either 
back or forward, and represent as present that which 
is past or future, he uses the present tense. 

" The face of the innocent sleeper was turned from 
the murderer, and the beams of the moon resting on 
the gray locks of his aged temple, showed him where 
to strike. The fatal blow is given ! and the victim 
passes, without a struggle or a motion, from the re- 
pose of sleep to the repose of death ! It is the as- 
sassin's purpose to make sure work ; and he yet plies 
12* 



138 Atf ANALYTICAL ANJ? 

the dagger, though it was obvious life had been de- 
stroyed by the blow of the bludgeon." 

So in the future : ' I shall be ready when he comes* 
" Then when my country takes her seat among the 
nations of the earth, let my epitaph be written." 

The following are actually future, because they 
have not the termination of the present. "Though 
he slay me yet will I trust in him/ 7 (though he should 
slay.) " If a man smite his servant, and he die, &c," 
(shall or should smite or die.) 

If we express a condition or wish, or make a sup- 
position contrary to a known or obvious fact, we use 
in the present an auxiliary or single predicative of the 
past tense ; and in the past one of a prior past tense; 
as 1. I should go if I thought it best. I wish I had 
a hammer. If I had the book I would let you have 
it. If the taxes laid by government were the only 
ones we have to pay, we would not complain. 2. If 
he had not had a strong constitution, he would have 
died. If it had not stormed, I should have gone. If 
it had thundered the air would have been cooler. 
This idiomatic mode of expression is adopted to dis- 
tinguish between suppositive propositions where un- 
certainty is involved, and those where a position is 
assumed contrary to fact. ' If he has not a coat I 
will give him one/ — here the supposition is made in 
the common form and implies uncertainty.' • If he 
had not a coat I would give him one/ — here the sup- 
position is made in the idiomatic form and implies 
that he has a coat, therefore I do not give him one. 
Mr. Webster complains that u this form of our tenses 
has never been the subject of much notice nor ever 
received its due explanation and arrangement." Yet 
he himself has done but a very little better, for he has 
only noticed the fact without giving any explanation 
why it is so. ' I wish I had a horse/ — this implies 
the contrary fact that I have no horse ; and why ? 



PHILOSOPHICAL GRAMMAR. 139 

Because it would be absurd to wish for that which I 
already have. As the apostle says about hope, f For 
what a man seeth why doth he yet hope for? 5 so what 
a man has why does he wish for 1 And as ; Hope that 
is seen is not hope,' so a wish for that which we have 
is not a wish. Again, if a man says, * I would go to 
church if it did not rain] and yet does not go, the 
only conclusion we can draw is, it rains. His 
declaration and his actions can be reconciled in no 
other way. So in other cases of the kind. 



PREDICALS. 

Predicals are words derived from predica- 
tives, and possess the properties of a predica- 
tive together with those of a noun or a defi- 
ner : as walking, walked, writing, written, 
fighting, fought. 

Predicals are of two kinds, perfect and 
imperfect. The perfect predical denotes 
completed action ; and the imperfect, action 
not completed. 

The predicals do not of themselves usually convey 
the idea of time any further than action completed or 
pending necessarily implies time past or present. 

The perfect predicals are regularly formed by ad- 
ding d or ed to predicatives. Those that are not reg- 
ularly formed usually end in t, n, or g ; as, wrought, 
bitten, rung, dug, &c. 

The imperfect predical is formed from the predica- 
tive by adding ing. The final e is usually dropped : 
as race, racing ; face, facing ; love, loving. 

When the two predicals are united, it is called a 



140 



AN ANALYTICAL AND 



compound predical: as having loved; having been 
written. 



NOMINAL PREDICATIVES. 

Nominal predicatives are a species of 
predicatives which partake of the nature of 
nouns and predicatives:* as ' to go, ? 'to 
be, ? ' to improve, 5 \ to have. 5 

They are formed by prefixing to, to a 
pure predicative. 

This to differs from the relative to as it has the 
force and probably the same origin as do, signifying 
act, performance, It seems to have been prefixed to 
predicatives upon dropping the Saxon termination of 
the infinitive ' an,' for the purpose of denoting action, 
and thereby to distinguish them from nouns : * Walk/ 
' a walk/ ' to walk.' 

Nominal predicatives are nearly equivalent to a 
predical with the definer the prefixed, and usually are 
used in nearly the same manner : as, ' To see the sun 
is pleasant ;' The seeing the sun is pleasant. * I did 
it for to secure your friendship ;■ I did it for the secu- 
ring your friendship. ' To have cfcwethat would have 
been folly ;' The having done that would have been 
folly. 

( When one faints the hardest part is to come to ;' 
When one faints the hardest part is the coming to. 

Hence you may see why they have the nature of 
nouns, and are subjective or objective. Hence too 

* " It is from the infinitive thus participating the nature of a 
noun or substantive that the best grammarians have called it 
sometimes 4 a verbal noun,' sometimes ' the verb's noun.' The 
reason of this appellation is in Greek more evident, from its 
taking the prepositive article before it in all cases." Harris. 



PHILOSOPHICAL GRAMMAR. 141 

you may see why like nouns they so easily take a rel- 
ative before them ; as 'He has money enough for to 
pay his debts ;' (for the paying.) ' I made a pen for 
to write a letter :' (for the writing.) 

Hence we have the rule that the nominal predica- 
tive is in the case that a noun would be, in like situa- 
tion ; for example, ' To change one's garments is con- 
ducive to health,' (subjective.) 'He began to write 
a letter/ (objective after a predicative.) 'What went 
ye out for to see?' (objective after a relative.) 

The nominal predicatives have no ' subject/ but 
they take after them the ' objective case/ the same as 
pure predicatives : as 

'Is not this the fast that I have chosen ? to loose 
the bands of wickedness, to undo the heavy burdens, 
and to let the oppressed go fre?, and that ye break 
every yoke V Is. 58. 6. 

If the nominal predicative has a noun in the objec- 
tive case before it, the relative must, in construction, be 
inserted ;* as ' I made a pen (for) to write a letter/ i. e. 
I made a pen for the writing a letter, not I made a 
pen the writing a letter. ' He began to write a letter,' 
i. e. He began the writing a letter, and not He began 
for the writing a letter.? 

The nominal predicatives can scarcely be said to in- 
volve the idea of ' time ;' but having some of the forms 
of ' tense' they are arranged accordingly. 

* " He did it to be rich ; here we must supply by an ellipsis 
the relative for, ' He did it for to be rich/ the same as if we 
had said ' He did it for gain. Even when we speak such sen- 
tences as the following, 4 1 choose to philosophize rather than 
to be rich / the nominal predicatives are in nature as much ob- 
jectives, as if we were to say 1 choose philosophy rather than 
riches." Harris' Hermes. 

t Thus it is sense as well as syntax, to say, i L desire to live / 
but not to say, * 1 eat to live/ unless by an ellipsis instead of 1 
eat for to live.' 



142 AN ANALYTICAL AND 

To, the sign of nominal predicatives is commonly 
omitted before predicatives following bid, dare, let, 
see, hear, feel, need, make: as, Bid him ( ) tell the 
tale. I saw him ( ) do it. 

Auxiliaries. 

On account of the variations of tense, it is neces- 
sary to unite several words to form one predicative. 
It is then called a compound predicative, and the last 
one of the words composing it, is called the principal, 
and the others auxiliaries, (i. e. helping,) because 
they help to compose and vary the predicative. 

There are only a few auxiliary words used, or needed 
to effect the infinite number of changes required to 
express the ever varying shades of thought. 

The auxiliaries are am, was, he, do, did, have, had, 
shall, should, will, would, can, could, may, might, must, 
and perhaps let, need, dare, and durst. 

Some of these are at times used also as principals. 

Can, and could, signify ability ox permission. 

May, and might, signify liberty, or contingency. 

Must, denotes necessity. 

Will, signifies intention, ox promise, when expressed 
by a person of himself; and prediction, or compulsion, 
when expressed of another. 

Would, denotes ivillingness, wish, or determined 
purpose, or simply declares a fact. 

Shall, when the speaker uses it of himself predicts ; 
when of others, predicts, or signifies compulsion. 

Should, when spoken of a third person, denotes 
duty, or compulsion ; when of a first person indicates 
purpose under contingency expressed by if: as, I 
should do it if I could. 

The auxiliaries are frequently used to give emphasis 
to an expression, or to signify opposition to some fact 
or assertion : as, " Difficult as was the task, he did 



PHILOSOPHICAL GRAMMAR. 143 

accomplish it ;" here did is emphatic. ' James did 
attend school,' implies that he does not now attend, or 
that it had been asserted by some one that he did not. 

The principal predicative, together with the remain- 
der of the clause, or sentence, is commonly omitted, 
when readily supplied to the mind by what has gone 
before : as, * John and Thomas have never attended 
school, but Henry has,' [attended school, being omit- 
ted, as the mind supplies it.) ' William will not do 
as I desire, but James will' ( ). 

For the 'principal, and remainder of the clause, do, 
in some of its forms is frequently substituted : as 

" One of the greatest pleasures we receive from 
poetry, is to find ourselves always in the midst of our 
fellows ; and to see every thing, thinking, feeling, and 
acting, as we ourselves do" That is, as we ourselves 
think, feel, and act. 

It is probable that originally there were no com 
pound predicatives, but that the auxiliary now, was 
then a simple predicative, and the principal now, was 
a nominal predicative : as, I can go, i. e. I can, or am 
able to go, I will go, I icill to go, I may go, I may to 
go, I dare go, I dare to go, Let go your hold, Let 
your hold to go. 



Variations of the Predicative. 

Predicatives do not have number and person ; that is, they do 
not generally vary to accord with the number and person of 
their subject. But — 

Simple predicatives in the present tense, depending 
on a noun of the third person, singular number, add 
s or es to their usual form ; as, I improve, You improve, 
He improves, We improve, You improve, They im- 



144 AN ANALYTICAL AND 

prove. I go, You go, He goes, We go, You go, They 
g°- 

In the solemn style, instead of s or es, th or eth is 
added ; He improveth, He goeth. 

A predicative depending on a noun of the second 
person singular, solemn style adds st or est to the usual 
form ; Thou improvest, Thou goest, Thou wentest, 
Thou didst. Shall and will have t only added, and 
one / is dropped ; Thou shalt, Thou wilt. 

In compound predicatives, the auxiliaries only are 
varied; I have improved, You have improved, He has 
improved, We have improved, You have improved, 
They have improved. Solemn style, Thou hast im- 
proved, He hath improved. 

None of the auxiliaries are varied, except am, teas, 
do, and have. 

Am and was are irregular, being thus, I am, You 
are, Thou art, He is, We are, You are, They are. 
I was, You was, Thou wast, He was, We were, You 
were, They were. 

Do follows the general rule. Have changes ve to 
s, otherwise it is regular. 

Was is the only auxiliary varied out of the present 
tenses, except in solemn style. 

Predicatives are never simple, except in the perfect 
present and perfect past tenses. 

By the following synopsis may be seen how false is the gen- 
eral rule that " a verb must agree with its nominative in num- 
ber and person." The varied predicatives are in italic, that it 
may be seen how few they are comparatively, and that the most 
of them are to accord with the solemn style, and not number 
and person. 



PHILOSOPHICAL GRAMMAR. 145 

SYNOPSIS OF THE VARIATIONS. 



SIMPLE PREDICATIVES. 

Move Fight Will 

1. I move I Fight I will 

You move You fight Y^ou will 

He moves Hejights He wills 

* ( 1. We move We fight We will 

| ) 2. You move You fight You will 

^ I 3. They move They fight They will 




J (1. 

| 2. 

I (3. 



Solemn Style. 

1. I move I fight 1 will 

Thou movest Thou Jightest Thou wiliest 
He moveth Hejighteth He willeth 

Other predicatives accord with these. 

Auxiliaries. 

Singular. Plural. Singular. Plural. 

Are Was 

-g ( I am We are J C I was We were 

| < You are You are 1 < You was You were 



£j ( He is They are H ( He was They were 

S. S. Thou art S. S. Thou icast 

Have Had 

| r I have We have . £ 1 had We had 

1 < You have You have I < You had You had 
$ ( He has They hare * I He had They had 
a a I Thou hast 
b ' fe * \ He hath 
13 



146 AN ANALYTICAL AND 

Singular. Plural. Singular. Plural. 

Do Did 

^ C I do We do . C I did We did 



^ 



C 1 do We do ^ ( I did We did 

< You do You do J < You did You did 

£ ( He does They do * (He did They did 

Q Q | Thou dost S. S. Thou didst 
°- ^ \ He doth 

May Might 

-g /I may We may ^ C I might We might 

1 < You may You may § < You might You might 
£ ( He may They may (He might They might 

S. S. Thou mayest S. S. Thou mightest 



(I 



Must 

must We must 

You must You must 



a* ( He must They must 

Can Could 

« ("I can We can C I could We could 

| < You can You can < You could You could 
4; ( He can They can ( He could They could 

S. S. Thou canst S. S. Thou couldest 

Will Would 

|S C I will We will ( I would We would 

4§ < You will You will < You would You would 
&h ( He will They will ( He would They would 
S. S. Thou wilt S. S. Thou wouldst 

Shall Should 

g ( I shall We shall C I should We should 
I < You shall You shall < You should You should 
I ( He shall They shall ( He should They should 

S. S. Thou shalt S. S. Thou shouldst 



PHILOSOPHICAL GRAMMAR. 



147 




§ a 
c 

no 
G 



S 






'IDdfldJ 



'9\dn(j 



'tudsddj; 



'Sutyudj; 



148 



AN ANALYTICAL AND 




'1U9S9UJ UOIUJT 



PHILOSOPHICAL GRAMMAR. 



149 



rz 



bG 




> •> 

.2 o 



£ 5 g I S a 9 

3 . >*> j_s ^ *? ♦** E^ 

c tfjj £_g ~ ~ H 

£ ra =r m 3 - w « jh 

£ W~ ffi „ * ffi >H 

»l £«i £«J X.S ><-3 ^-§ 

mEh _t£h h-t^h ~j* £S 2S 

V_ y 1 J j V ^ 



13* 



150 



AN ANALYTICAL AND 





^3 S3 

<u .5 

> > 

o o 

> <d o 

O ^5 ^ 



€.<g -S-S -i-g ** * ^ *£ 

gg SS © S oo _o« _oo 

& £ £ S * £ -g-g -g-g -g-g 

£• g" 5* £• S" &■ 

.£3 -=3 ^3 je ^q ^E3 

E^ H H jg H H 

^ 2" 5" E? 5 3 

.° k° k° O © O 

>» S* >< >H !* [>, 

cT •p* t cT qT of of 

>i H t* £ i* >< 

cf .9 .^ cT ^ of 

£ £ fe ^ £ £ 



000 

*a j=j jz 

02 CQ QQ 

of 3 oT 3 aT 3 
h-TIH 1— TH i— n?< 



PHILOSOPHICAL GRAMMAR. 



151 



The foregoing synopsis is a comprehensive view of all the 
varieties and combinations of the predicative. Any other 
principal may be substituted in the place of love, and undergo 
the same changes. It is not to be understood that all those 
subjects and all the auxiliaries are at once to be combined with 
the principal ; but either of the subjects and any one of the 
auxiliaries ; as I may love, or he may love ; we would love, or 
they tcould love. We may have been improved, or it may have 
been improved, &c. 

N. B. The synopsis of the predicatives is not to be commit- 
ted to memory and repeated, but to be understood and referred 
to as occasion may require. 



A list of the predicatives which are irregular 
in their formation. 



P. Present. 


P. Past. 


J. Predical. 


P. Predical. 


Abide 


abode 


abiding 


abode 


Am 


was 


being 


been 


Arise 


arose 


arising 


arisen 


Awake 


awoke 


awaking 


awakened 


Bear < r ,f m ^ bore, bare bearing 


borne, born 


Bear,to carry bore 


bearing 


borne 


Beat 


beat 


beating 


beaten, beat 


Begin 


began 


beginning 


begun 


Bend 


bent 


bending 


bent 


Bereave 


bereft 


bereaving 


bereft 


Beseech 


besought 


beseeching 


besought 


Bid 


bid, bade 


bidding 


bidden, bid 


Bind 


bound 


binding 


bound 


Bite 


bit 


biting 


bitten, bit 


Bleed 


bled 


bleeding 


bled 


Blow 


blew 


blowing 


blown 


Break 


broke 


breaking 


broken 


Breed 


bred 


breeding 


bred 


Bring 


brought 


bringing 


brought 


Build 


built 


building 


built 


Burst 


burst 


bursting 


burst 


Buy 


bought 


buying 


bought 



L52 


AN ANALYTICAL AND 




P. Present 


P. Past. 


J. Predical. 


P. Predical. 


Become 


became 


becoming 


become 


Behold 


beheld 


beholding 


beheld 


Cast 


cast 


casting 


cast 


Catch 


caught 


catching 


caught 


Choose 


chose 


choosing 


chosen 


Cleave to a^Aercclave 


cleaving 


cleaved 


Cleave to spin cleft or clove cleaving 


cleft, cloven 


Cling 


clung 


clinging 


clung 


Clothe 


clothed 


clothing 


clad 


Come 


came 


coming 


come 


Cost 


cost 


costing 


cost 


Crow 


crew 


crowing 


crowed 


Chide 


chid 


chiding 


chid 


Creep 


crept 


creeping 


crept 


Cut 


cut 


cutting 


cut 


Dare to venture durst or dared daring 


dared 


Dare to c 


hallenge — Regul 


ar. 




Deal 


dealt 


dealing 


dealt 


Dig 


dug 


digging 


dug 


Do 


did 


doing 


done 


Draw 


drew 


drawing 


drawn 


Drive 


drove 


driving 


driven 


Drink 


drank 


drinking 


drank, drunk 


Dwelt 


dwelt 


dwelling 


dwelt 


Dream 


dreamt 


dreaming 


dreamt 


Drop 


dropt 


dropping 


dropt 


Eat 


ate 


eating 


eaten 


Engrave 


engrared 


engraving 


( engraven 
( engraved 


Fall 


fell 


falling 


fallen 


Feed 


fed 


feeding 


fed 


Feel 


felt 


feeling 


felt 


Fight 


fought 


fighting 


fought 


Find 


found 


finding 


found 


Flee 


fled 


fleeing 


fled 


Fling 


flung 


flinging 


flung 


Fly 


flew 


flying 


flown 


Forget 


forgot 


forgetting 


forgotten 



PHILOSOPHICAL GRAMMAR. 



153 



P. Present. 


P. Past. 


/. PredicaU 


P. Predicai. 


Forsake 


forsook 


forsaking 


forsaken 


Freeze 


froze 


freezing 


frozen 


Forbear 


forbore 


forbearing 


forborne 


Gild 


gilt 


gilding 


gilt 


Get 


got 


getting 


got 


Gird 


girt 


girding 


girt 


Give 


gave 


giving 


given 


Go 


went 


going 


gone 


Grave 


graved 


graving 


graven 


Grind 


ground 


grinding 


ground 


Grow 


grew 


growing 


grown 


Have 


had 


having 


had 


Hang 


hung 


hanging 


hung 


Hear 


heard 


hearing 


heard 


Hew 


hewed 


hewing 


hewn 


Hide 


hid 


hiding 


hidden, hid 


Hit 


hit 


hitting 


hit 


Hold 


held 


holding 


held 


Hurt 


hurt 


hurting 


hurt 


Keep 


kept 


keeping 


kept 


Knit 


knit 


knitting 


knit 


Know 


knew 


knowing 


known 


Kneel 


knelt 


kneeling 


knelt 


Lay 


laid 


laying 


laid 


Lead 


led 


leading 


led 


Leave 


left 


leaving 


left 


Lend 


lent 


lending 


lent 


Let 


let 


letting 


let 


hietoliedownlay 


lying 


lain 


Load 


loaded 


loading 


laden 


Lose 


lost 


losing 


lost 


Light 


lighted, lit 


lighting 


lighted, or lit 


Make 


made 


making 


made 


Meet 


met 


meeting 


met 


Mow 


mowed 


mowing 


mown 


Mean 


meant 


meaning 


meant 


Pay 


paid 


paying 


paid 



154 



AN ANALYTICAL AND 



P. Present. 


P. Past 


/. Predical. 


P. Predical. 


Put 
Read 


put 
read 


putting 
reading 


put 
read 


Rend 


rent 


rending 


rent 


Rid 


rid 


ridding 


rid 


Ride 


rode 


riding 


rode 


Ring 


rang, or rung ringing 


rung 


Rise 


rose 


rising 


risen 


Rive 


rived 


riving 


riven 


Run 


run 


running 


run 


Saw 


sawed 


sawing 


sawn 


Say 


said 


saying 


said 


See 


saw 


seeing 


seen 


Seek 


sought 


seeking 


sought 


Sell 


sold 


selling 


sold 


Send 


sent 


sending 


sent 


Set 


set 


setting 


set 


Shake 


shook 


shaking 


shaken 


Shape 
Shave 


shaped 
shaved 


shaping 
shaving 


shaped,shapen 
shaven 


Shear 


sheared 


shearing 


shorn 


Shed 


shed 


shedding 


shed 


Shine 


shone 


shining 


shone 


Show 
Shoe 


showed 
shod 


showing 
shoeing 


shown 
shod 


Shoot 


shot 


shooting 


shot 


Shrink 
Shred 


shrunk,shrank shrinking 
shred shredding 


shrunk 
shred 


Shut 


shut 


shutting 


shut 


Sing 
Sink 


sung, sang 
sunk, sank 


singing 
sinking 


sung 
sunk 


Sit 
Slay 
Sleep 
Slide 


sat 
slew 
slept 
slid 


sitting 
slaying 
sleeping 
sliding 


sat 
slain 
slept 
slid 


Sling 
Slink 


slung 
slunk 


slinging 
slinking 


slung 
slunk 


Slit 


slit 


slitting 


slit 



PHILOSOPHICAL GRAMMAR. 



155 



P. Present P. Past. 



J. PredicaU P. Predical. 



Smite 

Sow 

Speak 

Speed 

Spend 

Spill 

Spin 

Spit 

Split 

Spread 

Spring 

Stand 

Steal 

Stick 

Sting 

Stink 

Stride 

Strike 

String 

Strive 

i Strow or 

( Strew 

Sweat 

Swear 

Swell 

Swim 

Swing 

Take 

Teach 

Tear 

Tell 

Think 

Thrive 

Throw 

Thrust 

Tread 

Wax 



smote smiting 

sowed sowing 

spoke, spake speaking 
sped speeding 

spent spending 

spilt spilling 

spun spinning 

spit spitting 

split splitting 

spread spreadiug 

sprung sprang springing 



stood 

stole 

stuck 

stung 

stunk 

strode 

struck 

strung 

strove 

strowed or 

strewed 

swet 

swore 

swelled 



standing 

stealing 

sticking 

stinging 

stinking 

striding 

striking 

stringing 

striving 

strowing or 

strewing 

swetting 

swearing 

swelling 



smitten 
sown 
spoken 
sped 
spent 
spilt 
spun 
spit 
split 
spread 
sprung 
stood 
stolen 
stuck 
stung 
stunk 
strode 
struck 
strung 
strove 
strown or ) 
strewed J 
swet 
sworn 
swollen 



swam, swum swimming swum 



swung 

took 

taught 

tore 

told 

thought 

throve 

threw 

thrust 

trod 

waxed 



swinging 

taking 

teaching 

tearing 

telling 

thinking 

thriving 

throwing 

thrusting 

treading 

waxing 



swung 

taken 

taught 

torn 

told 

thought 

throve 

thrown 

thrust 

trod, trodden 

waxed 



156 



AN ANALYTICAL AND 



Wear 


wore 


wearing 


worn 


Weave 


wove 


weaving 


woven 


Wet 


wet 


wetting 


wet 


Weep 


wept 


weeping 


wept 


Win 


won 


winning 


won 


Wind 


wound 


winding 


wound 


Work 


( worked 
( wrought 


working 


{ worked 
( wrought 


Wring 


wrung 


wringing 


wrung 


Write 


wrote 


writing 


written 



Explanations of some words hitherto improperly 
classed. 

As. 

As is always a definer ; it means so, such, like, 
while, when, and with to, respecting, concerning : as 
■•■ I state it as it was tola to me ;" " He is much es- 
teemed as a man;" " Take such as you please;" 
" He trembled as he spoke ;" " — he journeyed on 

Till as a rock's huge point he turned, 
A watchfire close before him burned;" 

" .4s to the truth of that, I could not say." 

As, when used correlatively has the same meaning 
as the correlative word, and also defines a like word 
understood : as " Send him such books as (i. e. such 
books) will please him." ' Send him books/ — what 
books ? ■ such books that will please him. 3 

" JJs safe to me the mountain way, 
At midnight as in blaze of day." 

That is, so safe the mountain way is to me in blaze 
of day, so safe it is to me at midnight. 

./4s, so, such, &c. aretransmissive words, and derive 
whatever force they possess at any time from their 
connection with a known, or specified circumstance. 
In the above case, we know the force of the first as, 
from its connection with the specified circumstance, as 



PHILOSOPHICAL GRAMMAR. 157 

in blaze of day ; and of the latter from a knowledge 
of the safety of a person in the light of day. A per- 
son is usually considered quite safe from robbers in 
the day time ; well, says young Malcolm, "I am as 
safe at midnight, as (safe) in the blaze of day." 

1 How much may I get V ' As much as you wish.' 
Ascertain the quantity you wish to get and so much 
you may get. - Do it as soon as you can,' do it so 
soon, — how soon ? so soon you can. " Take such as 
you please," — take such such you please. 

This repeating the definer is an idiom of the lan- 
guage. Such expressions contain two propositions ; 
and if there are only two definers, the first belongs to 
the first proposition, and the other to the second : as 
" The malecontents made such demands as none but 
a tyrant could refuse." The malecontents made such 
demands — none but a tyrant could refuse such ( ). 
If there are three definers, the first defines the second, 
and the third defines the same word understood ; as 
' Come as soon as you can,' — the first as defines the 
soon expressed, and the other defines soon understood. 

As has usually been called an adverb, or a con- 
junction. 

" But fear to call a more important cause, 
As if 'twere treason 'gainst English laws." 

Here as is called a conjunction, but an analysis of 
the sentence will show the error. ' We fear to call 
a more important cause, as we should fear if it was 
treason against English laws, to call a more important 
cause.' As, is a definer showing how we fear, by 
pointing to the fear well known, in a case respecting 
treason. 

' I do not wish as much as that,' — here as much 
as, is called an adverbial phrase ; but let us analyze 
it. * I do not wish as or so much money, as much that 
much or amount you named is ;' or, ' That much or 
quantity, you named, is as or so much ; I do not wish 
so much.' But who would think of calling, so many 
14 



158 AN ANALYTICAL AND 

more as, in the following sentence, an adverbial 
phrase; yet it may be done with equal propriety. 
" The Lord God of your fathers make you a thousand 
times so many more as you are, and bless you as he 
hath promised you." — That is, * You are so many, 
may God make you more than you are now, until you 
are a thousand times so many, your present number.' 
As is said to be a ' relative pronoun,' so called, 
when it follows many, such, or same ; but the absurd- 
ity is too gross to deserve notice. 

Than. 

Than is a definer, and is used in the same manner 
as as. It defines a word in the positive degree, cor- 
responding to the definer which precedes it, in the 
dualistic degree ; as, ' Solomon was wiser than Absa- 
lom,' — that is, Solomon was wiser than or so wise 
Absalom was. James is taller than (tall) William 
(is) ; William is so tall, James is taller, or more tall. 
When it follows other, a noun is repeated ; I have no 
other fruit than (fruit) apples. Than is a transmis- 
sive word, used to point out the object with which the 
comparison is made. It has been called a conjunc- 
tion, but for no other reason, than because it was not 
known what else to do with it. 

Each, Every, Either, and Neither. 

These words are always definers. 

Each relates to the individuals of a number : as, 
c Each man of the army is allowed a fixed ration.' 

Every denotes the whole taken separately : as, 
Every man is accountable for his own conduct. 

Either implies one or any one of a collection with- 
out including the rest ; * If either of them disobeys 
he is punished.' ' There are several ways of doing 
it, either of which is correct.' 

Neither means not either, that is, not any one of 
the whole. 



PHILOSOPHICAL GRAMMAR. 159 

These words have frequently been called pronouns, 
but it is an error, for they are never used instead of 
nouns; though the noun after them is often omitted. 

Either, or — Neither, Nor. 

These words are always definers; they have been 
falsely called conjunctions, and erroneously said to be 
correlative. Neither is formed from either, and nor 
from or, by prefixing the Saxon negative ne to either 
and or ; as, ne-either, ne-or. 

Or is a contraction of other, and means the same; 
as, * Let us conquer him or die.' — That is, ' Let us 
conquer him, other, or other than that, let us die.' 
1 He must work or starve/' — He must work or, other, 
otherwise starve. It denotes that if the preceding 
proposition is not true, the following one is. 

' You may take either book, 7 — here either is ad- 
mitted to be a definer, but in other cases it has been 
called a conjunction ; yet it has the same force and 
import when followed by or, as when not. ' You may 
take either this book, or that/ — that is, You may 
take either book, this book or, otherwise that book. 
' You may have either the apple, or the orange/ — 
You may have either fruit, the apple, or the orange; 
or more fully, You may have either fruit, you may 
have the apple, or i. e. if you do not take the apple, 
you may have the orange. Thus it may be seen that 
either, is not a conjunction. By these examples it 
may be seen too, that or is not a correlative of either ; 
for the proposition containing either, is independent 
of what follows ; as, ' You may have either fruit.' 
And the or, is a clausal definer between the two prop- 
ositions; You may have the apple, (or) You may 
have the orange. It is precisely like the following : 
' He leaped from the boat, otherwise, (or) he would 
have been killed. 7 

" Either John or Thomas did it." Query — how 
can either be a conjunction ? The either is superflu- 



160 AN ANALYTICAL ANB 

ous, but as it stands it may be thus explained ; Either 
proposition (i. e. one of the two) is true. John did it, 
or (if not) Thomas did it. The only peculiarity is, 
that either, means one instead of any one. 

The remarks respecting either and or, will with the 
proper change apply also to neither and nor. 

Oftentimes the either is suppressed ; as, ' Let us 
( ) conquer him or die;' ' It will ( ) sink, or swim. 7 

In poetry, or and nor are frequently used for either 
and neither. " Or nature's laws to fix or to repeal." 
" Father of all that is or heard or hears." " — or 
dense or rare." " Nor in sheet nor in shroud we 
wound him." It sometimes has a like use in prose ; 
as, " Another New England, nor we, nor our children 
shall ever see if this be destroyed." — Beecher. 

And, But, If, Though, Except, Save, Unless, 
Less. 

All these words, however they may have been class- 
ed heretofore, are regular, and proper imperatives. 
They usually apply to the proposition which follows, 
and may, or may not have that after them referring to 
it. When they apply to a word that follows, that 
cannot be used. 

And always means add. 4 add 2 are 6; 4 and 2 
are 6. 4 shillings add 6 pence, are 75 cents ; 4s. 
and 6d. are 75 cts. The capitals of Connecticut are 
Hartford and New Haven. 

It is used between subjects when the fact predicated 
is applicable alike to each ; as John and James and 
Harriet, are fine scholars. 

When several particulars are connected, the and, as 
it can readily be supplied by the mind, is usually 
omitted, except between the last two. " Is he proud 
of his skill in music, in dancing, in fencing, in fox- 
hunting, and in gambling ? of his knowledge in lan- 
guages, in literature, in arts and sciences ? Or is he 
proud that he is subjected to the asthma, the gravel, 



PHILOSOPHICAL GRAMMAR. 161 

the dropsy and the gout ; that his funeral will be at- 
tended by a train of mourners, and that a monument 
of marble will be erected to his memory when his 
carcass is putrefying with the reptiles of the dust?" 

But when it is desired to add weight to the sentence, 
and give prominence to the several particulars, the 
and is inserted. "I know thy works, and thy labor, 
and thy patience, and how thou canst not bear them 
which are evil ; and thou hast tried them which say 
they are apostles and are not, and hast found them 
liars; and hast borne, and hast patience, and for my 
name's sake hast labored and hast not fainted." 

But, being derived from two different words, has 
two different meanings. But, from the Saxon be-utau, 
be out, leave out, save, or except ; " All but one are 
here" — all save or except one. 

But for hot, as it was formerly written, from hot an 
to boot, add, preteradd. " Twenty are here, but five 
more are coming, " — add the proposition, " five more 
are corning." There is a corruption in respect to the 
use of but, but it is now so common as to authorize 
its use. " There were but five present." Here but 
is said to have the sense of only ; and since the sen- 
tence is readily understood and has the recommenda- 
tion of brevity, it may be justified. Yet the sentence 
construed literally, is defective; as, There were pres- 
ent except five. It should be, There were not but 
five present — that is, There were none present if we 
except five. 

If, suppose, grant, allow. It was formerly written 
gif the word from which give comes. " You shall 
have them if (grant the fact or proposition) I can 
get them." " If ( ) a man dies, will he live again V 
Suppose the fact, * a man dies,' ' will he live again V 

Though, Although, grant, allow, admit. " For 

though (that) I made you sorry with a letter, I do not 

repent, though ( ) I did repent." " Although all shall 

be offended yet will not I." Admit even that, all 

14* 



162 AN ANALYTICAL AND 

the rest shall be offended, yet (get or retain) this, I 
will not. Yet is originally the same word as get ; y 
and g being interchanged irrespectively. 

Except, to take out or away. " They have all ar- 
rived except three musicians." — " Except ( ) these 
abide in the ship ye cannot be saved. "—The proposi- 
tion, * Ye cannot be saved ' is true, if you take away 
the fact expressed in the other. " I tell you nay, but 
except ye repent, ye shall all likewise perish." Ye shall 
all likewise perish — this is true if (give or grant that) 
you do not repent. Except is not a preposition or 
relative as named by some grammarians, for it does 
not denote relation, which is the essential characteris- 
tic of that class of words. 

Save, leave out, except. " Of the Jews five times 
received I forty stripes save one." " And there was 
not left a man of them, save Caleb the son of Jephun- 
neh, and Joshua the son of Nun." 

Unless, take away, dismiss, except. It is used in the 
same manner as except, and often interchanged with it. 
e He is not in town unless he arrived yesterday.' 

Less, take away, remove. " 14 and 7 and 23, less 
4 are how many ?" 

Else is similar to less or unless in its meaning and 
use. 



PREDICALS. 

Lest, Provided, Notwithstanding, Seeing, 
During. 

Lest is a predical, from less, and means dismissed, 
taken away, &x. " Reprove not a scorner lest he hate 
thee." — Reprove not a scorner, that being dismissed, 
or, in other words, act to the contrary, and reprove a 
scorner and he will hate you. 

Provided, granted, allowed, &,c. " I shall go, 
provided he sends for me." 



PHILOSOPHICAL GRAMMAR. 163 

Notwithstanding means opposing, not standing with. 
" He went notwithstanding he was told not to." — He 
was told not to go ; notwithstanding or opposing that 
prohibition, he went. Mr. Webster says notwithstand- 
ing means not opposing, but in no case can we find 
that it has that meaning, but the contrary. Take, for 
instance, an example which he himself cites. " Moses 
said let no man leave of it till the morning, notwith- 
standing they tiarkened not to Moses." This in full 
he says, would be ' Moses said let no man leave of it 
until the morning ; notwithstanding this command of 
Moses, they harkened not to him.' Now, how he can 
make notwithstanding to mean not opposing, is to us a 
mystery. 

Seeing, when used as in the following sentence, 
" Wherefore come ye to me seeing ye hate me," 
means, being seen, or being in existence so as to be seen ; 
- Ye hate me, 5 seeing that, or that fact being seen or 
existing, ' wherefore come ye to met' Since is used 
before propositions, in the same manner and with a 
like meaning. 

During is in its formation a regular predical, from 
dure, but in its use is a relative, and is classed accor- 
dingly. 

Some of the foregoing words are used as definers, 
or relatives ; as, since when used before nouns, is a 
relative ; yet and else are often used as definers, &c. 

DEFINERS. 

What, Which. 

What and which are always definers ; though com- 
monly that which is defined is understood. What is 
often used as equivalent to that which, and must be 
parsed as such. ' This is what I wanted.' — This is 
that which I wanted. These words have usually been 
called pronouns, but it is an error, as they are never 
used instead of a noun. 



164 an analytical and 

That. 

That is always a definer, the thing denned being 
often omitted. That has been called an adjective 
pronoun; in respect to that, see p. 104. It is also 
called a conjunction ; but upon that point see in the 
sequel, the extract from Webster's Manual. 

All. 

All is a definer when it precedes a noun without 
any intervening word ; as, ' All men are mortal.' 
When the precedes or follows it, either expressed or 
implied, it is a noun ; as, ■ All the troops were dis- 
banded.' ' He has sold all of his hay,' — (the whole.) 

Never. 

Never when used as, ' It rained never so hard,' 
means something beyond any thing of the kind before. 
Ever is sometimes improperly substituted for it, and 
the substitution is authorized by some grammarians, 
yet it is an error. Substitute ever in the above sen- 
tence and the superlative meaning vanishes at once; 
instead of representing it as something more than 
eommon, it represents it as only what commonly hap- 
pens. ' It rains ever so hard ; that is, it always rains 
so hard. The substitution might as properly be 
made in the following sentence as in such as the above. 
" Never saw I the like before." Ever saw I the like 
before. The intended meaning is entirely perverted 
by the substitution; therefore it should be studiously 
avoided. 

Because. 

Because is a word compounded of by and cause ; 
it is a clausal definer, involving both the noun and rel- 
ative. It has usually been called a i conjunction,' but 
the impropriety of that may be seen from the remarks 
by Webster in the extract on a subsequent page. 



philosophical grammar. [65 

Then. 

Then when it denotes a consequence has been im- 
properly called a conjunction ; but it is always a definer. 
" He sent for you/' " Then I must go." Then defines 
must go, showing the reason why. That it is not a con- 
junction is evident, because if we substitute consequent- 
ly, which may be done with propriety, the same authors 
that call then a conjunction, would call consequently an 
adverb, that is, a definer of a verb, or some other part 
of speech except a noun, usually. 

Here, There, Where. 

These words were originally nouns, meaning this 
place, that place, and what place. They are now some- 
times used as nouns and sometimes as definers. "About 
ten o'clock in the morning we came to where this line 
of rugged hills swept down into a valley.'' — W. Irving. 
" They came to where the smoke of the distant camp 
was seen rising from the woody margin of the stream.' 3 
— Irving. 

" Go search it there, tvhere to be born and die, 
Of rich and poor makes all the history." — Pope. 

Whence, from which position. 

Hence, from a present position. 

Thence, from that place. 

Hitherto, to the time present. 

Hither, to this place. 

Thither, to that place. 

Whither, to what place. 

While, a wheel, a period, or revolution. 

Perhaps, by haps or chance. 

Wherefore, for which ( ). 

Therefore, for that ( ). 

These words are usually definers, though some of 
them are sometimes nouns ; as " From hence it appears 
probable enough." — Addison. 



166 AN ANALYTICAL AND 



RULES, 



Grammar rules are of two kinds; rules 
of construction and rules of collocation. 

RULES OF CONSTRUCTION. 
RULE I. 

A noun is in the Subjective case, when 
any thing is predicated of it. See p. 95. 

RULE II. 

A noun is in the Objective case, when it 
follows a predicative, or a relative. See p. 
95. 

RULE III. 

A noun is in the Relative case, when it 
indicates a relation between the objects 
represented by itself and a following noun. 
See p. 97. 

RULE IV. 

A noun is in the Independent case, when 
it has no constructive connection in a pro- 
position. See p. 98. 



PHILOSOPHICAL GRAMMAR. 167 

RULE V. 

A noun explaining another noun and de- 
noting the same thing, is in the same case. 
See p. 96. 

" Must I leave thee, Paradise." — Paradise is in the same case 
with thee. 

RULE VI. 

Pronouns have the same number and per- 
son and take the same relations to other 
words as the nouns they supersede would 
do in the same place. 

RULE VII. 

Two or more nouns united by and or add 
are usually taken as a collective plural in 
their relation to other words. 

RULE VIII. 

A collective noun, when the mind is di- 
rected to the individual parts by it embraced, 
takes the same relation to other words as a 
plural noun. 

u The clergy began to withdraw themselves from the tempo- 
ral courts." 

RULE IX. 

Words in their constructive relations to 
other w r ords, are singular, or plural, just as 



168 AN ANALYTICAL AND 

the idea of unity or plurality may predomi- 
nate. 

11 The greater 'part of philosophers have acknowledged the 
excellence of this government." 

" There was more than a hundred and fifty thousand pounds 
sterling." " A part of the exports consist of raw silk." " 1 
have not been to London this five years." " How long will 
that people provoke me, and how long will it be ere they will 
believe me for all the signs that I have showed among them" 
" Liberty should reach every individual of a people ; as they all 
share one common nature." " But it is not this real essence 
that distinguishes them into species ; it is men who range them 
into sorts." "Their safety and welfare is most concerned." 
" Either sex and every age ivas engaged in the pursuits of in- 
dustry." These sentences cited, though in opposition to the 
teachings of the old grammars, respecting number and person, 
are nevertheless of the best authority, both as to their authors 
and their propriety ; and show that nature will triumph over, 
or break through the trammels of grammar rules imposed ar- 
bitrarily. The following improper and inelegant sentences 
show the absurdity of adhering to the rules in all cases. " The 
proportion of infants which dies;" Is it the proportion which 
dies, or is it the infants f . " While such a cloud of mischiefs 
hangs about us." " — because a greater part of the born lives 
to marry." Query, does the part marry ? 

It is correct to say, nine times nine are eighty one, or nine 
times nine is eighty one ; for the individuals of the number are 
considered in the one case, and the aggregate in the other. 

RULE X. 

Nominal predicatives are in the same 
case that a noun would be in the same sit- 
uation. 

" For to me, to live is Christ and to die is gain." " What 
went ye out for to see 9" " To confess the truth, 1 was much 
in fault." In the first sentence, it is in the Subjective ease, in 
the second, Objective, in the third, Independent. 

RULE XI. 

Imperatives are often used without any 
proper subject. 



PHILOSOPHICAL GRAMMAR. 169 

" Israel burned none, save Hazor only.'' " Let us make 
man," &c. " Go to now let us," &c. 



RULE XII. 

Imperfect predicals take the objective 
case after them, the same as predicatives. 

"Men speaking perverse things, will arise." 
RULE XIII. 

Imperfect and compound predicals may 
have case like nouns. 

" His being intemperate deprived him of good society." "I 
had heard of his beinsL intemperate." Being of an ungovern- 
able temper they could do nothing with him. 

RULE XIV. 

Any predicative may take after it one or 
more objective case. 

" They offered him a salary; therefore, he was offered a sala- 
ry." tc They slept their last sleep." 

RULE XV. 

Definers are used to define single words 
of any class, or an assemblage of words. 

RULE XVI. 

Words of any class may occasionally be 
used in any other class ; and when so, they 
are parsed according to the class in which 
they are used. 
15 



170 AN ANALYTICAL AND 



Remark. 



And is used between subjects when the fact predi- 
cated is applicable alike to them all. 

Remark. 

The subject and predicate may be either logical, 
or grammatical. 

A grammatical subject is simply the subject of 
the predicative, without any modifying words; as 
" The principal ministerial officer in a county is the 
sherif." 

A logical subject is the subject of the predicative 
together with all its modifying words; as " The prin- 
cipal ministerial officer in a county is the sherif." 

A grammatical predicate is simply the predicative 
without any modifying words ; as "The air is an elas- 
tic substance." 

A logical predicate is the predicative together with 
all the modifying words ; as " The air is an elastic 
substance." 

The above distinctions are sometimes referred to 
by calling the grammatical subject ' the subject of 
the predicative ;■ and the logical subject i the subject 
of the proposition. ; 



RULES OF COLLOCATION. 

Rules respecting the collocation of words are so 
numerous and variable, that they are better learned 
from observation, than from a book. The following 
general rules may be given, but they are by no means 
certain at all times, and less so in poetry than in prose. 

1. The natural order is, first, the subject, next, the 
predicative, and last, the object ; \ David slewGoliah.' 



PHILOSOPHICAL GRAMMAR. 171 

2. Single modifying words are placed before the 
subject and object. * These abominable principles 
demand the most decisive indignation.' 

3. Modifying clauses are usually placed after the 
subject and object. ' The improvements of the press 
have reduced the price of books, 1 

4. The subject may be separated from its predica- 
tive, by an intervening proposition. c The press, that 
lever of Archimedes, which now moves the world, was 
unknown.' 

5. In interrogative propositions the subject is placed 
after a simple predicative, and after the first auxiliary 
of a compound predicative. ' Have you a horse V ' Is 
he well V ( Do you call this submission V Who, which, 
and what form exceptions to the rule ; ( Who can 
abide it V ' Which is the one V ' What book is that V 

6. In conditional or hypothetical propositions, 
where the word expressing the hypothesis is omitted, 
the subject is placed the same as in interrogative prop- 
ositions. ( Had the day been fair, 1 should have gone.' 
' Did he but know my fears, he would be more careful.' 
* Was it only a mile, I would go.' 

Imperative propositions sometimes accord with the 
above, and sometimes with the natural order. 

7. When a proposition introduced by a definer, has 
no objective case, the subject is often placed after the 
predicative. * Gradual sinks the breeze ;' ' Wonderful 
was the effect of their labor ;' ' So panteth my soul 
after thee, O Lord;' ' Thus saith the Lord.' 

8. In narration, the order of the proposition intro- 
ducing another's language, is frequently inverted. 
" Father, said I, what are these huge volumes? These, 
said he, are the Interpreters of the Scriptures. There 
is a prodigious number of them, replied I. Are there, 
answered he ?" 

Respecting the position of definers, no certain rules 
can be given, for it is a matter to be determined by 
the particular idea the writer wishes to convey ; for 



172 AN ANALYTICAL AND 

instance, ■ Enter this door only' — that is, enter this 
door and not the others. ' Enter this only door' — 
that is, there is but this one door which yon may or 
can enter. * Enter only this door' — that is, merely 
enter and no more ; this form is sometimes used to 
mean the same as the first, but incorrectly. 'Only 
enter this door' — here only defines the proposition ; as 
much as to say, Enter this door, and such and such 
will be the consequences. We see from the example 
given, that the position of the definer is determined 
by the idea required to be conveyed, consequently no 
fixed rules can be given. We would ask the Adver- 
bial grammarians if they can make scholars see the 
propriety of calling only, as in the above cases, some- 
times an adverb, and sometimes an adjective ? Query 
— what is only in the last example, where it belongs 
not to a verb, adjective, or noun alone, but to all to- 
gether 1 

Respecting the omission of words, it may be given 
as a general rule, that words may be omitted whenever 
the ellipse will not obscure the meaning ; the follow- 
ing are some cases where they are usually omitted. 

1. The to of nominal predicatives following bid, 
let, see, hear, feel, make, and some others is omitted ; 
as, ' He bid me ( ) come unto him,' * They made him 
( ) do it/ &c. 

2. The relative before nouns of time, distance, di- 
rection, &c, is usually omitted. • He lived here ( ) 
seven years ;' ' The horses ran ( ) a mile,' &c. The 
propriety of inserting a relative in such cases whether 
in writing or parsing is by many doubted, because it 
is an idiom of the language to use the expressions 
without a relative. 

3. After the definers which, what, this, that, these, 
those, few, many, &,c. the noun defined is often omit- 
ted. ' Many ( ) are called, but few ( ) are chosen.' 
' This ( ) is an evidence of the truth of that ( ).' 
' Which ( ) will you have?' ' What ( ) is this V 



PHILOSOPHICAL GRAMMAR. 1T3 

4. After than, there is usually an ellipsis of one or 
more words besides the definer corresponding to the 
one the in dualistic degree. - There is none in this 
house greater than ( ) I," ( ) — that is, than great, I am. 
1 It is better for me to die, than ( ) ( ) to live' — -for me. 

But it is needless as well as impossible to give rules 
for all cases of ellipse. When a word or words, once 
mentioned, occur again in close connection, there is 
usually an ellipse : as, ( I will pull down my barns and 
( ) build greater' ( ). 'I shall not go to town today, 
but Henry will' ( ). 



PUNCTUATION. 

Before giving rules for punctuation, it will be prof- 
itable to consider what punctuation is, and what is its 
use. Punctuation is commonly defined to be, " The 
marking of the several pauses to be observed in read- 
ing and speaking." And in strict consistency with 
this definition the comparative length of the pauses, 
is given. But. whatever punctuation may have been 
formerly, it is manifest to an investigator, that it is 
not now what it is said in the above definition, to be. 
For if the object is to mark the pauses to be observed 
in reading, then a point should be placed wherever a 
pause is to be made, and a pause should be made 
wherever a point is placed; which is not the case, as 
every good reader knows. Good reading often re- 
quires a pause to be made after the subject of a verb 
or predicative : but it would be a violation of the 
rules of punctuation, to put a point there. Thus, 
" All finery — is a sign of littleness."' "An idle, tri- 
fling society — :s near akin to such as is corrupting.'"' 
" True gentleness — is native feeling heightened and 
improved by principle. " As to the length of the 
pauses, it is well known that we make the same pauses 
15* 



174 AN ANALYTICAL ANI> 

of much greater length in reading serious, dignified 
pieces, than in those of a lively, spirited nature. And 
as to the comparative length of them, we know that 
good readers often stop as long at a comma as is re- 
quired for a semicolon, or colon, and frequently for 
these last, not longer than for a comma ; and at a pe- 
riod we may stop one, two, three, or four moments, or 
as many hours. Hence we infer it is not the business 
of points to mark the pauses to be observed in reading. 
We do not mean by this, to say that punctuation has 
nothing to do with reading. Good reading is mainly 
dependent on the apprehension of the sense of the 
piece, and punctuation, so far as it aids in a ready 
and clear perception of that, is highly conducive to 
it. And this we conceive to be the main object of 
punctuation ; not to mark the pauses, but the sense. 
For illustration ; " On the use made of the Psalms, 
in the New Testament'' — This sentence requires no 
pause, yet it requires points to mark the sense ; for 
who ever heard of there being psalms in the New 
Testament ? Yet without punctuation the sentence 
reads thus. But separate the clause of the Psalms 
by points, and then it will read as it should, " On the 
use made in the New Testament." Again ; " That I 
may be delivered from them that do not believe in 
Judea." — Here also points are needed to mark the 
sense rather than a pause. There should be a com- 
ma after believe, to show that the clause in Judea, 
does not come in connection with it ; and another 
after them, to show that it belongs in there. For the 
apostle was speaking of disbelief in Christianity , not 
Judea ; but the men were in Judea. 

The following on punctuation, it is hoped, will be 
found to be not merely new, but better than the rules 
heretofore given, inasmuch as the reasons are given. 

Punctuation is the division of a composi- 



PHILOSOPHICAL GRAMMAR. 175 

tion, by significant points, to aid in appre- 
hending the meaning. 

The Period (.) is a point placed at the 
close of a sentence to denote that the 
thought is complete. Man is mortal. Truth 
is immutable. It is used also to denote an 
abbreviation ; as N. Y. New York. Heb. 
Hebrews. 

Thl°L ( micolon(;)i is used between mem- 
bers of a sentence to denote that the previ- 
ous member is complete, yet, what follows 
is to be considered in connection with it ; 
as " Economy is no disgrace ; for it is bet- 
ter to live on a little, than to outlive a great 
deal." " Be in peace with many ; never- 
theless have but one counselor of a thou- 
sand." 

The Comma (,) is used to remove obscu- 
rities that may arise from collocation. 
When the order of construction is so inter- 
rupted by transposition, interposition, or el- 

* "This point is of little use; the difference between 
the colon and semicolon is so small, that the two pauses are 
frequently confounded, as may be seen in our present version 
of the Proverbs. It is said that a colon should be placed before a 
quotation; but I consider the u&e of the semicolon as prefera- 
ble. 1 conceive the colon might be rejected, without injury 
to the perspicuity of sentences ; and punctuation very much 
simplified by substituting the semicolon and the full point. 
That slight dependence of a subsequent sentence upon a pre- 
ceding one, which is marked by a colon, is also marked by the 
full point; for we are not to suppose a full point precludes a 
connection between sentences.'' — Webster s Grammar, p. 154. 



176 AN ANALYTICAL AND 

lipse that it may occasion doubt, or obscurity, 
a comma is required to indicate it. 

ILLUSTRATIONS. 

" The fear of the Lord is the beginning f wisdom." 
— This sentence needs no comma, because the order 
of construction is as perfect as it can be ; for no part 
can be omitted or have its place changed without de- 
stroying the sentence. 

" His work is, in many respects, very imperfect." — 
Here the order is interrupted by the transposition of 
the clause ( in many respects,' which belongs after 
imperfect ; hence a comma is required at the begin- 
ning and end of it. " I remember with gratitude, his 
goodness to me." — Here the order is interrupted by 
the interposition of the clause, with gratitude, which 
may be omitted, or be changed in location without 
injury to the sentence ; but as ivitk shows the relation 
between remember and gratitude, no point should be 
placed at the beginning of the clause; yet one is re- 
quired at the close of it to show that the following 
words are broken off from their proper connection. 
Grammarians have hitherto taught that the clause 
with gratitude and the like, should have a comma at 
the beginning as well as the end ; but it is incorrect. 
The following is a case where an interposed clause 
requires a comma at the beginning ; " Vices, like 
shadows, towards the evening of life, grow great and 
monstrous." — A comma is required before like to de- 
note that it does not show relation between vices and 
shadows. The vices are not like shadows, but they 
grow great and monstrous like shadows. If there 
was no comma after vices, it would mean that those 
vices only which are like shadows, grow great and 
monstrous. A comma is required after shadows to 
show that it does not mean shadows toward the evening 
of life. " Among the ancient critics, Longinus pos- 



PHILOSOPHICAL GRAMMAR. 177 

sessed most delicacy ; Aristotle, most correctness." — 
A comma is required after Aristotle, on account of 
the ellipse. The ellipsis of and should be indicated 
by a comma; as " David was a brave, wise, and pious 
man." " In a letter, we may advise, exhort, comfort, 
request and discuss." 

A few remarks may be necessary respecting certain 
words which sometimes require points. Clausal defi- 
ners require points in the same manner and upon the 
same, principle as clauses. " Peter, therefore, was 
kept in prison." " It is, therefore, not much approv- 
ed." Therefore is a clausal definer defining the 
whole proposition, hence its proper place is not in 
the proposition. " Finally, I shall only repeat what 
has often been justly said." " Indeed, some of those 
heavy particles, &c." 

The imperatives, such as if, though, and, but, sup- 
pose, &,c. require a comma after them, when the 
collocation of what follows does not accord with the 
construction; as, "If, on the contrary, he asserts 
that mind is material," &c. — A comma is required 
after if to show that the clause on the contrary does 
not pertain to if or the act of granting. It is not to 
be granted on the contrary, but it is to be granted 
that he asserts on the contrary. Place the words in 
the order of construction, and no comma is required 
after if " If he asserts on the contrary, that mind 
is material." " Yet, in the dialect which obtained in 
the beginning of the last century, these modes of 
expression were common." " Yet these modes of 
expression were common in the dialect," &c. " But, 
however this may succeed, our duty is the same." 
" But our duty is the same, however this may suc- 
ceed." 

Or requires a point before it, when the words be- 
fore and after it do not represent the same thing ; as 
" Error in act, or judgment, is the source of endless 
sighs." If they represent the same thing, no point 



178 AN ANALYTICAL AND 

should be used; as, " A sphere or globe is a round 
body like this earth." 

And requires a comma before it when the addition 
is not to be made to one thing alone of several ; as, 
" A woman, gentle, sensible, well educated, and reli- 
gious," — here and requires a comma before it to de- 
note that religious is not to be added to well educated 
alone. 

The Interrogation point (?) is used to denote that 
the previous proposition or sentence is a question ; 
as, " Who can fathom the plans of the Almighty V* 
It may be put in the place of a period, or a semico- 
lon. 

The Exclamation point (!) is used to show that the 
words were uttered under the influence of deep emo- 
tion ; as, " Admirable ! This is more than I could 
have hoped." Ir may be put in the place of a period, 
semicolon, or comma. 

The Parenthesis ( ) encloses some thought which 
is explanatory, or additional, yet not essential. 

Brackets [ ] enclose some important explanation, 
or remark. 

The Dash ( — ) denotes a sudden turn of thought ; 
as, " Perdition catch my soul — but I do love thee;" 
an omission ; as, 

-On they move, 



Indissolubly firm - 

also a reference of what follows to what precedes ; as 
" You don't care sixpence whether he was wet or 
dry." — Johnson, " The word is used in its primitive 
manner, without government, like many other names 
of portions of time, — a month, a week." " They 
cannot choose but — that is, they have no choice except 
to be very fallible." 

The Hyphen (-) shows a union of the words or 
parts of words between which it is placed. A word 
divided at the end of a line should be divided between 
syllables, and the hyphen be but once used. 



PHILOSOPHICAL GRAMMAR. 179 

Quotation marks (" ") indicate that the writer 
gives the sentiment of another in the person's own 
words. 

The Apostrophe (') shows an abbreviation; as, e'er 
for ever ; 'tis for it is. 

The Caret ( A ) shows the place where omitted 
words should be inserted. 

Various other marks are used, some for the purpose 
of reference, and some for other purposes ; but they 
need not be explained here. 



CAPITAL LETTERS. 

1. All distinctive appellations should be- 
gin with a capital letter. 

2. The first word of every sentence, 
verse, or paragraph ; and the first word of 
every line of poetry. 

3. The first word of an example. 

4. The first word of a quotation introdu- 
ced in a direct manner. 

5. The pronoun 7, and the exclamation O. 

Remark. 

What is meant by a distinctive appellation, is, a 
word which separates out from others, the thing rep- 
resented, and makes it an object of distinct consider- 
ation ; as, " The proper study of mankind is Man." 
" He lectures on Temperance and Slavery" Of 
course all particular nouns are distinctive appella- 
tions ; likewise, definers derived from particular 
nouns ; as English, Spanish, &c. The names applied 
to the Supreme Being, are distinctive of the true God, 



180 AN ANALYTICAL AND 

in opposition to false and idol gods ; hence they com- 
mence with a capital letter. " God said Let there be 
light." 

" It is not Cesar, but the gods, my fathers ; 
The gods declare against us, and repel 
Our vain attempts." 

But when any particular, fabled, or idol god is 
spoken of, a capital letter is used ; as, 

" The River Gods no longer rise like old father Thames. " 

" Rollin's Ancient History." — Rollin's begins with 
a capital letter, because it is a particular noun ; An- 
cient begins thus to distinguish the history of ancient 
things, from an old history ; and History, because it 
designates a particular book appropriated to history. 
( Thompson's Seasons,' and other titles of books and 
subjects follow the same rule, for similar reasons. 



Much has been said respecting the proper address 
when two or more persons of the same name are in- 
cluded. Some grammarians contend that the distinc- 
tive title only should be plural, as, The two Hisses 
Brown ; others that the name only should be plural, 
as, The two Miss Browns ; and others, that title and 
name both should be plural, as, The two Misses 
Browns. A little reflection will be sufficient to show 
that the last is the only correct form. For the name, 
as is obvious, is not a definer defining the title, but is 
a noun in apposition. Hence by substituting, or an- 
nexing other appositive nouns we shall see that it 
should be plural ; as, The two Misses Browns, Man- 
tuamakers, The Gentlemen Russells, Silversmiths, and 
not, The two Brown Misses Mantuamaker, nor The 
two Misses Brown Mantuamaker, nor The two Misses 
Brown Mantuamakers ; not The Russell Gentlemen 
Silversmiths, nor, The Gentlemen Russell Silver- 
smiths. The twelve Cesars, Romans, or, The 



PHILOSOPHICAL GRAMMAR, 181 

twelve Romans, Cesars ; and not The twelve Cesars 
Roman, nor The twelve Romans Cesar, which would 
be the case, if The Misses Brown was correct. 



COMPOSITION. 

This subject, in its details belongs more properly 
to rhetoric than to grammar ; hence we shall not en- 
large upon it, and what we do say, will be more in 
the way of pointing out errors to be avoided, than in 
prescribing rules to be followed. 

In writing, the following inquiry should be constant- 
ly applied as a test of propriety — does my language 
express my whole meaning and nothing but my mean- 
ing ; does it express it concisely ; does it express it 
elegantly ? 

The following are violations of the rule. 

1. " — and their cattle were brought into the area, 
every night, under penalty of their being driven off 
before morning. 5 ' — Martineau. It is evident that this 
sentence does not express the writer's meaning and 
had she applied the test, she would not have left it as 
it is. The sentence as it now stands, means that the 
cattle were liable to be driven off as a forfeiture for 
their being brought into the area; but the writer's 
meaning evidently was, that cattle left out of the en- 
closure, were liable to be driven off by prowling 
plunderers. Hence they were not brought in under 
the penalty, but would have been left out under pen- 
alty of their being driven off before morning, by 
prowlers. 

2. " I shall give from the work last quoted, a spec- 
imen (I cannot say of great delicacy) in stigmatizing, 
but at least of such an indirect manner as is sufficient 
to screen the author from the imputation of down* 

16 



182 AN ANALYTICAL AND 

right rudeness." — Campbell's Ph. Rhet. This sen- 
tence is very faulty in its arrangement, or in its design. 
The clause but at least, evidently was intended to 
qualify the clause in the parenthesis, but if that was 
omitted, which according to rules it might be, what 
would but at least apply to ? Besides, as it now 
stands it most properly qualifies in stigmatizing, but 
that would make little or no sense. The arrangment 
would be better, thus, " I shall give from the work 
last quoted, a specimen in stigmatizing, (I cannot 
say of great delicacy, but at least,) of an such an in- 
direct manner as is sufficient to screen the author 
from the imputation of downright rudeness." 

3. "From one element, c solid and liquid fire/ the 
poet has framed a world of horror and suffering, such 
as imagination had never traversed. But fiercer 
flames than those which encompass Satan, burn in 
his own soul." — Channing. Who would suspect from 
the language here used, that his own does not refer to 
the poet ? yet reflection and the context both show 
that it does not. If own was omitted, the ambiguity 
would be removed — " But fiercer flames than those 
which encompass Satan, burn in his soul/ — that is, 
fiercer flames rage within, than without. 

4. "The conduct of the Jews towards the disciples 
after their Lord's death, proves that they knew noth- 
ing of the Trinitarian doctrine." — Ware. There is 
nothing in this sentence that would go to show that 
they does not refer to the Jews, and it obviously does 
refer to them ; yet the context shows that they stands 
for the disciples and not the Jews. 

5. " It is folly to pretend to arm ourselves against 
the accidents of life, by heaping up treasures, which 
nothing can protect us against, but the good provi- 
dence of our heavenly Father." — Sherlock. Which, 
in this sentence would obviously refer to treasures, 
but who wishes to be protected against treasures 1 
The sentence should stand thus — " It is folly to at- 



PHILOSOPHICAL GRAMMAR. 183 

tempt, by heaping up treasures, to prm ourselves 
against the accidents of life, from which nothing can 
protect us, but the good providence of our heavenly 
Father." Pretend and against are incorrectly used 
in the first form of the sentence. 

6. " — and looks like Scarron's character of the 
great queen Semi ram is who says that author was the 
founder of Babylon, conqueror of the east and an 
excellent housewife." — Addison, Now did the writer 
mean to say that Queen Semiramis says the author 
Scarron was the founder of Babylon, conqueror of 
the east, and an excellent housewife ; or that, the au- 
thor Scarron says Semiramis was so? There is noth- 
ing except punctuation (which is purposely omitted) 
that would determine it to be the latter. But if prac- 
ticable the arrangement should determine the sense 
without the aid of punctuation ; which might have 
been done in this case, by placing says after author — 
* who that author says.' 

7. " But see yourg Juba ! the good youth appears, 

Full of the guilt of his perfidious subjects." — Addison. 

The clause, full of the guilt, is ambiguous, as it may 
mean that Juba though ostensibly good, was yet full 
of the same perfidiousness as his subjects, or that he 
was full of sorrow and regret on account of the guilt 
of his perfidious subjects ; and this, probably, was 
the writer's meaning. 

8. " If rich freights are in danger afar of from 
storms, and harvests at home, from blights." — Marti- 
neau. The phrase afar off is very improperly loca- 
ted. Whether it be * in danger afar off or ' afar off 

from storms,' either is an impossibility, or an absur- 
dity. As afar off applies to ' freights,' it should be 
thus — ' If rich freights afar off, are in danger from 
storms, and harvests at home, ( ) from blights. — ' 

9. " Such were the centaurs of Ixion's race, 

Who a bright cloud, for Juno, did embrace." — Denham. 



184 



AN ANALYTICAL AND 



What does tolio represent, the centaurs, or Ixion, or 
Ixion's race ? The pronouns are very liable to cause 
ambiguity ; and often it is impossible to prevent it 
without excluding them and substituting that which 
they represent. " They were persons of such moder- 
ate intellects, even before they were impaired by their 
passions." Here the pronoun first stands for persons, 
and next for intellects, and then for persons, again.. 
" If it were spoken with never so great skill in the 
actor, the manner of uttering that sentence could 
have nothing in it which could strike any but people 
of the greatest humanity, nay, people elegant and 
skillful in observations upon it." The definer which, 
is often liable to the same fault unless the noun defin- 
ed is inserted. " One may have an air which pro- 
ceeds from a just sufficiency and knowledge of the 
matter before him, which may naturally produce some 
motions of his head and body, which might become 
the bench better than the bar." Here which defines 
three different things, and the mind does not readily 
apprehend what they are ; hence, in such cases the 
expression should be varied, or the thing defined 
should be inserted a sufficient 'number of times to 
prevent all doubt or hesitancy in regard to the mean- 
ing. There are some words that have a double mean- 
ing, and unless they are used with great caution 
ambiguity will arise from their use. " The young 
man did not want natural talents." There may at 
first be a doubt whether want means to desire or to 
lack; yet upon reflection we know that there are 
none that do not desire natural talents, consequently 
we conclude that the young man did not lack natural 
talents. But sentences that require us to stop and 
reflect for to apprehend the meaning, are faulty. 

Inattention to the position of definers is a common 
fault among writers. " Not only Jesuits can equivo- 
cate. " Here only defines equivocate according to 
grammatical construction, or if not, it defines Jesuits, 



PHILOSOPHICAL GRAMMAR. 185 

making them - only Jesuits ;' but the writer's meaning, 
evidently was i Jesuits only/ hence he should have 
said, ' Not Jesuits only can equivocate.' " Theism 
can only be opposed to atheism," — that is, it can be 
nothing more than opposed ; it should be, ' Theism 
can be opposed to atheism only.' " The Romans 
understood liberty, at least, as well as we." The 
collocation here would indicate that at least was to 
be taken with liberty, meaning that among all the 
subjects which the Romans understood, liberty at 
least they understood as well as we ; that is, if they 
did not understand the other things, as well as we, 
they did liberty. But the writer's meaning was prob- 
ably that the Romans understood liberty, if not bet- 
ter, at least as well as we; hence it should be, The 
Romans understood liberty, as well at least, as we. 

Ellipsis often occasions obscurity. " I can lift the 
weights as easily as you," — does this mean that the 
weights, or you can be raised with equal ease ; or does 
it mean I can lift the w r eights as easily as you can 
lift the weights? If the latter was the writer's mean- 
ing, can should not have been omitted. "I have fur- 
nished the house exactly according to your fancy, or, 
if you please, my own ; for I have long since learnt 
to like nothing but what you db, v — does do mean 
here like, or perforin ? 

There are errors of another kind, a few examples 
of which may be given to put the student upon the 
alert. " Of this art, it is not easy to decide, which 
deserves to be most admired, the difficulty, the inge- 
nuity, or the usefulness of the invention." — Webster's 
Gr. p. 6. Do we admire a difficulty? " There are 
three things in that establishment which I admire—* 
the folly of the builder — the waste of property-^-and 
the taste displayed in wasting it." — Dr. Tenney. 
Whatever meaning may be attached to admire, it can- 
not be appropriate to all the objects which follow, 
because they are incompatible. The ' taste' is an ob* 
16* 



186 AN ANALYTICAL AND 

ject to be admired, but the others are not, unless ad- 
mire should be used with a different meaning, which 
is not admissible in the same sentence. Present cus- 
tom inclining to make admire a factotum ; hence, we 
hear often such expressions as these. " I should ad- 
mire to have you see that building." " You would 
admire to hear him." This incorrect use of admire 
is an affectation that ought to be discarded. 

In the use of the auxiliaries shall, will, &,c., En- 
glish writers violate good English, and some Ameri- 
can writers, through affectation, expose themselves to 
the same censure, " He speaks an infinite deal of 
nothing. His reasons are as two grains of wheat hid 
in two bushels of chaff; you shall seek all day ere 
you find them, and when you have them they are not 
worth the search." — Shakspeare. It seems rather 
hard to compel one to search all day when he may 
perhaps find them in a very short time. 

" China vessels are playthings for women of all 
ages. An old lady of fourscore shall be as busy in 
cleaning an Indian mandarin, as her great-grand- 
daughter is in dressing her baby." — Addison. 
" There is as little hazard that a piece shall be faulty 
in this respect, as that a mirror shall be too faithful 
in reflecting the images of objects, or that the glasses 
of a telescope shall be too transparent." — Campbell. 
Shall should be wilL " For they were now sure we 
would fall in with robbers." — Henderson. Should 
and not luould. If native writers do not use good 
English, we cannot find fault with the Frenchman who 
complaining of tardy assistance while he was drown- 
ing, said, 'I will drown, I will drown, nobody shall 
help me.' 

With is often improperly used. " So much with 
regard to the use of copulatives." — Blair. " They 
are disheartened from doing their best with (by) the 
miserable reward which in some places they receive." 
" 1 do likewise dissent with the Examiner, upon the 



PHILOSOPHICAL GRAMMAR. 187 

phrases of ' passion's being poised/ and of the ( re- 
trieving merit from dependence/' which are very beau- 
tiful and poetical."'' — Addison. The language here 
means, that he with the Examiner, dissented from 
some one else: hut the last clause shows that he dis- 
sented from the Examiner. Of is improperly used, 
and should be omitted. 

In the use of of great looseness as well as great lat- 
itude prevails. " What is life in the slave States in 
respect of work.'"' — Martineau. " So that the size of 
the object may be inconsiderable in respect of it. ;; — 
Gregory. To should be used instead of of " No 
one is admitted of the museum proprietary body, who 
has not doubled the capes Horn and Good Hope.''' — 
Martineau. This is a very obscure sentence, and it 
is difficult if not impossible, to determine the exact 
meaning. " Plan of the gradual abolition of the poor 
laws proposed :" for. " A little after the reformation 
of Luther." This more properly implies a change 
in Luther, than one wrought hy him, which the writer 
meant. " — able to separate us from the love 

of God.' ? — Paid. Of is used before the subject and 
to before the object ; therefore as Paul meant our 
love to God, and not the love of God to us, he should 
have used to instead of of 

There is one use of of, which it may be rash in us 
to pronounce an error, yet it looks so much like it 
that we cannot help pointing it out. We find in our 
best authors, this use made of cf; 'Of Pronouns,' 
l Of Versification,'' 'Of reading verse,'" &c. It 
would have been a favor, if Mr. Webster had told us 
in his Grammar what of means in the case ; his Dic- 
tionary throws no light upon the subject, unless we 
are to consider the heading, Pronouns, Versification, 
&c. as the source, from or out of which, proceed the 
remarks that follow them. Remarks are generally 
spoken or written on a subject rather than of it. 



188 AN ANALYTICAL AN& 

We can conceive no advantage accruing from the 
exchange of on for of " He wrote at this time his 
work of Human Nature." 

In the use of or there is an almost unavoidable 
ambiguity. " They were both much more ancient 
among the Persians than Zoroaster or Zerdusht." 
There is no way by the sentence, to determine wheth- 
er Zoroaster and Zerdusht are the same, or two. If 
the rule which we have given for punctuation in such 
cases, was uniformly followed, that would decide that 
Zeroaster and Zerdusht, both are one, because there 
is no comma used before or. Likewise, if in such 
cases a or the, or a relative is used before the first 
noun and not the second, it determines that both refer 
to the same object. Both is wrongly placed in the 
above, as it now defines were, saying that they were 
both more ancient and something else. But that is 
not the meaning ; it should be, They both were more 
ancient, &c, — that is, there were two things each of 
which were, &c. Emphasis often corrects erroneous 
collocation, but it never excuses it. 

Elegance depends upon both the words and their 
collocation. It may be violated by the use of low 
words and phrases, by harsh words, and by an unhar- 
monious disposition of the words. A sentence should 
not end with such small words as of, withy to, &c. 
The unharmonious repetition of a word should be 
avoided by an interchange of synonymous words, un- 
less precision should forbid it. A chaste use of fig- 
ures tends much to an increase of elegance in com- 
position. On these several points ample instruction 
may be derived from Rhetorics, But as they are less 
full upon the subject of versification, we shall give 
more particular directions in respect to that. 



PHILOSOPHICAL GRAMMAK. 189 



PROSODY.— LAWS OF VERSIFICATION.* 

The following rules for the composition of English verse, are 
drawn from the writings of Dryden, Pope, and other great mas- 
ters of poetry, chiefly by the late Judge Trumbull, of Connec- 
ticut, who was, probably, the most accurate critic, in this de- 
partment of literature, which the present age has produced. A 
careful attention to these rules, may check the prevalence of 
mistakes in measure, which often disfigure the compositions of 
modern writers. 

Prosody is that part of grammar which treats of the 
pronunciation of words, and the laws of versification. 

Pronunciation is regulated principally by accent 
and quantity. 

Accent is a particular stress of voice with which a 
certain syllable of a word is uttered, and by which it 
is distinguished from the others. Thus, in pronoun- 
cing probability , we lay a greater stress of the voice 
upon the third syllable, than upon the others — the 
voice naturally resting upon that, and passing over the 
others with rapidity and a slight enunciation. This 
stress of voice on a particular part of a word, is 
equally necessary to the ease of utterance and the 
melody of speaking. 

In addition to the accent, which may be called pri- 
mary, there is, in pronouncing words of many sylla- 
bles, a secondary accent, less distinct than the princi- 
pal accent, but evidently distinguishing some one 
syllable from those which are unaccented. Thus, in 
the word indiscriminate, the principal accent is on the 
third syllable ; but the first syllable is evidently uttered 
with more force of voice, than the second and last 
two syllables. The final cause of both accents is the 
ease of pronunciation, and by this should both be reg- 
ulated ; for that manner of pronouncing words which 

* Taken from Webster's * Manual of Useful Studies,' and in- 
serted without alteration or remark. 



190 AN ANALYTICAL AND 

is most easy for the speaker, enables him to utter the 
several syllables with the most distinctness, which is 
consistent with a rapid communication of thoughts ; 
and this is necessary to render his enunciation agree- 
able to his hearers. Hence no rules of pronunciation, 
drawn from the termination of words, from their ety- 
mologies, or from the practice of popular speakers, 
should be suffered to interfere with this fundamental 
principle, the ease of utterance — for a forced, unnatu- 
ral accent is not only painful to the speaker, but ut- 
terly destructive of melody. 

The accent may fall on a vowel or on a consonant. 
When it falls on a vowel, the vowel is long — as in 
glory, table, lawful. When it falls on a consonant, 
the consonant closes the syllable, and the preceding 
vowel is short : as in hab'it, gratitude, deliverance.* 

The quantity of a syllable is the time in which it 

* It has been the practice of many English authors, to place 
the marks of accent, in all cases, over the vowel of the accent- 
ed syllable — a practice probably borrowed from the Greek lan- 
guage. Thus, in Johnson's Dictionary, and in Richardson's, 
the vowel a in habit as well as o in h'ly, has the mark of ac- 
cent, for which reason the mark is no guide to the true sound 
of the letter, and the learner would be led to give to a its long 
sound, thus, ha-bit, as well as to o its long sound in holy. 

But this is not the worst evil. The usual rules for dividing 
syllables, are not only arbitrary, but false and absurd. They 
contradict the very definition of a syllable given by the authors 
themselves Thus Lowth defines a syllable to be "a sound 
either simple or compound, -pronounced by a single impulse of 
the voice, and constituting a word or part of a word." But in 
dividing syllables, no regard is had to the definition — for mani- 
fest — Lowth divides thus, ma-ni-fest. Here, the first syllable, 
man, is pronounced with a single impulse of the voice — accord- 
ing to the definition : yet in writing, the syllable is split— the 
constituent part of a word is divided into two parts — that which 
is to be pronounced with a single impulse of the voice, is so 
separated, as to require two impulses. A syllable in pronuncia- 
tion is an indivisible thing ; and strange as it may appear, what 
is indivisible in utterance, is divided in writing ; when the very 
purpose of dividing words into syllables in writing, is to lead 
the learner to a just pronunciation. 



PHILOSOPHICAL GRAMMAR. 191 

is pronounced. In English this time is long or short 
— loner as in frame, denote, compensation — short, as 
in that, not, melon. 

The accent has no small influence in determining 
the length of a syllable, by prolonging the sound of 
the vowel ; but, in many words, vowels have their 
long sound, though not under the accent, as nosegay, 
agitate. 

There are some general rules for accenting sylla- 
bles, which may be discovered by attending to the 
analogy of formation. Thus words ending in tion 
and sion have the accent on the last syllable save one ; 
as protection, adhesion ; words ending in ty usually 
have the accent on the last syllable except two, as 
vanity, hostility. 

Few of these rules, however, are so general, that 
the exceptions to them are not almost as nume- 
rous as the words which fall within the rule ; and there- 
fore the accent of words is best learned from a dic- 
tionary and general usage. The rules laid down for 
this purpose in several works of distinction, are so 
numerous, and subject to so many exceptions, that 
they tend rather to embarrass, than to assist the stu- 
dent. 

Most prosodians who have treated particularly of 
this subject, have been guilty of a fundamental error, 
in considering the movement of English verse as de- 
pending on long and short syllables, formed by long 
and short vowels. This hypothesis has led them into 
capital mistakes. The truth is, many of those sylla- 
bles which are considered as long in verse, are formed 
by the shortest vowels in the language; as strength, 
health, grand. The doctrine, that long vowels are 
necessary to form long syllables in poetry, is at length 
exploded, and the principles which regulate the move- 
ment of our verse, are explained ; viz. accent and 
emphasis. Every emphatical word, and every accent- 
ed syllable, will form what is called in prose a long 



192 AN ANALYTICAL AND 

syllable. The unaccented syllables, and unemphati- 
cal monosyllabic words, are considered as short 
syllables. 

But there are two kinds of emphasis ; a natural 
emphasis, which arises from the importance of the 
idea conveyed by a word ; and an accidental emphasis, 
which arises from the importance of a word in a 
particular situation. 

The first or natural emphasis belongs to all nouns, 
verbs, participles, and adjectives, and requires no eleva- 
tion of the voice ; as 

" Not half so swift the tremhlmg doves can^/." 

The last or accidental emphasis is laid on a word 
when it has some particular meaning, and when the 
force of a sentence depends upon it; this therefore 
requires an elevation of the voice ; as, 

" Perdition catch my soul — but 1 do love thee." 

So far the prosody of the English language seems 
to be settled ; but the rules laid down for the con- 
struction of verse, seem to have been imperfect and 
disputed. 

Writers have generally supposed that our heroic 
verse consists of five feet, all pure Iambics, except 
the first foot, which they allow may be a Trochee. 
In consequence of this opinion, they have expunged 
letters from words which were necessary, and curtail- 
ed feet in such a manner as to disfigure the beauty of 
printing, and in many instances, destroyed the harmo- 
ny of our best poetry. 

The truth is, so far is our heroic verse from being 
confined to the Iambic measure, that it admits of eight 
feet, and in some instances of nine. I will not per- 
plex my readers with a number of hard names, but 
but proceed to explain the several feet, and show in 
what places of the line they are admissible. 

An Iambic foot, which is the ground of English 
numbers, consists of two syllables, the first short and 



PHILOSOPHICAL GRAMMAR. 193 

the second long. This foot is admitted into every 
place of the line. Example, all Iambics. 

11 Where slaves once more their native land behold, 
No fiends torment, no christians thirst for gold." 

Pope. 
The Trochee is a foot consisting of two syllables, 
the first long and the second short. Example. 

" Warms in the sun, refreshes in the breeze, 
Glows in the stars, and blossoms in the trees " 

Pope. 

The Trochee is not admissible into the second 
place of the line ; but in the third and fourth it may 
have beauty, when it creates a correspondence between 
the sound and sense. 

" Eve, rightly call'd mother of all mankind. " 

" And staggered by the stroke, drops the large ox." 

The Spondee is a foot consisting of two long sylla- 
bles. This may be used in any place of the line. 

1. " Good life be now my task, my doubts are done." 

Dryden. 

2. " As some lone mountain's monstrous growth he 

stood." Pope. 

But it has a greater beauty when preceded by a 
T.rochee. 

" Load the tall bark and lanch into the main." 

3. " The mountain goats came bounding o'er the 

lawn." 

4. " He spoke, and speaking in proud triumph 

spread, 
The long contended honors of her head." 

Pope. 
17 



194 AN ANALYTICAL AND 

5. " Singed are his brows, the scorching lids grow 
black." Pope. 

The Pyrrhic is a foot of two short syllables ; it is 
graceful in the first and fourth places, and is admissi- 
ble into the second and third. 

1. " Nor in the helpless orphan dread a foe." 

Pope. 

2. " On they move, 

Indisso/wbly firm." -Milton. 

3. " The two extremes appear like man and wife, 
Coupled together for the sake of strife." 

Churchill. 
But this foot is most graceful in the fourth place. 

" The dying gales that pant upon the trees." 

<c To farthest shores the ambrosial spirit flies, 
Sweet to the world and grate/wZ to the skies." 

The Amphibrach is a foot of three syllables, the 
first and third short, and the second long. It is used 
in heroic verse only when we take the liberty to add a 
short syllable to a line. 

" The piece you say is incorrect, why take it, 
I'm all submission, what you'd have it, make it." 

This foot is hardly admissible in the solemn or sub- 
lime style. Pope has indeed admitted it into his Es- 
say on Man. 

" What can ennoble sots or slaves or cowards, 
Alas ! not all the blood of all the Howards." 

Again : 

" To sigh for ribbands, if thou art so silly, 

Mark how they grace Lord Umbra or Sir Billy." 

But these lines are of the high burlesque kind, and 
in this style the Amphibrach closes lines with great 
beauty. 



PHILOSOPHICAL GRAMMAR. 195 

The Tribrach is a foot of three syllables, all short ; 
and it may be used in the third and fourth places. 

" And rolls impetuous to the plain." 

Or thus : 

" And thunder down impetuous to the plain." 

The Dactyl, a foot of three syllables, the first long 
and the two last short, is used principally in the first 
place in the line. 

" Furious he spoke, the angry chief replied," 

" Murmuring, and with him fled the shades of night." 

The Anapest, a foot consisting of three syllables, 
the two first short and the last long, is admissible into 
every place of the line. 

" Can a bosom so gentle remain 

Unmoved when her Corydon sighs? 
Will a nymph that is fond of the plains, 

These plains and these valleys despise ! 
Dear regions of silence and shade, 

Soft scenes of contentment and ease, 
Where I could have pleasantly stay'd, 

If aught in her absence could please." 

The trissyllabic feet have suffered most by the gen- 
eral ignorance of critics ; most of them have been 
mutilated by apostrophes, in order to reduce them to 
the Iambic measure. 

Thus in the line before repeated, 

" Murmuring, and with him fled the shades of night," 

we find the word in the copy reduced to two syllables, 
murmWing, and the beauty of the Dactyl is destroyed. 
Thus in the following : 

" On every side with shadowy squadrons deep," 

by apostrophizing every and shadowy^ the line loseg 



196 AN ANALYTICAL AND 

its harmony. The same remark applies to the follow- 
ing. 

" And hosts infuriate shake the shudd'ring plain." 
" But fashion so directs, and moderns raise 
On fashion's moMring base, their transient praise. 

Churchill. 

Poetic lines which abound with these trissyllabic 
feet, are the most flowing and melodious of any in 
the language ; and yet the poets themselves, or their 
printers, murder them with numberless unnecessary 
contractions. 

It requires but little judgment, and an ear indiffer- 
ently accurate, to distinguish the contractions which 
are necessary, from those which are needless and inju- 
rious to the versification. In the following passage 
we find examples of both. 

" She went from op'ra, park, assembly, play, 
To morning walks and pray'rs, three times a day ; 
To pass her time 'twixt reading and bohea 
To muse and spill her solitary tea ; 
Or o'er cold coffee trifle with the spoon, 
Count the slow clock, and dine exact at noon ; 
Divert her eyes with pictures in the fire, 
Hum half a tune, tell stories to the 'squire ; 
Up to her godly garret after sev'n, 
There starveand pray, for that's the way to heav'n." 

Pope's Epistles. 

Here e in opera ought not to be apostrophized, for 
such a contraction reduces an Amphibrachic foot to 
an Iambic. The words prayers, seven, and heaven, 
need not the apostrophe of e ; for it makes no differ- 
ence in the pronunciation. But the contraction of 
over and betwixt is necessary; for without it the 
measure would be imperfect. 



PHILOSOPHICAL GRAMMAR. 197 



PAUSES. 

Having explained the several kinds of feet, and 
shown in what places of a verse they may be used, I 
proceed to another important article, the pauses. Of 
these there are two kinds — the cesural pause, which 
divides the line into two equal or unequal parts; and 
the final pause, which closes the verse. These 
pauses are called musical, because their sole end is 
melody of verse. 

The pauses which mark the sense, and for this rea- 
son are denominated sentential, are the same in verse 
as in prose. They are marked by the usual stops, a 
comma, a semicolon, a colon, or a period, as the sense 
requires, and need no particular explanation. 

The cesural pause is not essential to verse, for the 
shorter kinds of measure are without it ; but it im- 
proves both the melody and the harmony. 

Melody in music is derived from a succession of 
sounds : harmony from different sounds in concord. 
A single voice can produce melody ; a union of voices 
is necessary to form harmony. In this sense harmony 
can not be applied to verse, because poetry is recited 
by a single voice. But harmony may be used in a 
figurative sense, to express the effect produced by ob- 
serving the proportion which the members of verse 
bear to each other. 

The cesural pause may be placed in any part of the 
verse : but has the finest effect upon the melody, when 
placed after the second or third foot, or in the middle 
of the third. 

After the second : 

" In what retreat, inglorious and unknown, 

Did genius sleep, when dullness seiz'd the throne." 

After the third : 

" O say what stranger cause, yet unexplored, 
Could make a gentle belle reject a lord V 
17* 



198 AN ANALYTICAL AND 

In the middle of the third : 

" Great are his perils, in this stormy time, 
Who rashly ventures on a sea of rhyme." 

In these examples we find a great degree of melody, 
but not in all the same degree. In comparing the 
divisions of verse, we experience the most pleasure 
in viewing those which are equal ; hence those verses 
which have the pause in the middle of the third foot, 
which is the middle of the verse, are the most melo- 
dious. Such is the third example above. 

In lines where the pause is placed after the second 
foot, we perceive a smaller degree of melody, for the 
divisions are not equal ; one containing four syllables, 
the other six, as in the first example. 

But the melody in this example, is much superior 
to that of the verses which have the cesural pause 
after the third foot ; for this obvious reason : When 
the pause bounds the second foot, the latter part of 
the verse is the greatest, and leaves the most forcible 
impression upon the mind ; but when the pause is at 
the end of the third foot, the order is reversed. We 
are fond of proceeding from small to great, and a cli- 
max in sound pleases the ear, in the same manner as 
a climax in sense delights the mind. Such is the first 
example. 

It must be observed further, that when the cesural 
pause falls after the second and third feet, both the 
final and cesural pauses are on accented syllables ; 
whereas, when the cesural pause falls in the middle 
of the third foot, this is on a weak syllable, and the 
final pause on an accented syllable. This variety in 
the latter, is another cause of the superior pleasure 
we derive from verses divided into equal portions. 

The pause may fall in the middle of the fourth 
foot : as, 

" Let favor speak for others, worth for me ;" 

but the melody, in this case, is almost lost. At the 



PHILOSOPHICAL GRAMMAR. 199 

close of the first foot, the pause has a more agreeable 
effect. 

ct That's vile, should we a parent's fault adore, 
And err, because our fathers err'd before ?" 

In the middle of the second foot, the pause may be 
used, but it produces little melody. 

*' And who but wishes to invert the laws 
Of order, sins against the eternal cause." 

Harmony is produced by a proportion between the 
members of the same verse, or between the members 
of different verses. Example : 

" Thy forests, Windsor, and thy green retreats, 
At once the monarch's and the muse's seats, 
Invite my lays. Be present, sylvan maids, 
Unlock your springs, and open all your shades." 

Here we observe, the pause in the first couplet is 
in the middle of the third foot ; both verses are in 
this respect similar. In the last couplet, the pause 
falls after the second foot. In each couplet, separately 
considered, there is a uniformity ; but when one is 
compared with the other, there is a diversity. This 
variety produces a pleasing effect. The variety is 
further increased, when the first lines of several suc- 
ceeding couplets are uniform as to themselves, and 
different from the last lines, which are also uniform as 
to themselves, Churchill, speaking of reason, lord 
chief justice in the court of man, has the following 
lines : 

" Equally form'd to rule, in age or youth, 
The friend of virtue, and the guide to truth ; 
To her I bow, whose sacred power I feel, 
To her decision make my last appeal ; 
Condemn'd by her, applauding words in vain 
Should tempt me to take up my pen again ; 



200 AN ANALYTICAL AND 

By her absolv'd, the coarse I'll still pursue ; 
* If Reason 's for me, God is for me too.' " 

The first line of three of these couplets, has the 
pause after the second foot ; in this consists their sim- 
ilarity. The last line in three of them, has the pause 
in the middle of the third foot ; they are uniform as 
to themselves, but different from the foregoing lines. 
This passage, which on the whole is very beautiful, 
suffers much by the sixth line, which is not verse, but 
rather hobbling prose.* 

The foregoing remarks are sufficient to illustrate 
the use and advantages of the cesural pause. 

The final pause marks the close of a line or verse, 
whether there is a pause in the sense or not. Senten- 
tial pauses should be marked by a variation of tone ; 
but the final pause, when the close of one line is inti- 
mately connected with the beginning of the next, 
should be merely a suspension of the voice, without 
elevation or depression. Thus : 

" Of man's first disobedience, and the fruit 
Of that forbidden tree, whose mortal taste 
Brought death into the world, and all our woe/ 5 &,c. 

When these lines are read without a pause after the 
words fruit and taste, they degenerate into prose. 
Indeed, in many instances, particularly in blank verse, 
the final pause is the only circumstance which distin- 
guishes verse from prose. 

* Churchill has improved English versification, but is some- 
times too incorrect. It is the remark of some writer, u That 
the greatest geniuses are seldom correct," and the remark is 
not without foundation. Homer, Shakspeare, and Milton, were 
among the greatest geniuses that ever lived, and they were 
certainly guilty of the greatest faults. Virgil and Pope were 
much inferior in point of genius, but excelled in accuracy. 
Churchill had genius, but his contempt of rules made him 
sometimes indulge a too great latitude of expression. 



PHILOSOPHICAL GRAMMAR. 201 



EXPRESSION. 



One article more in the construction of verse de- 
serves our observation, which is Expression. Expres- 
sion consists in such a choice and distribution of 
poetic feet as are best adapted to the subject, and best 
calculated to impress sentiments on the mind. Those 
poetic feet, which end in an accented syllable, are the 
most forcible. Hence the Iambic measure is best 
adapted to solemn and sublime subjects. This is the 
measure of the Epic, of poems on grave moral sub- 
jects, of elegies, &c. The Spondee, a foot of two 
long syllables, when admitted into the Iambic measure, 
adds much to the solemnity of the movement. 

" While the clear sun, rejoicing still to rise, 
In pomp rolls round immeasurable skies." 

Divight. 

The Dactyl, rolls round, expresses beautifully the 
majesty of the sun in his course. 

It is a general rule, that the more important sylla- 
bles there are in a passage, whether of prose or verse, 
the more heavy is the style. For example : 

" A past, vamp'd, future, old, reviv'd new piece." 
" Men bearded, bald, cowl'd, uncowl'd, shod, unshod." 

Such lines are destitute of melody, nnd are admis- 
sible only when they suit the sound to the sense. In 
the high burlesque style, of which kind is Pope's 
Dunciad, they give the sentiment an ironical air of 
importance, and from this circumstance derive a 
beauty. On the other hand, a large proportion of 
unaccented syllables or particles, deprives language 
of energy ; and it is this circumstance principally 
which in prose constitutes the difference between the 
grave historical, and the familiar style. The greatest 
number of long syllables ever admitted into a heroic 



202 AN ANALYTICAL AND 

verse is seven, as in the foregoing ; the smallest num- 
ber is three. 

" Or to a sad variety of woe." 

The Trochaic measure, in which every foot closes 
with a weak syllable, is well calculated for lively 
subjects. 

" Softly sweet in Lydian measures, 
Soon he sooth' d his soul to pleasures ; 
War, he sung, is toil and trouble, 
Honor but an empty bubble," &x. 

The Anapestic measure, in which there are two 
short syllables to one long, is best adapted to express 
the impetuosity of passion or action. Shenstone has 
used it to great advantage in his inimitable pastoral 
ballad. It describes beautifully the strong and lively 
emotions which agitate the lover, and his anxiety to 
please, which continually hurries him from one object 
and one exertion to another. 

" I have found out a gift for my fair, 

I have found where the wood pigeons breed I 
Yet let me that plunder forbear, 

She will say 'twas a barbarous deed. 
For he ne'er could prove true, she averr'd, 

Who could rob a poor bird of her young : 
And I lov'd her the more when I heard 

Such tenderness fall from her tongue." 

The Amphibrachic measure, in which there is a 
long syllable between two short ones, is best adapted 
to lively comic subjects ; as in Addison's Rosamond. 

" Since conjugal passion 

Has come into fashion, 
And marriage so blest on the throne is, 

Like Venus I'll shine, 

Be fond and be fine, 
And Sir Trusty shall be my Adonis." 



PHILOSOPHICAL GRAMMAR. 203 

Such a measure gives to sentiment a ludicrous air, 
and consequently is ill adopted to serious subjects. 

Great art may be used by a poet in choosing words 
and feet adapted to his subject. Take the following 
specimens : 

" Now here, now there, the warriors fall ; amain 
Groans murmur, armor sounds, and shouts convulse 
the plain. " 

The feet in the last line are happily chosen. The 
slow Spondee, in the beginning of the verse, fixes the 
mind upon the dismal scene of woe ; the solemnity is 
hightened by the pauses in the middle of the second 
and at the end of the third foot : but when the poet 
comes to shake the plains, he closes the line with 
three forcible Iambics. 

Of a similar beauty take the following example. 

" She all night long, her amorous descant sung." 

The poet here designs to describe the length of the 
night, and the music of the nightingale's song. The 
first he does by two slow spondees, and the last by 
four very rapid syllables. 

The following lines from Gray's Elegy, written in 
a country church yard, are distinguished by a happy 
choice of words. 

" For who, to dumb forgetfulness a prey, 
This pleasing anxious being e'er resigned? 

Left the warm precincts of the cheerful day, 
Nor cast one longing, lingering look behind !" 

The words longing and lingering express most for- 
cibly the reluctance with which mankind quit this 
state of existence. 

Pope has many beauties of this kin 

And grace and reason, sense and virtue split, 
With all the rash dexterity of wit." 



204 AN ANALYTICAL AND 

The mute articulations with which these lines end, 
express the idea of rending asunder, with great ener- 
gy and effect. The words rash and dexterity are also 
judiciously chosen. 

In describing the delicate sensations of the most 
refined love, he is remarkable for his choice of smooth 
flowing words. There are some passages in his Eloi- 
sa and Abelard, which are extended to a considerable 
length, without a single mute consonant or harsh word. 



PARSING. 

To parse is to construe and analyze language. 

First — construe or explain the piece, showing the 
order in which the words should be arranged to make 
the sense; supply the words omitted by ellipsis, and 
explain the punctuation. Secondly — take the sen- 
tences in their order, and resolve each into its sep- 
arate propositions, naming and classing the connec- 
tives; then taking each proposition by itself, begin- 
ning with the first, sepsrate it into its subject and 
predicate ; then name and describe the predicative, 
its subject, and object, with their modifying words. 

ILLUSTRATIONS. 

1. "Then Judah came near unto him, and said, 
Oh, my lord, let thy servant, I pray thee, speak a 
word, in my lord's ears, and let not thine anger burn 
against thy servant ; for thou art even as Pharaoh." 
Parsed thus — 

Then Judah came near unto him, and said, I pray 
thee, Oh, my lord, let thy servant speak a word, &c— 
of the remainder, the construction is the same as the 
collocation. 

There is a comma after him, to show that him is 



PHILOSOPHICAL GRAMMAR. 205 

not that, to which, said is to be added — a comma is 
required after said, because it is not followed immedi- 
ately by the thing said — one is placed after Oh, be- 
cause it is an interposed word — one is placed after 
my lord, because it is a transposed clause, its proper 
place being after thee — a semicolon is used after ser- 
vant, because what precedes is complete, and, in it- 
self, independent, yet what follows is to be consider- 
ed with it, &c. 

The propositions are — Then Judah came near unto 
him — Said, an elliptic proposition, consisting of the 
predicative only, and having understood, the same 
subject as the previous proposition — I pray thee, Oh, 
my lord, let thy servant speak a word in my lord's 
ears, and let not thine anger burn against thy servant 
— Thou art even as — Pharaoh is. 

The connectives are — then, a definer, which connects 
the first proposition with something previous, and de- 
fines the whole proposition, showing the time of Ju- 
dah's coming unto Joseph ; — and, an imperative, con- 
nects the first two propositions, and shows that the fact, 
Judah spoke, is to be added to the other fact, Judah came 
near ; — the imperative and is the connective between 
the members of the third proposition \—for, a definer, 
is the connective between the third and fourth pro- 
positions defining the reasons of his petitioning and 
of his petition ; — as, a definer, is the connective be- 
tween the last two propositions. 

Judah is the subject of the first proposition, and 
came near unto him is the predicate ; — Judah is the 
subject of the second, and said, the predicate; — /is 
the subject of the third, and pray thee my lord, let 
thy servant speak a tvord in my lord's cars, and, let 
not thine anger burn against thy servant, is the pre- 
dicate; — Thou is the subject of the fourth, and art 
even as Pharaoh is, is the predicate ; — Pharaoh is the 
subject of the last proposition, and is is the predicate. 

Of the first proposition Judah is the grammatical 
18 



206 AN ANALYTICAL AND 

subject. It is a particular noun, because it is a name 
given to a particular individual — singular number, 
because it shows that it is a single object — third 
person, because it represents that which is spoken of 
— masculine, because it denotes a male — subjective 
case, because it is the subject of the predicative came. 
Came is a predicative from come ; come, came, coming, 
come, to come; come, have or has come, came, had 
come, shall or will come, shall or will have come ; 
came, was come, was coming, it is made in the ' past 
tense perfect ;' has Judah for its subject. Near and 
unto are relatives showing the relation between came 
and him. Him is a pronoun, because it supersedes 
the use of the noun — singular number — third person 
— masculine — objective case after the relatives near 
and unto. In the second proposition, the subject is 
the same of the preceding, the predicative is said from 
say ; say, said, saying, said, to say ; say, have or 
has said, said, had said, shall or will say, shall or 
will have said ; said, was said, was saying, made in 
the ' past tense perfect f its subject is Judah (under- 
stood.) Of the next proposition lis the grammatical 
subject. It is a pronoun— first person, because it is 
representative of the person speaking, singular num- 
ber — neuter, because it does not indicate the sex of 
the object represented — subjective case to the predica- 
tive pray. Pray is a predicative, from the same ; 
pray, prayed, praying, prayed, to pray ; pray, have 
or has prayed, prayed, had prayed, shall or will pray, 
shall or will have prayed ; pray, is praying, the duple 
tenses of this predicative are seldom used ; pray is 
made in the c present tense perfect ;' / is its subject. 
Thee is a pronoun — second person — singular — neuter 
— objective case after the predicative pray. Oh is an 
exclamative ; independent. My is a pronoun — singu- 
lar — -first person — neuter — relative case to lord, be- 
cause it shows the relation between the persons rep- 
resented by my and lord. Lord is a general noun, be- 



PHILOSOPHICAL GRAMMAR. 207 

cause it is a name applied to individuals of a genus or 
class — second person, because it represents the person 
addressed — singular — masculine — objective case after 
the predicative pray, the same as thee, because it repre- 
sents the same object. Let is a predicative from the 
same ; let, let, letting, let, to let ; let, have or has let, 
let, had let, shall or icill let, shall or will have let ; to 
let, it is a nominal predicative in the objective case 
after pray, I pray thee to let, &c, the to being omitted 
after some predicatives. 

The above will serve imperfectly to show the mode 
of parsing. It will be observed, that in the above, 
where the reasons of any step have been once explained, 
the explanation is afterwards omitted for the sake of 
brevity ; yet scholars should be taught to give the 
reasons until they are perfectly familiar with them. 
The scholar should be taught in parsing predicatives, 
to name the principal parts, which are the present and 
past, the two predicals, and the nominal predicatives — 
to collect the tenses, that is, to name all the perfect 
tenses — and to inflect the tense where found. If any 
predicative is not used in all the forms, it should be 
mentioned. Scholars should be frequently exercised 
in giving a complete synopsis of predicatives. The 
colloquial form may be used in parsing, if preferred. 
Thus — " Read the paragraph or section — How many 
sentences are there ? — What is a sentence ? Why is 
( ) a sentence ? — Why is not ( ) a sentence ? — 
Construe — Why is there a comma after ( ) ? Should 
not there be a point after ( ) ? How many proposi- 
tions are there in the first sentence? Name them — 
Name the subject and predicate of each — What is a 
proposition ? Why is ( ) a proposition ? Why is not 
( ) a proposition V &c. Such will be the part of 
the teacher, and the reply to the several particulars 
will be the part of the scholar. 



208 AN ANALYTICAL AND 

The following is given to show how full the exer- 
cise of construing may be. 

" Hail, holy Light, offspring of Heaven, first born. 
Or, of the Eternal, coeternal beam. 
May I express thee, unblam'd? Since God is light, 
And never, but in unapproached light, 
Dwelt from eternity, dwelt then in thee 
Bright efHuence of bright essence increate." — Milton. 

[Construed.] — Hail, holy Eight, first-born offspring 
of Heaven, or other than call thee first-born offspring, 
may I unblamed express or call thee coeternal beam of 
the Eternal or God ? Since God is light and dwelt 
not from eternity except in iinapproached light, then 
consequently he dwelt in thee, bright effluence of 
bright essence increate or self-existent. 

[Explained.] — This is the commencement of Mil- 
ton's address to Light, written after he had become 
blind. Milton did not believe that * all things were 
created out of nothing,' but believed them to be an 
efflux of the Deity, a part of God himself proceed- 
ing forth and assuming an infinite variety of forms, 
and this sentiment he has embodied in this paragraph, 
especially in the last line. He in high admiration of 
light, which in consequence of his blindness was fully 
appreciated, at first, calls it the first-born offspring of 
Heaven, but as that did not quite equal his views of 
it, yet fearing lest he should be called to account, by 
some, if he boldly said that light was a part of God 
or coeternal with him, he says May I unblamed or be 
unblamed if I express thee, coeternal beam of the 
Eternal; and then to further turn off reproof, gives 
the reason for his belief. As God must from eterni- 
ty have dwelt in light, for he is light, consequently 
light must be coeternal with God, and must be a 
bright effluence from the bright essence of an uncreated 
God. 

Such explanations should always be given ; by the 
scholar when able, and when not, by the teacher. 



PHILOSOPHICAL GRAMMAR. 209 



Miscellaneous Remarks and Criticisms. 

" The chief were those who, from the pit of Hell, 
Roaming to seek their prey on Earth, durst fix 
Their seats long after next the seat of God.*' — Milton. 

" the wisest heart 



Of Solomon he led by fraud to build 

His temple right against the temple of God." — Milton. 

By these examples we see that definers define rel- 
atives, for long and right are definers denning the 
relatives, after and against. It is hardly possible to 
conceive how this case could be disposed of by the 
old grammars, for after and against are according to 
them, prepositions, and they have no rules for adjec- 
tives or adverbs belonging to prepositions. . . 

" Henry was driving a dark grey horse." 

Was driving is a predicative from drive ; drive, 
drove, driving, driven, to drive; drive, have or has 
driven, drove, had driven, shall or will drive, shall or 
will have driven; drove, ivas driven, was driving, 
made in the ' past tense pending, 5 and has Henry for 
its subject. A is a definer defining horse. Dark is 
a definer defining grey. Grey is a definer defining 
horse. Horse is a general name, objective after was 
driving * 

*Some grammarians in parsing, separate the imperfect predi- 
cal from the predicative, but parse the perfect predical as form- 
ing part of the predicative. Is there any reason for so doing ? 
is not the former a part of the predicative, as much as the lat- 
ter ? Take an example ; 1 am destroying my book ; I have 
destroyed my book. The timber was lying in the water ; The 
timber was laid in the water. Can any one see why am de- 
stroying, or was lying should not be parsed together as form- 
ing one predicative, as much as hate destroyed, or icas laid. 
It appears to us, that the error of separating the one and not 
the other, arose from the error of ' passive verbs,' One error, 
like one lie, needs another to help it out. Having erroneously 
adopted the theory of passive verbs, it brought them into a 
difficulty, from which they could not extricate themselves 
without violating common sense, as above. Other grammari- 

. . 18* 



210 AN ANALYTICAL AND 

" Belial came last than whom, a spirit more lewd 
Fell not from Heaven." — Milton, 

" Which, when Beelzebub perceived than whom 
Satan except, none higher sat." — Milton. 

It is amusing to witness the various shifts of gram- 
marians, in trying to dispose of whom in the above in- 
stances. Sometimes, than is said to have the force 
of a preposition, and to govern tvhom; sometimes 
whom is considered as a privileged case, where the 
objective is used without any governing word ; and 
sometimes it is put in the objective case after than 
according to the Latin rule, ' The comparative de- 
gree governs the ablative,' forgetting that the objec- 
tive case in English corresponds to the accusative in 
Latin, and not the ablative. But what would be the 
course of a sensible, independent mind, one not ac- 
customed to bow to authority without reason 1 Such 
a person would at once declare whom to be a corrup- 
tion for ivho, and having corrected the error would 
parse it according to the rules for all such cases, instead 
of endeavoring to pervert the principles of grammar 
to conform to the use of a word, because it is found 
in Milton, or any other distinguished author. An 
author may be permitted to depart from principles of 
grammar already established, when utility or neces- 
sity require it, but no such defence can be made in 
behalf of this use of whom ; it is a corruption of 

ans go to the other extreme, and parse all predicals separate 
from the predicative, calling the predieal a definer. But let us 
see whether there is any more reason for this than for the 
above. T have written a letter ; to say I have a written letter ', 
will do very well ; but I have spilt my milk — to say 1 have my 
spilt milk) is false. 1 have destroyed the paper ; L have the de- 
stroyed paper, is not correct, for we cannot have what is not, 
and destroyed paper is no paper at all Again ; John is burn- 
ing brush. If burning is a definer, what does it define ? 4 John 
is— burning brush ;' John is, may stand for a proposition, al- 
though a useless one, but what of l burning brush'? nothing. 
If burning refers to John, it then would be Burning John is 
brush— Burning brush is John. The absurdity of the theory 
is too manifest to need further remark. 



PHILOSOPHICAL GRAMMAR. 21 1 

good English. This will be perceived by changing 
the position. ' Except Satan none higher sat, than 
whom.' f Except Satan none sat higher than Beelze- 
bub sat.' Whom is a pronoun used instead of Beel- 
zebub ; but who will say that this is good English, 
' Except Satan none sat higher than whom sat V If 
we are to subscribe to all we find in distinguished 
authors, we should have to justify the following. 

11 If thou beest he ; but O, how fallen." — Milton. 

" Save he who reigns above."— Milton. 

" If a man have built a house," &c. &c. 

" I knew of his being a gambler" 

Being is a predical used as a noun ; in the objective case after 
the relative of. Gambler is a noun in the same case with beings 
because it is explanatory ot it. — Rule 5. I knew of his being, 
or I knew his being — what was it? — it was the being of a gam- 
bler. "His being a gambler deprived him of good society." 
What was it that deprived him of good society? — His being or 
life ; what was his life ? — He was or lived a gambler, 

"The child was called Alfred." 

Alfred is in the objective case after was called. The Passive 
verb grammars parse Alfred as in the nominative case after 
wus called; but it is an error; for, 'The child Alfred was 
called,' is a very different proposition from 4 The child was 
called Alfred.' The child was not Alfred, before they named 
him; the act of naming made him Alfred. They named him 
Alfred, therefore he was named Alfred. Alfred must he in the 
objective case as the result of the action, the same as ' They 
ran a race J 'They built a building,' &c. They named a name 
for the child, and that name was Alfred. 

" Must I leave thee, Paradise? thus leave 
Thee, native soil, these happy walks and shades, 
Fit haunt of gods 1" 

Paradise and soil are in the same case with thee. The old 
grammars would make them in two cases ; in the objective case 
with thee, according to (he rule, ' A noun explaining another 
is put by apjwsition in the same case ;' and in the nominative 
case, by the rule, 'When a direct address is made, the noun 
or pronoun is in the nominative case independent.' 

To say nothing of the falsity and absurdity of making Para- 



212 AN ANALYTICAL AND 

dise in two cases, we think that the two rules named, show 
clearly the want of reflection which characterized the authors 
of the old grammars. What does put by apposition mean ? Ap- 
position means putting to, hence we cannot see but the rule 
reads thus — A noun explaining another noun is put by putting 
to in the same case ! Do we in parsing, put a word in any 
case, or does the writer put it in the case in which it is? See 
Rule 5. 

The above example shows the absurdity of the 4 nominative 
case independent.' To say that a noun is in the nominative 
case independent, merely because a direct address is made, is 
a nominative absurdity. If Paradise and soil are at all inde- 
pendent, they are in the objective independent, and not nomina- 
tive independent. 

" I would not be a leaf, to die 
Without recording sorrow's sigh." 

Would is a predicative in the present tense, and equivalent 
to zvish or desire. Be is a nominal predicative, in the objective 
case after would ; the to is omitted. Leaf is a noun in the same 
case with to be, being explanatory of it. 1 would or desire not 
he being — what being? The being of a leaf, a leaf's being, a 
leaf. I would not to be a leaf and to die. 

" The more a people know, the less exposed they are 
to every description of extravagance." "The less 
they know, the better they obey." 

Query — How will the old grammars parse the? Is the an 
'article 1 limiting the signification of a noun? 

" Some heavy business hath my lord on hand, 
And I must know it, else he loves me not." 

Else is an imperative. — ' 1 must know it,' dismiss that, that is, 
if he does not let me know his business, l he loves me not.' 

" The stars resemble one another." 

Query — Is resemble a verb according to the old grammars ? 
does it express either action, being, or passion? 

" Her face is pale, and it would frighten me, 
But that I know she loves me." 

This sentence shows in a clear light, two of the errors in 
previous grammars. Might, could, would and should are said 



PHILOSOPHICAL GRAMMAR. 213 

to be in the imperfect, that is, a past tense ; but what is 
more evidently false ? Her face is pale — it would frighten me. 
" If she would waken, she zcould soon be warm. Why is she 
wrapt in this thin sheet? If 1, this winter morning, were not 
covered better, I should be cold like her. If I could wake her, 
she would smile on me as she always does, and l.iss me. Moth- 
er ! you have slept too long." — Shakspeare. Who can read this 
and not be astonished that the falsehood that chuld, icould and 
should are in a past tense, should have been taught to scholars 
for centuries, unreprobated ! It is only a specimen of the 
blindness of those blind guides who have attempted to enlighten 
the public on grammar. But is called a conjunction, but how 
can that be disposed of, if but is a conjunction ? " 1 know 7 she 
loves me," be out that, and her face would frighten me. But is 
an imperative, and that is in the objective case after it. 

" I have eight pair of tame pigeons." — Coivper. 

" So he departed thence and found Elisha the son 
of Shaphat who was plowing with twelve yoke of ox- 
en before him, and he with the twelfth." — Bible, 

" There were five span of horses in market." 

Some incline to make pair, yoke,&c. in such cases, plural, 
according to grammatical principles, as pairs, yokes, spans, &c. 
but general practice authorizes the use of the singular form. 

Ten foot pole; Two foot rule. 

Some would-be critics contend that it should be, Ten feet 
pole, Two feet rule, but it is evidently an error, the first form 
being more correct; for foot marks the primary divisions of 
the measures, which divisions give the name to it. It is a foot 
pole, afoot rule, &c, that is, it is a pole or rule divided off* into 
divisions of a foot each. The length of the measure is deter- 
mined by the numeral, ten, two, &c. Who would think of 
saying, a three rods chain, yet it would be required by consis- 
tency, if ' A ten feet pole' is admitted to be correct. We say 
A four horse team, and not A four horses team. 

There is a peculiar awkwardness manifested by 
some writers in their attempt to adhere to the old 
grammar principles of the Subjunctive mode. " If a 
man have built a house, the house is his." — Wayland. 
" The triumph remained — if triumph there were— 



214 AN ANALYTICAL AND 

with South Carolina. " — Martineau. " If when a 
dearth occurs the court do not make some attempt to 
relieve the people ." — Malthus. 

What can be more awkward than to say, If a man have 
built a house ? We do not hear the common class of people 
use such an expression, for nature teaches them better; it is 
only those who are trammelled by the arbitrary rules of false 
grammar that thus corrupt the language. " Banish gentleness 
from your hearth, and what sort of society will remain? — the 
solitude of the desert ivere preferable to it." Were as in this 
case is not admissible, its use is not good English. The fol- 
lowing is another specimen of corruption arising from the same 
source. " If in the last line, the poet had used the verb ' rais- 
ed' which though not equivalent would have conveyed much 
the same meaning, the expression had been fainter." Here the 
writer, simply because he had used if at the beginning of the 
sentence, thought he must use had instead of would have. The 
theory and rules of the Subjunctive Mode have ever been de- 
structive of the elegance and propriety of language, and the 
sooner they are discarded, the better. See Webster's Grammar 
under Rule 43, — pages 13d, 9; also pages 148, 9. 

"The bishops and abbots were allowed their seats 
in the house of Lords." " Theresa ivas forbid the 
presence of the emperor." " He was shown that very 
story." 

Mr. Webster says, ' this idiom is outrageously anomalous, but 
perhaps incorrigible.' It would be strictly more correct to say 
* Seats were allowed to the bishops,' than that 'The bishops 
were allowed their seats,' but the latter is authorized by gener- 
al practice, and is as he says incorrigible. But it is no more 
4 outrageously anomalous' than the following; '* The provi- 
sions were not fit to eat ;*' "The oxen are fat enough to kill ;" 
"The grain is ripe enough to cut. ." Use authorizes these ex- 
pressions, though to be eaten, to be killed, to be cut would be 
more in accordance with strict arbitrary principles, 

-while we 



Sit here deliberating in cold debates 

If we should sacrifice our lives to honor 

Or wear them out in servitude and chains." — Addison. 

" Quick, let us hence ; who knows if Cato's life 
stands sure." — Addison. 



PHILOSOPHICAL GRAMMAR. 215 

The use of if for whether, is somewhat common, but it is 
scarcely admissible. 

u Why did they make this law ? Because they are 
obliged to do so." — Dwight. 

Here is an incorrect use of the tenses ; are should be were. 

" It may appear, perhaps, that a doctrine — " 

It should be, * It may perhaps appear,' &c. The doubt and 
contingency should be together, that the mind may pass at 
once from them to the declaration. 

" Nadab and Abihu took either of them his cen- 
ser." — Bible, 

Here either should be each, because it means that both took 
them ; but either means one of two or more, but not both, or 
all. 

" Let us resume the worship of God by singing in 
the one hundreth psalm. " 

This mode of expression is not incorrect only, but extremely 
inelegant. We sing psalms, not sing in psalms. 

" He was fined in the sum of two dollars," 

This is an error common with those who affect the law style ; 
but it is ridiculous nonsense. What would be thought if a per- 
son should say, he was struck in the amount of two blows ? 
Why is it more correct to say, He was struck two blows, than 
He was fined two dollars ? We say such a thing weighed five 
pounds, not, weighed in the sum of five pounds ; and so of a 
multitude of cases; it is the idiom of the language, and is on 
the same or nearly the same principle as, Ran a race, Dreamed 
a dream, &c. 

"The tambors beat, the cymbals rung 
As they would rend the sky." — Bowles. 

Here if is omitted after as ; they rung as they would ring if 
they would rend the sky. 

" Would I had met my dearest foe in heaven 
Or ever I had seen that day, Horatio !" — Shakspeare. 
The or here appears to be a corruption of ere before, 



216 AN ANALYTICAL AND 

" Ham. I ivould I had been there. 
Hor. It would have much amazed you. 
Ham. Very like, very like. Staid it long ?" 

Shakspeare. 
Would is often used in the sense of icish. Like is here used 
for likely, and defines i would have amazed.' 

" Who cheapens life abates the fear of death."- Young. 
Who for he who. 

" Or life or death' is equal ; neither weighs; 

All weight in this — O let me live to thee." — Young. 

This sentence is incorrect. Two things are equal, not is 
equal. The meaning probably is, life and death are equal for 
neither of them weighs anything. But the use of or is unpar- 
alleled ; the first one is superfluous, and the second equivalent 
to and. 

" Know, all the good that individuals find 

Or God and nature meant to mere mankind. "-Pope. 

That is omitted after or in this case. 

" O love of gold, thou meanest of amours !" — Young. 

Of instead of for ; this is a common, though, strictly speak- 
ing, an incorrect use of of. 

" Plan of a gradual abolition of the poor laws pro- 
posed." 

Of should be for, 

" whilst they (distilled 

Almost to jelly with the act of fear) 

Stand dumb, and speak not to him." — Shakspeare. 

With should be by ; with sometimes denotes the instrument, 
but never the cause. 

" And as the mind must faint under trouble that 
sees no prospect of its termination, and no conviction 
of its use, it was necessary that they should keep in 
view the kingdom of God." — A. Clarke. 

This sentence is defective in consequence of the use of that, 



PHILOSOPHICAL GRAMMAR. 217 

which refers more naturally to trouble than to mind. It would 
be better thus, * And as the mind must faint under trouble, of 
which it sees no prospect of a termination,' &c. 

" The sentence might have closed with fully as 
much advantage, at the word view," — -full. 

" Most of these kinds of pyramids have originally 
been raised by the first settlers from Norway, and have 
been held in repair from generation to generation." — 
Henderson. 

Here hare been raised is incorrectly used for the past tense, 
were raised. 

" They have all names which they answer to read- 
ily." 

Here all, instead of being placed after they and in apposition 
with it, as it should be, is placed so as be the definer of names, 
implying that there were no names but which they (the sheep) 
had. It should be, They all have names to which they answer 
readily. 

" The spring will winter's gloom o'ershade, 
Ere yet the fields are white with snow; 
Ere yet the latest flowrets fade, 
Thou in thy grave will sleep below." 

Yet should be that ; it is in the objective case after the rela- 
tive ere. 



As some of the departures which we have made, 
from the systems of the old Grammars, will be deem- 
ed ultraisms, we give the following extracts in their 
defence. And if authority or reason weigh anything, 
they will fully justify the changes we have made. 

The following, from Webster's Manual of Useful 
Studies, will sustain the position we have taken in 
respect to the 

ARTICLE. 

An, or a, is an adjective of number, signifying one i and u«e^ 
indifferently before any noun, definite or indefinite. 
19 



218 AN ANALYTICAL AND 

In the grammars of the English language, there has been, 
and still is, a continued series of errors on the subject of this 
word, an. These grammars tell us that a is an indefinite arti- 
cle, prefixed to nouns, and used to point out a single thing of 
the kind, in a vague sense, indeterminate, or not pointing to a 
thing certain : as, " give me a book ; that is, any book." So 
ignorant were the first compilers of English grammar, of the 
origin of this word, that they considered a the original word, 
and that n was added before a vowel, — a thing that has never 
been done in any instance in the language. All this is a mis- 
take. 

In the first place, an, or a, is never prefixed to a noun. A 
prefix is united with a word, forming a part of it, which is nev- 
er the case with an, or its abbreviation a ; or a prefix is a part 
of a title : as in St. John. 

In the second place, an is the original word, and a is used in 
the place of it, before a consonant. Its only use is to express 
one, and that without the least reference to the definiteness or 
indefiniteness of the noun to which it relates. It is used before 
definite, or indefinite words, just as two, three, four, and every 
adjective of number, is used. 

The example given above is correct. u Give me a book," 
that is, one, or any hook. Just so is two used. u Give me two 
books," that is, any two. u Give me three books," that is, any 
three. From a basket of oranges, " bring me an orange," that 
is, any orange. " Bring me two oranges," that is, any two. 
44 Bring me ten oranges," that is, any ten ; and so onward to a 
thousand, or to any other number. The word an, or a, in this 
respect, stands on precisely the same footing as every adjective 
of numbers in the language. 

But let other cases be cited. Congress consists of two houses, 
a senate, and a house of representatives ; that is, according 
to the foregoing definition, any senate, indeterminate, or in a 
vague sense ; and any house of representatives, uncertain 
which, but one of a number. 

New York stands on an island : that is, on any island, inde- 
terminate. 

44 1 will be to them a God, and they shall be to me a people." 
Heb. viii. 10. That is, I will be to them any God, in a vague 
sense, indeterminate ; one God of a number, but uncertain 
which. They shall be to me a people, that is, any people, inde- 
terminate. 

Who is not surprised, that such a false definition and classi- 
fication of this word, should keep its place in a grammar, and be 
taught to children, age after age ; and at this day, boldly defen- 
ded by nearly every compiler who treats of the subject ? 

This, however, is the fact, not only in English grammar, but 
in French, Italian, German, and other languages. 



PHILOSOPHICAL GRAMMAR. 



219 



The following rules and examples, taken from Web- 
ster's and Cardell's Grammars, seem sufficient to 
show that the use of adverbs and adjextives is the 
same, and that they constitute but one class. 

[From Webster s Grammar.] 

Rule xv. — Adjectives are usually placed before the nouns 
to which they belong ; as, a wise prince ; an obedient subject ; 
a pious clergyman ; a brave soldier. 

Rule xvi. — Adjectives belong to verbs in the infinitive 
mode; as "to see is pleasant "—" to ride is more agreeable 
than to walk ;" " to calumniate is detestable.'" 

Rule xvii. — Adjectives belong to sentences, or whole pro- 
positions : Examples : 

" Agreeable to this, we read of names being blotted out of 
God's book" — Burder's Oriental Customs, 375. 

" Greece, which had submitted to the arms, in her turn, 
subdued the understandings of the Romans, and contrary to 
that which in these cases commonly happens, the conquerors 
adopted the opinions and manners of the conquered." — Enfield, 
Hist. Phil. b. 3,1. 

Note. — Writers and critics, misapprehending the true con- 
struction of these and similar sentences, have supposed the at- 
tribute to belong to the verb, denoting the manner of action. 
But a little attention to the sense of such passages will be 
sufficient to detect the mistake. For instance, in* the example 
from Enfield, the attribute contrary cannot qualify the verb 
adopted; for the conquerors did not adopt the opinions of the 
conquered in a manner contrary to what usually happens — the 
manner of the act is not the thing affirmed, nor does it come 
into consideration. The sense is this, the fact, that the conquer- 
ors adopted the opinions and manners of the conquered, was con- 
trary to what commonly happens in like cases. The attribute 
belongs to the whole sentence or proposition. The same ex- 
planation is applicable to every similar sentence. 

In consequence of not attending to this construction, our 
hypercritics, who are very apt to distrust popular practice, and 
substitute their own rules for customary idioms, founded on 
common sense, have condemned this use of the attribute, and 
authors, suffering themselves to be led astray by these rules, 
often use an adverb in the place of an adjective. 

Rule xix. — Some adjectives are used to modify the sense of 
others and of participles ; as a very clear day, red hot iron, a 



220 AN ANALYTICAL AND 

more or most excellent character. "Without corning any 
nearer." — Locke; more pressing necessity, most grating sound, 
"a closer grained wood." — Lavoisier Trans. 

Rule xx. — Adjectives are used to qualify the sense of ad- 
verbs ; as a city was very bravely defended ; the soldiers were 
most amply rewarded ; a donation more beneficially bestowed ; 
a house less elegantly furnished ; a man the least peaceably 
disposed. 

Rule xviii. — Adjectives are used to modify the action of 
verbs, and to express the qualities of things in connection with 
the action by which they are produced. Examples : 

" Open thine hand wide" — Deut. 15. 17. 

" Bray, to pound or grind small."— Johnson s Diet. 

"Magnesia feels smooth ; calcarious earths feel dry; litho- 
marga feels very greasy or at least smooth ; yet some feel dry 
and dusty" — Kirwan. vol. 1. 12. 189. 

" Drink deep or taste not the Pierian spring." — Pope. 

" Heaven opened wide her ever during gates." 

Milton, P. L. 7. 

" And just as short of reason he must fall." — Pope. 
" Thick and more thick the steely circle grows." 

Hooles Tasso* b. 8. 

" The cakes, eat short and crisp." — Vicar of Wakefield. 
" Here grass is cut close and gravel rolled smooth. Is not 
that trim?" — -Bo-swell. Johnson. 3. 

"To hands that longer shall the weapon wield." 

Hoole. Tas. 7. 

" So while we taste the fragrance of the rose, 

Grows not her blush the fairer ?" Ibm. 2. 77. 

"How much nearer he approaches to his end." 
14 1 have dwelt the longer on the discussion of this point." 

Junius Let. \7. 

Authors, misguided by Latin rules, and conceiving that 
every word which is used to qualify a verb, must be an adverb, 
have pronounced many of the passages here recited and sim- 
ilar ones to be incorrect — and in such as are too well establish- 
ed to bear censure, they call the adjective an adverb. Were 
it not for this influence in early education, which impresses a 
notion that all languages must be formed with the like idioms, 
we should never have received an idea that the same word may 
not modify a noun, an adjective and a verb. 



PHILOSOPHICAL GRAMMAR. 221 

Thus, elay burns white — objects may be seen double — may 
rise high — fall low — grow strait, or thick, or thin, or fat, or lean 
— one may speak loud — the sun shines clear — the finer a sub- 
stance is pulverized — to grow wiser, to plunge deeper, spread 
wider — and similar expressions without number, constitute a 
well established idiom, as common as it is elegant. 

It is a just remark of Mr. Tooke, that all words which critics 
have not understood, they have thrown into the common sink 
of adverbs. 

[From CardelL] 

The list given in the neuter grammar books for adverbs is 
subdivided into various arbitrary classes, from eleven to seventy, 
according to the fancy of the different compilers, and are set 
forth as so many kinds of adverbs. 

The prevailing use of the words called adverbs, is said to be 
to express the manner of action. This supposition is a total 
mistake of the principle. 

A large proportion of the words called adverbs are formed by 
adding ly to an other word. The syllable ly is from the same 
root, and means the same as the adjective like. The word so 
compounded is an adjective of the second class, almost invaria- 
bly describing the object of the verb, in reference to some re- 
semblance which it acquires or holds, as the effect of the action. 

The resemblance denoted by ly or like, may be close, or very 
remote. There is no rule for using or omitting this syllable. 
It is entirely a question of fact, determined by fashion and good 
taste. The difference exists not only between verbs of similar 
meaning used in the same way \ but in cases where the same 
verb stands in the same construction. It is worthy of remark 
likewise, that the verbs called neuter, all take the words which 
are said to express the manner of action, in the same way as 
the acknowledged active verbs, so that if the neuter verb theory 
was true, there would be manner of action where there was tw 
action. 

The man sleeps soundly. 

She sits genteelly or perfectly well. 

She sits idle and contented. 

She remains quiet and entirely undisturbed. 

She lives contented and happy. 

She Jives virtuously and happily. 

The new house is finished elegantly. 
It is made elegant. 
It is rendered elegant, 

19* 



222 AN ANALYTICAL AND 

Jt appears elegant or splendid. 
It looks well or elegantly. 
It looks neat and substantial. 
It shows well or superbly. 

The medicine cures the patient completely. 
It makes him completely well. 
It makes his cure complete. 
It effects his cure completely. 
It renders his cure effectual. 

It sometimes happens that a number of the words called i 
verbs come together ; as, 

Have you learned your lesson ? 

.#7is. JVbtf i/e£ quite well enough, 'perhaps. 



CONJUNCTIONS. 

[From Webster's Manual, p. 185.] 

The words if ', though, that, notwithstanding, because, during , 
except, save, provided, are generally classed with conjunctions or 
prepositions. But nothing can be farther from the truth. 

If and though are verbs, and always verbs. If is only an 
abbreviation of give, or the Saxon spelling of the word, gif, 
which has been obsolete scarcely a century. Though is also a 
verb, defective in all its inflections ; but both these words have 
the signification of verbs, and sentences in which they occur 
cannot be correctly analyzed, without considering them as 
verbs. They have no property of conjunctions. 

In this sentence, " He will go, if you desire it," the original 
and true form was, he will go, give that, you desire it ; that is, 
grant the fact that you desire it, then he will go. The word 
that, referring to the following clause, is generally omitted. 

" But 1 pursue, if that I may apprehend." Phil. iii. 12. 
Here is the original form of expressing condition. If is a verb, 
for give, and that is the objective case after it, referring to the 
following sentence or clause. 

"But though that we, or an angel from heaven, preach to 
you otherwise." — Bishop's Bible. This is the old form of writ- 
ing, and is good English. Though is here a verb, governing 
that, which is a pronoun, or substitute for the sentence follow- 
ing. That, after though, is now omitted, as it is after if. 

The phrase above is, though that, grant or admit that we, or 
an angel, &c. " Though Moses and Samuel stood before me, 
yet my mind could not be toward this people." Jer. xv. I. 

Because, too, is numbered among the conjunctions. How 



PHILOSOPHICAL GRAMMAR. 223 

then, can we parse such expressions as these ? Because of 
these things ; because of me ; because of the present rain. 
They cannot be analyzed on the supposition that because is a 
conjunction. Because is now one word, but formerly the parts 
of the word were written separately, by cause ; and to parse 
the foregoing phrase, we must still consider be and cause as two 
words ; by cause of these things. 

Notwithstanding is a compound of not and withstanding. 
This is properly followed by that, though this word is often 
omitted. It rains, but notwithstanding that, (it rains,) I must 
return. Withstanding is always a participle, whether with or 
without that ; and notwithstanding in union with that, or a sen- 
tence, always forms the clause independent, or case absolute. 

During has the same character and use. It is always a parti- 
ciple of the obsolete verb, dure, (to endure,) and with the fol- 
lowing words, constitutes the clause independent : as, during 
the time, during the day, during the conversation. 

Provided is a participle of the perfect tense ; and with the 
clause or words following, always constitutes the independent 
clause. He will ride, provided you will furnish him with a horse. 
Here provided, with the following words, constitutes the clause 
independent. He will ride, you furnishing him with a horse be- 
ing provided; that is, on that condition. 

Except, in the sentence " except ye repent, ye shall all like- 
wise perish," is a verb. Except, take away, remove the fol- 
lowing fact, or condition, ye repent, and ye shall all perish. 

Save, in the phrases, " fight neither with the small nor great, 
save only with the King of Israel." " Israel burned none of 
them, save Hazor only," is a verb ; in the latter passage, it gov- 
erns Hazor in the objective ; in the former, its object, or objec- 
tive, is the following part of the sentence, save, except, take out 
of the order given, the King of Israel. 

Hence the mistake in the following passages. " There was 
no stranger with us in the house, save we two in the house." 
We, should be us, in the objective. 

u All men can not receive this saying, save they to whom it 
is given." They should be them. 

But no mistake of the true character of words has been the 
cause of so much injury, as that of supposing that to be a con- 
junction, in cases where it refers to a sentence. A like mistake 
was made, by ealy writers, in regard to the Greek oti, and the 
Latin quod. Jerome adopted it, and it runs through his version 
of the scriptures. The consequence is, that his version abounds 
with errors like the following : " Ye have heard, because it was 
said to them of old time." In our common version, this mis- 
take occurs in two or three passages ; one only will be here 
mentioned. This is in Romans, viii. 20, 21., where the word 
because should be that, and no point should stand between hope 
and that. In consequence of this mistake, the passage is hard- 



224 AN ANALYTICAL AND 

ly intelligible ; whereas, by the use of that, without the point 
after hope, the meaning is obvious. 

These brief remarks show how imperfectly our language has 
been analyzed. Errors of long standing are retained, in oppo- 
sition to the clearest evidence, and greatly to the prejudice of 
the language. 

[From Webster's Grammar, p. 139.] 

It has been before remarked that if, though and unless, are 
old Saxon verbs in the Imperative Mode, and that the ingen- 
ious invention of our ancestors to express a condition or sup- 
position was, to employ a verb, with the sense of give, grant, 
put, be, if, that is, give the fact. We retain the idiom, and the 
words employed ; but as these have lost their inflections, critics 
have ignorantly classed them with conjunctions — a part of 
speech to which they have no more alliance than they have to 
nouns or adjectives.* We have also certain words of Latin 
original, employed for precisely the same purpose — suppose, 
allow and admit, which indeed are not yet misnamed and class- 
ed with conjunctions. 

The Saxon method therefore of expressing condition, doubt 
or hypothesis, was to declare the fact which was to be sup- 
posed, by a verb in the Indicative Mode, and prefix to this fact 
or statement, a verb in the Imperative Mode, denoting give, 
grant or suppose. Thus, u Give his son shall ask bread, will 
he give him a stone." Give, in the Imperative, and his son 
shall ask bread, a sentence, following give as its object. This 
is precisely the construction of such sentences of a conditional 
kind Now to omit the personal termination of the verb in 
the hypothetical sentence, " Give, he ask bread," is to convert 
the sentence into false English, unless we suppose the tense 
future, and the auxiliary will or shall suppressed. In the pre- 
sent tense, it is just as bad English, as to omit the termination 
after the Latin equivalent words suppose ox admit. " Suppose, 
his son ask bread" — u Suppose he be the son of God." 

Unless, is a verb, onhjsan, to unloose, release, dismiss, put 
away, remove. Unless he wash his flesh, he will be unclean. 
That is, dismiss (or suppose not to exist) this fact — he tcash 
his flesh, and he will be unclean. This shows that the sen- 
tence is not English, except we consider wash as in the future, 

*"// his son ask bread, will he give him a stone." In the 
name of reason, what single property of a conjunction has if? 
" Though he slay me, yet will I trust in him." What con- 
necting powers has though? Not the least ; and this is equally 
true of si and nisi in Latin. 



PHILOSOPHICAL GRAMMAR. 225 

and the auxiliary shall suppressed. That the tense is future, 
is not only obvious, from the sense of the verb itself, but from 
the following clause — If his son (shall) ask bread, will he give 
him a stone?— Unless he (shall) wash his flesh, he will be un- 
clean — the last clauses are in the future, corresponding in time 
with the contingent events expressed in the first clause. 

The evils resulting from the Subjunctive Mode we 
have partially noticed; the following illustrates it 
more fully. 

[From Webster s Grammar, p. 147.] 

The mischiefs resulting from the vague manner of institut- 
ing Grammar rules, will be fully seen in the perpetual confu- 
sion of tenses which occur in almost every author. We are 
told that conjunctions connect like tenses and modes— and 
whether is a conjunction. Let us see the consequence, " If I 
should ask any one, whether ice and water were two distinct 
species of things." — Locke, 3. 6. 18. 

To resolve this sentence by common grammars, we are to 
say, that should ask is a verb in the imperfect tense of the sub- 
junctive mode, whether is a conjunction, and were, a verb con- 
nected with ash hy that conjunction. And what sort of lan- 
guage is this — " If I should ask" — a contingent event or hy- 
pothesis—of course the time future — " Whether ice and wa- 
ter were, two distinct things," that is, were, in time past, and 
perfectly past ; for were by itself never denotes time imperfect- 
ly past ? 

In this way, the author is led to write what he never in- 
tended — sheer nonsense. The verb was intended to express a 
fact of general existence — one which is always true or false — 
that is, the identity or diversity of ice and water — a fact exist- 
ing in nature, and therefore to be mentioned in the present 
tense indefinite — " Whether ice and water are two distinct 
substances." 

" They considered the body as a hydraulic machine, and the 
fluids as passing through a series of chimical changes ; for get- 
ting that animation was [is] its essantial characteristic." — Dar- 
win, Zoon. pref. 

" A stranger to the poem would not easily discover that this 
was [is] verse." — Murray's Grammar. 

Examples of this mistake may be cited without end— but 
those which I have collected are amply sufficient to show the 
miserable state of grammatical knowledge. How easy would 
it have been to detect these blunders, had the parts of speech 
been understood, and properly classed ! Take for example, the 



226 AN ANALYTICAL AND 

passage from Murray — and resolve itaccording to the explana- 
tion of that which is given in the preceding pages — " This was 
verse — a stranger to the poem would not easily discover that.' 
What nonsense ! But correct the verb. u This is verse — a 
stranger would not easily discover tlbat" The whole error 
has arisen probably from considering that as a conjunction — 
when in fact it is a representative of the following member of 
the period — and the sentence is found to consist of two clauses 
— one hypothetical, and the other declaratory — " A stranger to 
the poem, (if he should attempt) would not easily discover 
that — this is verse." 

A few authors, led by their own sense of right and wrong, 
[for surely they have h:id no Grammar to guide them] have 
occasionally avoided these errors, and written the language with 
correctness. 

" They said that man is an animal." — Anarch, vol. 4, note. 

"He told us these birds are natives of Samos."— ibm. ch. 74. 



THE DUPLE TENSE. 

[From Cardell, p. 65.] 

The glass is broken. 

It is in that condition, in which the finished action of break- 
ing has left it. 

The book is printed. 

The act of printing is finished, and the book is as the effect of 
that action has made it. 

" My son was lost, and now is found." 



ACTIVE, PASSIVE, AND NEUTER VERBS. 

[From CardelVs Grammar, p. 48.] 

The verb is the part of speech without which no sentence 
can be framed, and on which other terms, in construction, 
mainly depend. They assume great variety in relation to the 
endless forms of action ; but there is no established principle 
for making division lines between them. From the general 
practice of language in dropping redundant words, the object 
of a verb is omitted, when by familiar use it is understood. 

All verbs appear to have been originally used to denote visi- 



PHILOSOPHICAL GRAMMAR. 227 

ble activity ; and generally in its highest forms of manifesta- 
tion. It was not the post or tree, sustaining itself in an erect 
posture, which gave rise to the verb stand; nor were other 
verbs first applied to apparently motionless things. They all 
had their origin in obvious actions ; and in the progress of lan- 
guage, extended their meaning, through lessening degrees of 
analogous appearance. In this unconscious manner, the nations 
of unlettered men, so adapted their language to philosophic 
truth, that all physical and intellectual research can find no 
essential rule to reject or change. What the simple fathers of 
mankind did, from first impulse, was exactly accordant with 
those laws of nature which industrious genius may admire, but 
can never fully explore. 

At every patriarchal home, it was, of course, seen that adult 
persons could support themselves in an erect posture, and the 
infants could not; that the revered parent, at one time, stood 
firm, surrounded by the family circle, and at another, lay pros- 
trate on a bed of sickness, while they were anxiously bending 
over him ; for these things are common to human life : one 
man was seen to stand faithfully by his friend, or steadfastly 
at his post, in the hour of danger, while another fainted with 
fear, or basely deserted, to extricate himself from the peril : 
another stood in a slippery place, where his companion was 
seen to fall ; all these, and a thousand others, were instances of 
manifest action ; and a word to express it became of important 
use. 

"When the verb stand was established to denote what the 
man did, from united volition, energy, and skill, it was easily 
extended to the post and tree, sustaining themselves in the same 
position, without stopping to inquire by what unknown cause 
their action was performed. In this extension, the continuity 
remains unbroken, and the application just; for where obvious 
movement ceases, action on scientific principles always exists; 
and so inevitable is this rule, in its adaptation to things, that 
not only no neuter verb ever was employed, but it is beyond 
all human power to form one, to give it either meaning or use. 

If the "Wonderful Activity" of the rope dancer, who stand* 
on his head, upon a swinging cord, at an elevation of fifteen 
feet in the air, is no action, then what is action ? and who shall 
dare to name the feats of the mountebank, in comparison with 
what the oak, by Divine Wisdom, performs in standing, and 
renewing its verdure, for ages, against all the tempests which 
howl around it ? 

Concerning the objects of verbs, the errors in grammatical 
ineulcation appear to be of a remarkable cast. 



228 



AN ANALYTICAL AND 



The few specimens which follow, will give some idea of the 
reciprocity of verbal actors, actions, and objects. These exam- 
ples are clumsy indeed, but not therefore the less instructive. 
It belongs to the art of an able writer to conceal this structure, 
and obviate iis monotony, or alliteration. The enlightened lin- 
guist, on the contrary, instead of being deceived by this dis- 
guise, should make it a most efficient instrument in the eluci- 
dation of his principles ; for it should not be forgotten, that, in 
the construction of language, the first process is the formation 
of single words, with definite meaning, and not the practice of 
elegant brevity in their combinations. 



A very large class of verbal objects are the productions or 
effects, resulting from actions. Many others denote the per- 
formance itself taken as a circumstance, fact, or thing. 



Agent. 
Builders 
Pinrnakers 
Dreamers 
Laughers 
Singers 
Breathers 
Speakers 
Actors 
Sleepers 
Drinkers 
Walkers 
Producers 
Workers 
Sitters 

Profligate livers 
The dying 
Pleaders 
A coiner 
Sufferers 
A player 
Thinkers 
A person 
Casters 
Fishers 
Twisters 
An equal 
Light 
The glow 



Verb. 
build 
make 
dream 
laugh 
sing 
breathe 
speak or make 
act or perform 
sleep 
drink 

walk or take 
produce 

work or execute 
sit, or hold 
live 

die or encounter 
plead or make 
coins 
suffer 
plays 

think or employ 
personates 
cast 

fish or catch 
twist 
equals 

lights or sheds 
glows or diffuses 



Object. 
buildings, 
pins, 
dreams. 

laughter or laugh, 
singing or songs, 
breathing or breath, 
speeches, 
actions or parts, 
sleep, or naps, 
drink, 
walks. 

products or results, 
work. 

sittings or sessions, 
profligate lives, 
dying or death, 
pleadings or pleas, 
coin. 

sufferings, 
plays, 
thoughts, 
a personage, 
casts or castings, 
fish, 
twists, 
an equal, 
light, 
a glowing or glow. 



PHILOSOPHICAL GRAMMAR. 229 

The taste tastes the taste. 

The feeling feels the feeling. 

Rain rains rain. 

Frost frosts or freezes frost. 

The sight sees the sight. 

All languages are full of this construction. The veil which 
covers it is more thin than would be at first supposed. This 
tabular explanation will serve to explain it, instead of explain- 
ing any other explanation which can be explained respecting 
it. The student has only to study the study of nature, around 
him and within him, to know the knowledge of those princi- 
ples which chiefly govern all human speech. 

The next mystery in verbal objects, appears to be the exten- 
sive class of self actions, commonly included under the name 
of reflected verbs. These imply actions which recur upon the 
agents, or in which the actor does something to himself. 

Another set of verbs called reciprocal, denote actions in 
which two or more agents act on each other. 

None of these distinctions amount to any real difference in 
the character of verbs, which are all substantially alike. No 
rational division line can be drawn between them. 

Dr. Sangrado often bled his patients, and occasionally bled 
himself ; he sometimes opened their veins, and sometimes his 
own. 

The doctor, in both cases, performed the operation of bleed- 
ing, with the same lancet, in the same way. Whether he 
opened his own or his patients' veins, appears not to vary the 
nature of the action, or the character of the verb, any more 
than the difference between bleeding the same person in the 
arm, or the foot. 

After attempting to show that all verbs are active ; that they 
all denoted, in their origin, manifest action ; in what manner 
they act; and what that action produces; it remains to think 
some farther brief thoughts, concerning the nature of verbal 
objects. 

"To Sleep." 

The action signified by this verb always affects two objects 
at the same time ; and both are inevitably understood as the 
objects or the verb, whether either is expressed or not. 

The noun sleeping islthe name of the act which the verb de» 

20' 



230 AN ANALYTICAL AND 

notes, as, " His sleeping was quiet :" M They were kept from 
sleeping.' 1 

The noun sleep is the resulting effect of the action of sleep- 
ing^ or the thing which sleeping produces, as breath is only what 
is breathed. The way to have, get, or take sleep, is to sleep it. 

"The stout hearted have slept their sleep:" "They shall 
sleep a perpetual sleep and shall not wake," means that they 
"shall sleep the sleep of death," or, " Sleep the long sleep" and 
not merely sleep a short nap, or sleep the ordinary sleep of the 
night. 

That the noun sleep is always the object of the verb sleep, is, 
on the clearest principles of philosophic demonstration, as cer- 
tain as that very simply proving must afford very simple proof, 
or bleeding produce blood. 

Sleeping also, as a self action, infallibly produces its effect 
on the sleeper as its object. 

This action, like most others performed by man, depends 
partly on necessity, and partly on reason and choice. 

" For this cause many sleep :" 1 Cor. xi. 30. 

" I will not give sleep to my eyes, nor slumber to my eyelids, 
until 1 have found out a place for the Lord." — Ps. " Awake 
thou that sleepest, and arise." 

Every human being, at short intervals, resorts to " tirexi Na- 
ture's sweet restorer, balmy sleep ;" to sleep himself into new 
vigor, after the exhaustion of his waking hours. 

A mother, because her child was peevish, rocked it to sleep, 

id " it slept itself quiet." 

" A young lady, in great distress of mind, took a # strong opi- 
ate, and slept herself to death." " Many idle persons sleep 
themselves into a kind of unnatural stupidity," as topers drink 
themselves drunk. 

The acetous fermentation of wine is one of the moderate 
kind of actions. A moment's attention will show something of 
its nature. 

1. The wine converts itself to vinegar. 

2. It imbibes oxygen, or the acidifying principle, from the air. 

3. It changes the surrounding atmosphere by changing the 
proportions of its constituents. 

This liquid then, apparently motionless in the cask, performs 
its direct actions on three objects at the same time. 



and 



PHILOSOPHICAL GRAMMAR. 231 

To shine. 

The original and strict meaning of the verb to shine is to 
brighten objects ; to make them sheen, sheeny, shining, glossy or 
bright. 

" The Sun shines." 

This verb, during the last four hundred years, very seldom 
has an object directly expressed ; not because it has no object, 
or because the sun, in shining, produces no effect ; but for more 
consistent reasons, which may be clearly explained. 

On philosophic principles, and likewise according to popular 
conception, the sun, in shining, either produces some effect on 
its own body ; or it throws out something from itself; or it in- 
fluences bodies on which its shining falls. It does all the three. 
It exhibits itself in brightness, " in peerless majesty :" u It sheds 
its dazzling radiance through the world :" and it brightens all 
objects on which this radiance falls. 

The brilliancy which the sun disp 7 ays on its own disk, iss«m 
shine It diffuses or sheds this brilliancy by shining it : and the 
light with which it shines, enlightens, or irradiates the world, is 
sun shine. 

The reason, then, why this verb has no object expressed, is, 
in the first place, because it has so many objects, that it is im- 
possible to enumerate them ; and, secondly, because its action 
is so uniform and familiar, that it is unnecessary to particularize 
for the sake of perspicuity. 

To smile. 

To smile is necessarily to smile smiles. 

The sycophant " bowed and smiled himself into favor at court." 

" To smile our cares away." 

" And smile the wrinkles from the brow of age." 

No acti n in the order of nature can affect less than two ob* 
jects at the same time, nor can any verb ever have less than 
two objective words inevitably depending on it in construction, 
whether either is expressed or not. This statement may be 
exemplified by the following anecdote, in which duplicate ob^ 
jects, to each verb, are alternated with each other, 

A foreigner, hired to an American farmer, wrote writing on a 
sheet of paper, or wrote a sheet of paper with writing, to inform 
the information to his mother or inform his mother by the inform 
motion, that the man who employed Mvi in employment, or em« 



232 AN ANALYTICAL AND 

ployed employment for him, fed him with meat, or fed meat to 
him, twice a week. His fellow laborer, struck with the singu- 
larity of such a letter, asked the question of him, or asked him 
by the question, how he could the conning of himself, or co?zZd 
himself with the cunning, to communicate such a communication 
to his friends, or communicate his friends and himself by such 
communication, and whether he did tio£ himself in the deed, or 
did wot the deed for himself, to e«£ the eating of raeaf, or eo2 
mea£ for his eating, every day in the week ? 

The foreigner answered the ansicer to his companion, or erc- 
swered his companion with the answer, " Poh ! icould you the 
t#i// in yourself, or would you yourself by the 2#z7Z, to /*«re ?rae 
with the having, or A«ve the having of me, to ZeZ/ the telling of 
such a toZe, or £el£ the ta/e by such telling, that my friends in 
Europe would never believe the 5efo'ef of &-, or believe it with 
their 6eZie/i? 

Such a letter, of course, is not given as a specimen of fash- 
ionable elegance in modern practice ; but, if any one, on peru- 
sing this kind of composition, should think it w T himsically new, 
far fetched, or overdone, let him take a little time to examine 
it, and try the most doubtful words, by the substitution of oth- 
ers, of similar meaning, as, instead of " employing a man in 
employment,'" to employ him in business, or furnish him with 
employment. When this is done, let the expressions here used 
be compared with their prevailing contractions, which doubt- 
less sound better, and, perhaps, may at first seem more correct, 
because they are more familiar. 

" A man communicates, by letter, with his friend/' 

Communicates what with his friend ? The communication 
which communicates, without the community of more objects 
than one, is much worse grammar, rhetoric, and logic, than any 
thing in the foreigner's letter, however singular that may ap- 
pear : yet this communication, of nothing with some thing else, 
has become the established diction, and is one of the most tri- 
fling absurdities in the doctrine of unoperative actions, and 
neuter affirmations. 

It is the purpose of grammar, properly conducted, to explain 
language, on rational principles ; to show the reciprocal depen- 
dence and connection of words ; ascertain what is vague ; and 
supply what, for the sake of common sense, must necessarily 
be understood : for, if the scholarship of the civilized world is 
to be confined merely to teaching set forms or words, by rote, 
then it aims at nothing higher than children in all savage coun- 
tries may learn from their grandmothers. 

No other word is of so extensive use as the verb to be ; and 
consequently none has so much need of relieving its monoto- 



PHILOSOPHICAL GRAMMAR. 233 

nous repetitions, by making its inflections irregular. No less 
than five verbs therefore are blended to make the parts of this 
one : for be, am, is, are, and were, are so many distinct radical 
terms. They have different shades of original meaning ; as to 
lire, or prtserve one's self in being ; to assume or take some po- 
sition, appearance, or form; to exist, stand forth, or exhibit one's 
self; to breathe air, enjoy it, or appear in it ; and to exercise vital 
powers of body or mind. Most of the applications of the verb 
to be are the inferential meanings from the original ideas. 

This verb is not of a different nature from others. The fre- 
quency of its use depends on its specific importance, and not 
on any thing distinctive in its verbal character. Jt expresses 
transitive action in every form of its use ; but that action be- 
longs to itself, and is not employed to conjugate other verbs; 
nor to make them either active or passive. 

On the same principles which have already been explained, the 
verb to be, always has two objective words irresistibly inferred. 

They are, or breathe air. 
They are, or air themselves. 

This verb has its first application in the manifest and highest 
qualities of living beings, and then, like other verbs, descends 
to inferior things, till the analogy can hardly be traced. No 
one can doubt that the verb to be, with its governed objects ex- 
pressed, must appear remarkably new to those who never 
thought of such a thing before, and who take it for granted, 
that, if a word is not explained in their grammar or dictionary, 
it can only be because it never had any meaning. If, from 
unconscious and familiar use of the verb to be, we are inclined 
to overlook its important signification, the reflections of com- 
mon sense ought to set us right; for while we see so strong a 
tendency to omit all words w T hich can be spared, how should 
this one be retained in more than half the sentences through 
the language ? The verb are, with its governed objects, has, 
indeed, a clumsy appearance in practice, because so little 
known ; but this can not alter its nature, nor the truth of its 
principle. Let the objector read the aecount of the English 
prisoners in the Black-hole dungeon at Calcutta, suffocating 
for want of air; climbing over their dead and dying compan- 
ions, and gasping for breath, at the scanty aperture, and he will 
have a better idea of the verb are, as connected with the ques- 
tion of life and death. The twenty-three persons who survived 
that scene of horror, would easily have understood and felt the 
explanation of this word, and would not have considered it 
either awkward, unmeaning, or entirely new. 

In the practical use of verbs, the variations are often very 
20* 



234 AN ANALYTICAL AND 

great. From one original and strict meaning, they pass, by 
easy transitions, to very diversified, analogous, and figurative 
uses. One striking circumstance in the employment of verbs, 
is the number of different agents to which the same verbal 
action may be referred. 

Mr. Jones has a new grate in his front parlor, in which he 
burns Liverpool coal. 

His new grate burns coal very well. 

The coal burns handsomely. — (burns itself.) 

The fire burns well. — (burns the coal.) 

The servant burns too much coal. 

Mr. Jones burns coal in preference to wood. 

The same kind of action frequently assumes very great vari- 
ety in its relations, both to agents and objects. 

All verbs have objects alike ; but, as it happens with other 
words, it becomes an elegant practice to omit these objects, 
when they are sufficiently understood to answer the purposes 
of discourse without them. Whether they are to be used, or 
omitted, does not belong to any possible rule to explain ; but it 
is entirely a question of fashion and good taste. 

The verb to feed, to supply with feed or food, is in very fa- 
miliar use. A moment's attention will show how differently 
the same action in its literal and strict sense is performed in 
relation to different objects, as applied to their nature and wants. 
To feed a babe, is to put feed into its mouth : to feed a horse, is 
to fill the rack or manger before him : a man, who carries on 
large business, and employs a hundred workmen, feeds them 
and their families effectually, by sitting in his office, and sign- 
ing a bank check, for the amount of their wages, when it be- 
comes due. 

To run, is one of the verbs which frequently, by custom, has 
its object omitted. This is particularly the case, when the fact 
is, that the agent runs himself, and the accompanying circum- 
stances are such, that no other object is likely to be understood. 
Any necessary distinction, or particularity, requires the objec- 
tive word, in this self action, to be expressed, and this is to be 
determined by the sense, and not by arbitrary rule. 

Two men were engaged in argument The believer in in- 
transitive verbs, sat out to run his opponent into an evident ab- 
surdity, and, contrary to his expectation he ran himself into 
one. Leave out the objects of this verb, run, and the sense is 
totally changed. He sat out to run into an evident absurdity, 
and he ran into one : that is, he did the very absurd thing 
which he intended to do. 



PHILOSOPHICAL GRAMMAR. 235 

To run signifies to advance some thing by continued prog- 
ress from one place to an other, and generally includes the 
idea of rapidity. 

In general, a word has only one meaning, and all apparent 
varieties in its use, are but extensions, not perversions, of the 
original and strict import. 

" The man soon ran himself into discredit by his mismanage- 
ment." u We chased the deer till we ran ourselves out of 
breath." "The horse ran himself to death." " The pirates 
ran their vessel into a small creek." "We determined to run 
our ship ashore, and betake ourselves to the boats." " The prof- 
ligate runs a dreadful career." "They were compelled to run 
the gauntlet." " He ran the spear through him." " He ran 
him through the body." " The captain ran his men to rescue 
them from the enemy." " The whale ran out fifty fathoms of 
line." " The glass has but a few more sands to run." He ran 
a godly race." " The company run their steam boat every day." 
" They run three lines of stages." "The drivers run their 
horses, trot, or walk them, according to circumstances." " He 
ran his head against a post." " He ran a sliver into his finger." 
" The still runs a puncheon of whiskey a day." " The distance 
was seven miles, and he ran it in twenty minutes." " The 
barrel runs emptyings" " We ran the squirrel up a tree, and 
ran the rabbit into his burrow." "The wheel and reel ran off 
forty runs of yarn, and which yarn runs forty knots to the 
pound." " Run that calico off, and see if it holds out measure." 
" Run the account over, and see if it is right." " The brokers 
run the ba nk severely." " The note overran its time" "He 
out ran all his competitors." 

" Surprising Feats of Activity." 

For the second time in America ! ! ! 

Mr. Skipalino icill appear and perform on the slack rope at 
the Goose and Gridiron Hotel, on Tuesday evening next. He 
will walk, dance, balance, and turn, first on his head, and then 
on one foot, with the cord in full swing. He will lie crosswise 
and lengthwise on the rope ; volt instantly to an erect posture ; 
and stand balanced on his head, four feet above the floor. 

Mr. S. has had the honor to exhibit with great applause to the 
admiring nobility and gentry, at Saddlers' Wells, and other 
principal gymnastic theatres, and his astonishing feats of activ- 
ity and skill have surprised and delighted the most fashionable 
circles of Europe. 

N. B. Performance to commence at 7 o'clock. 



236 AN ANALYTICAL AND 

Which exhibits the greatest "science" the rope dancer who 
performs all these feats, or the men who make rules to express 
them all, by verbs expressing no action, and having no objects 
implied? 



The following remarks upon the verb to be, from 
Cardell, will be valuable to the inquisitive and reflect- 
ing student. 

First in importance, and first in frequency of use, is the 
Word of Words, the Verb To Be. 

From the impossibility of explaining language by grammar 
rules, without knowing the meaning of terms, a slight exposi- 
tion of the different parts of this verb will be given; confining 
the elucidation to plain English, instead of adducing proofs 
from foreign tongues. 

am, signifies to possess and exercise liveliness, or the act- 

ing principle ; to continue, to sustain, to vivify, or 
uphold one's self; to retain vitality and enjoy its attri- 
butes. 
This verb can be used only in the first person singular, of 
the present tense ; that is, by the person actually uttering it 
at the time. It therefore has not the least variety in manner 
of application ; but is always confined to the same literal fact. 
No being can state a falsehood in saying I am ; for no one can 
utter it, if it is not true. Am always denotes action of the 
highest kind ; but it is self action in the strictest form : and not 
that which, except from the unavoidable nature of actions, ex- 
tends its effects to secondary objects. 

be, signifies to live, to breathe ; to exercise the qualities and 

functions of animal life ; and when applied by analogy 
to matter, to take, possess, or hold some state of being, 
among existing things. It is the same word, slightly 
altered, as the first syllable in fo'-ography, which means 
a history of a person's life, 
airfare, art, these are the same word, which in modern prac- 
tice, is slightly and conveniently modified in form ; 
but without any alteration of meaning. Thou art is 
contracted from thou arest. 

" They are," means first, they air, or are themselves ; 
they supply themselves with air : they vivify, inspirit, 
and preserve themselves by means of air ; and applied 
to the lower ranks of creatures, they continue them- 
selves in air ; or the regions of air, light, or being. 



PHILOSOPHICAL GRAMMAR. 237 

Second. They are air ; they inhale or imbibe air; as 
they drink drink, sleep sleep, or breathe breath ; they en- 
joy the enlivening influence of air ; and inferior things 
do something as nearly analogous to the same action 
as their various natures and circumstances will admit. 

is, signifies to exist, being a contraction from the same 

radical word; to stand forth ; to exhibit ones self : to 
take, or hold some stand, or position, in the universe of 
existing things. Is, always denotes self-action. One 
person does not exist an other person, and the actor is 
one of the objects. 

Is, like other verbs, has a verbal noun, or the equiva- 
lent idea, necessarily implied; as, It stands its stand- 
ing ; it exists its existence; it holds its place, and acts 
its acts, among the actors, living and dead, throughout 
the Creator's works. 

Were, wert, werth, worth, word, " In the beginning was the Word, 
and the Word was with God, and the Word was God." 
These are all but the variations of one term, signify- 
ing spirit ; the enlivening power ; the vital, or life giv- 
ing principle ; "They were;" they inspirited them- 
selves, they possessed vitality ; and as applied to the 
minor gradations of being, they possessed and exercised 
those acting powers, analogous, by receding degrees, 
to animal life, which acting powers pervade every 
portion of the material icorld. 

was, is from the same radical word as were, and with the 
same meaning. 

" Is the theory of the word to be, as both a noun and an ac- 
tive verb, exemplified in practice ?" 

" And God said, ' Light be ;' and light was" 

If it was any action to create the sun and stars, with their 
attendant orbs, that action is signified by the short sentence 
above ; and if the sentence denotes action, it is " expressed" en- 
tirely by the verbs be and was. 

be, imperative verb, exist ; spring into being; assume position, 
order, and acting influence, in the system of wheeling 
worlds. 

teas, indicative verb, past tense, denoting that the fiat of Al- 
mighty power and wisdom, " Light be," was instantly 
obeyed. 

And QOD said unto Moses, " 1 AM that 1 AM ; and thus 



238 AN ANALYTICAL AND 

shalt thou say unto the children of Israel ; 1 AM hath sent me 
unto you." — Exod. 

I AM the first, and 1 the last, 
Through endless years the same ; 

I AM is my memorial still, 
And my eternal NAME. 

Doct. Watts ; Hymn 45. 

The compounded word which, through its varying forms, we 
call the verb to be, though in all its parts both noun and verb, 
and exceedingly significant as such, has been so long unex- 
plained, and, by the force of tradition and habit, unconsciously 
used, that to develop its forcible, sublime, and true meaning, is 
necessarily to exhibit it in an unfashionable point of view. 

" 1 am the am, or that I am," 

am, verb, expressing self-action, the action of sustaining 
one's self in life. Never having any variation in its o£- 
ject it is unecessary to express it, for the sake of perspi- 
cuity, or distinction. No word therefore is retained in 
use tor this purpose. In parsing, it is only necessary to 
have the principle well understood, without dwelling 
upon it in practice. 
the I AM ; Vitality itself ; uncreated, boundless, unending Being; 
Life-giving Power; Self sustaining Existence; the 
eternal, uncontrolled, unassisted self acting Principle 
of Life. 
I am, as here used, is taken together, as a noun ; and such a 
noun as never had a parallel in expression. It could not be 
translated, from the original, into any language, without greatly 
lessening its force. 

/ dm, as a nuun, could never be used, but by the Ever-living 
God; and, without verbal reasoning upon it, the unavoidable 
necessity of the case shows that it can be taken only as a nom- 
inative word, or as the actor : because that, as the Supreme Be- 
ing has no " variableness or shadow of turning," and is above 
all influence of inferior actors, he can not in strictness be con- 
templated as the object of any action ; for the nature of action 
is unavoidably to produce change in that on which it operates. 
In the use of language, the name of the Deity frequently be- 
comes the object of -a verb ; but this mode of expression is to 
be understood as growing out of the necessity of the case, and 
the mere relative and limited conceptions, which finite beings 
must have of the Sovereign Lord. 

For similar reasons, no past participle can ever apply to the 
Supreme Being, for what he absolutely is. We can say, rela- 



PHILOSOPHICAL GRAMMAR. 239 

tively, of the Most High, " He has been our Protector, ever 
since we had existence :" but, in all which pertains to his own 
Divine Attributes, it can not be said that he ever has been any 
thing which he is not now ; because the past participle in every 
possible form of its use, denotes the resulting effect of action or 
change. 

" City of JYeio-York, ss. The People of the State of New- 
York, to Timothy Trusty, Greeting : 

We COMMAND YOU that, all and singular business and 
excuses being laid aside, you BE and APPEAR, in your prop- 
er person, at the next court of common pleas, to be held at the 
City Hall of the city of New- York, on the third Monday of 
January next, at ten o'clock in the forenoon of the same day, 
to testify all and singular, what you may know, in a certain 
cause now depending in the said court, then and there to be 
tried, between John Doe plaintiff and Richard Roe defendant, 
of a plea of trespass on the case ; and this you are not to omit, 
under the penalty of two hundred and fifty dollars. 

Two hundred and fifty dollars penalty for not performing the 
action of being in court at the time commanded. 

You be and appear, that is, you have, and present, yourself 

Almost thou persuadest me to be a Christian : to make a 
Christian of myself, to turn or convert myself into a Christian. 
The best way for a man to seem to be any thing is really to be • 
ichat ( ) he would to be. 



PART III. 



SUBJECTS FOR EXERCISE. 

Then Judah came near unto him, and said, O my 
lord, let thy servant, J pray thee, speak a word in my 
lord's ears, and let not thine anger burn against thy ser- 
vant : for thou art even as Pharaoh. My lord asked 
his servants, saying, Have ye a father, or a brother ? 
And we said unto ray lord, We have a father, an old 
man, and a child of his old age a little one ; and his 
brother is dead, and he alone is left of his mother, and 
his father loveth him. And thou saidest unto thy ser- 
vants, bring him down unto me, that I may set mine 
eyes upon him. And we said unto my lord, The lad 
cannot leave his father ; for if he should leave his fa- 
ther, his father would die. And thou saidst unto thy 
servants, Except your youngest brother come down 
with you, ye shall see my face no more. And it came 
to pass when we came up unto thy servant my father, 
we told him the words of my lord. And our father 
said, go again, and buy us a little food. And we said, 
We cannot go down : if our youngest brother be with 
us, then will we go down : for we may not see the man's 
face, except our youngest brother be with us. And 
thy servant my father said unto us, Ye know that my 
wife bare me two sons : and the one went out from me, 
and I said, Surely he is torn in pieces ; and I saw him 
not since : and if ye take this also from me, and mis- 
chief befall him, ye shall bringdown my gray hairs with 
sorrow to the grave. Now therefore when I come to 



PHILOSOPHICAL GRAMMAR. 241 

thy servant my father, and the lad be not with us ; see- 
ing that his life is bound up in the lad's life ; it shall 
come to pass, when he seeth that the lad is not with 
us, that he will die : and thy servants shall bring down 
the gray hairs of thy servant our father with sorrow to 
the grave. For thy servant became surety for the lad 
unto my father, saying, If I bring him not unto thee, 
then I shall bear the blame to my father forever. Now 
therefore, I pray thee, let thy servant abide instead of 
the lad a bondman to my lord ; and let the lad go up 
with his brethren. For how shall I go up to my father, 
and the lad be not with me? lest peradventure I see 
the evil that shall come on my father. 



MOUNT AUBURN. 

So far as we ourselves are concerned, it matters 
not where our corruptible bodies are deposited after 
death. No sequestered spot — no perfumed air — no 
balmy breezes, can save our flesh from the worm of 
the grave. Whether placed in consecrated ground, 
or deposited by the public highway, we are alike sub- 
jected to the horrors of that ' narrow house, prepared 
for all the living. 5 Whether entombed beneath the 
lofty colums, or whether our grave be made within 
the watery waste, 'tis all the same — the same decay 
and change awaits us. To us, it matters not : but to 
those near and dear friends who may survive us, it is 
different. To those we love, we look with different 
feelings. When we see father, mother, brother, 
sister, or friend, to whom we are bound by the tender 
cords of affection, consigned to their last, long home, 
in a neglected spot, left with - no stone to tell where 
they lie/ — left, exposed to the rude tread of the stran- 
ger, to be forgotten — their graves, perhaps, to be 
made the place of the jest and the song, how poignant 
21 



242 AN ANALYTICAL AND 

are our feelings — how repugnant to our natures are 
the thoughts which come rushing on the mind. At 
times like this, how do we wish that some lone spot, 
consecrated to the memory of the departed,was at hand, 
in which we might deposit the last frail relics of those 
in whom we have centered all our affections — where 
they should not be forgotten ; but where their memory 
might be blessed with the tear of the passer-by — 
where they could be consigned to the grave amid the 
fragrance of nature, and where roses might bloom 
over them, as fit emblems of their virtues and decay — 
where no rude footstep should pollute the ground thus 
made sacred by their remains, but where all would be 
led to contemplate with awe and respect, the home of 
the dead. 

Such a place is Mount Auburn! Consecrated to 
the memory of the dead, by the first and master spirits 
of the age, it is ' Holy Ground.' There is not, per- 
haps on earth, a place so well calculated for its pres- 
ent purpose as Mount Auburn. The celebrated and 
far-famed Pere La Chaise, in the vicinity of Paris, so 
far as nature is concerned, is as far inferior to it, as 
pigmy mountains to the towering Alps. Nature has 
made this romantic — art has made it beautiful — the 
Creator has made it lovely — Man has made it sacred ! 
Here are to repose the remains of Talent, of Virtue 
and Love — Here will much that is fair, much that is 
beautiful, take up its abode, \ until the last trump shall 
sound, and the graves shall yield up their dead.' 



ORIGIN OF WAR. 



On what principle in the nature or condition of 
man, does the advocate for war found its necessity % 
He has been defined to be a religious animal. But 
who will find the cause or the necessity of wars in 



PHILOSOPHICAL GRAMMAR. 243 

man's religion? Every relation he sustains to his 
Creator — every light in which he can be viewed, as 
connected with his final Judge, leads to an opposite 
conclusion. He is a reasonable being. Wars are 
inseparably connected with the highest acts of ingrati- 
tude, revenge, cruelty, and crime. Apply the epithet 
reasonable to these acts, and you have a string of 
solecisms. 

War, it is said, is necessary, because it has been 
the business of the world, — because it has afforded 
occupation for one half of the population of the earth 
in all ages. War is useful, because it has made nearly 
all the great men that ever lived. Take away, they 
exclaim, from the history of the species, all that apper- 
tains to war and conquest, and what an uninteresting, 
barren, desolate retrospect have we left! Some emi- 
nent lawyers and physicians, a few profound divines 
and learned judges, here and there a great orator — 
doubtful if they would have been so, but from the 
excitements growing out of the events of war ! Now 
and then a good poet — questionable even this, if they 
could not have sung of arms ! 

Thus men think, talk, and declaim; and thus are 
cheated to believe that wars cannot be prevented. 
But where is the man who has undertaken by fair and 
legitimate deduction, from any principles applicable to 
human conduct, or from the nature of things, to prove 
that war is necessarily entailed upon the race of man? 
What moralist has ever come to this result? What 
writer, upon the nature or history of man, has ever 
shown that a love of war is born with him, interwoven 
in his very nature, instinctive and incorrigible? 

Bigelow. 



MILTON S LAMENTATION FOR THE LOSS OP HIS SIGHT. 

Hail, holy light i offspring of heaven first-born ! 
Or of th' Eternal, co-eternal beam ! 



244 AN ANALYTICAL AND 

May I express thee unblam'd. Since God is ligm% 

And never, but in unapproached light 

Dwelt from eternity — dwelt then in thee, 

Bright effluence of bright essence increate. 

Or hear'st thou rather, pure etherial stream, 

Whose fountain who shall tell ? Before the sun, 

Before the heavens thou wert, and at the voice 

Of God, as with a mantle didst invest 

The rising world of waters dark and deep, 

Won from the void and formless infinite. 

Thee I revisit now with bolder wing, 

Escap'd the Stygian pool, though long detain'd 

In that obscure sojourn; while in my flight, 

Through utter, and through middle darkness borne, 

With other notes, than to the Orphean lyre, 

1 sung of Chaos and eternal Night ; 

Taught by the heavenly muse to venture down 

The dark descent, and up to re-ascend, 

Though hard and rare. Thee 1 revisit safe, 

And feel thy sovereign vital lamp — but thou 

Revisitest not these eyes, that roll in vain 

To find thy piercing ray, and find no dawn ; 

So thick a drop serene hath quench'd their orbs, 

Or dim suffusion veil'd. Yet not the more 

Cease I to wander were the Muses haunt, 

Clear spring, or shady grove, or sunny hill, 

Smit with love of sacred song — but chief 

Thee, Zion, and the flowery brooks beneath, 

That wash thy hallow'd feet, and warbling flow, 

Nightly 1 visit — nor sometimes forget 

Those other two equall'd with me in fate, 

So were I equall'd with them in renown, 

Blind Thamyris, and blind Mssonides ; 

And Tiresias, and Phineus, prophets old : 

Then feed on thoughts, that voluntary move 

Harmonious numbers— as the wakeful bird 

Sings darkling, and in shadiest covert hid, 

Tunes her nocturnal note. Thus, with the year 5 

Seasons return — but not to me returns 

Day, or the sweet approach of even, or morn, 

Or sight of vernal bloom, or summer's rose, 

Or flocks, or herds, or human face divine; 

But clouds instead, and ever-during dark 

Surround me, from the cheerful ways of men 

Cut off, and, for the book of knowledge fair, 

Presented with an universal blank 

Of nature's works, to me expung'd and raz'd, 

And wisdom, at one entrance, quite shut out. 



PHILOSOPHICAL GRAMMAR. 245 

So much the ralher, thou, celestial light, 

Shine inward, and the mind, through all her powers, 

Irradiate ; there plant eyes j all mist from thence, 

Purge and disperse ; that 1 may see and tell 

Of things invisible to mortal sight. 



TO-MORROW. 

L To-morrow, didst thou say ? 
Methought I heard Horatio say, To-morrow. 
Go to — 1 will not hear of it — To-morrow ! 
'T is a sharper, who stakes his penury 
Against thy plenty — who takes thy ready cash, 
And pays thee nought, but wishes, hopes, and promises, 
The currency of idiots — injurious bankrupt, 
That gulls the easy creditor ! — To-morrow ! 
It is a period no where to be found 
In all the hoary registers of Time, 
Unless perchance in the fool's calendar. 

2. Wisdom disclaims the word, nor holds society 
With those who own it. No, my Horatio, 
'Tis Fancy's child, and Folly is its father; 
Wrought of such stuff as dreams are, and as baseless 
As the fantastic visions of the evening. 
But soft, my friend — arrest the present moment : 
For be assur'd they are all arrant tell-tales : 
And though their flight be silent, and their path 
Trackless, as the wing'd couriers of the air, 
They post to heaven, and there record thy folly. 
Because, though station'd on th' important watch, 
Thou, like a sleeping, faithless sentinel, 
Didst let them pass unnolic'd, unimprov'd. 
And know, for that thou slumb'rest on the guard, 
Thou shalt be made to answer at the bar 
For every fugitive : and when thou thus 
Shalt stand impleaded at the high tribunal 
Of hood-wink'd Justice who shall tell thy audit ? 
21* 



246 AN ANALYTICAL AND 

3. Then stay the present instant, dear Horatio, 
Imprint the marks of wisdom on its wings. 
'Tis of more worth than kingdoms ! far more precious 
Than all the crimson treasures of life's fountain. 
O ! let it not elude thy grasp ; but, like 
The good old patriarch* upon record, 
Hold the fleet angel fast until he bless thee. 

Cotton. 



VANITY OF POWER AND MISERY OF KINGS. 

1. No matter where ; of comfort no man speak : 
Let's talk of graves, of worms, and epitaphs : 
Make dust our paper, and with rainy eyes 

Write sorrow on the bosom of the earth. 
Let's choose executors, and talk of wills : 
And yet not so, — for what can we bequeath, 
Save our deposed bodies to the ground ? 
Our lands, our lives, and all are Bolingbroke's, 
And nothing can we call our own, but death ; 
And that small model of the barren earth, 
Which serves as paste and cover to our bones. 

2. For heaven's sake, let us sit upon the ground, 
And tell sad stories of the death of kings : — 
How some have been depos'd, some slain in war ; 
Some haunted by the ghosts they have depos'd ; 
Some poison'd by their wives, some sleeping kill'd ; 
All murder'd ; — 

3. For within the hollow crown 
That rounds the mortal temples of a king, 
Keeps death his court : and there the antic sits, 
Scoffing his state, and grinning at his pomp ; 
Allowing him a breath, a little scene, 

To monarchize, be fear'd, and kill with looks ; 
Infusing him with self and vain conceit, — 

* See Genesis, chap, xxxii. 24 — 30. 



PHILOSOPHICAL GRAMMAR. 247 

As if this flesh, which walls about our life, 
Were brass impregnable ; and humor' d thus, 
Comes at the last, and with a little pin 
Bores through his castle wall, and — farewell king ! 

4. Cover your heads, and mock not flesh and blood 
With solemn reverence ; throw away respect, 
Tradition, form, and ceremonious duty, 
For you have but mistook me all this while : 
I live with bread like you, feel want, taste grief, 
Need friends : — Subjected thus, 
How can you say to me — I am a king ? 

Shalcspeare. 



HOW TO TELL BAD NEWS. 

Mr. G. Ha ! Steward, how are you my old boy ? 
how do things go on at home ? 

Steioard. Bad enough, your honor ; the magpie ? s 
dead. 

Mr. G. Poor Mag ! so he 's gone. How came he 
to die ? 

Stew. Over-ate himself, sir. 

Mr. G. Did he, faith ? a greedy dog ; why, what 
did he get he liked so well 1 

Stew. Horse-flesh, sir ; he died of eating horse- 
flesh. 

Mr. G. How came he get so much horse-flesh 1 

Stew. All your father's horses, sir. 

Mr. G. What ! are they dead, too ? 

Stew. Ay, sir ; they died of over-work. 

Mr. G. And why were they over- worked, pray ? 

Stew. To carry water, sir. 

Mr. G. To carry water ! and what were they car- 
rying water for ? 

Stew. Sure, sir, to put out the fire. 

Mr. G. Fire! what fire? 



248 AN ANALYTICAL AND 

Stew. Oh, sir, your father's house is burned down 
to the ground. 

Mr. G. My father's house burned down ! and how 
came it set on fire ? 

Stew. I think, sir, it must have been the torches. 

Mr. G. Torches ! what torches ? 

Stew. At your mother's funeral. 

Mr. G. My mother dead ! 

Stew. Ah, poor lady, she never looked up after it. 

Mr. G. After what? 

Stew. The loss of your father. 

Mr. G. My father gone too ? 

Stew. Yes, poor gentleman, he took to his bed as 
soon as he heard of it. 

Mr. G. Heard of what 1 

Stew. The bad news, sir, and please your honor. 

Mr. G. What ! more miseries ! more bad news ? 

Stew. Yes, sir, your bank has failed, and your 
credit is lost, and you are not worth a shilling in the 
world. I made bold sir, to come to wait on you 
about it, for I thought you would like to hear the 
news ! 



THE LITTLE THIEF. 

I tell with equal truth and grief, 
That little Kitt's an arrant thief: 
Before the urchin well could go, 
She stole the whiteness of the snow ; 
And more — that whiteness to adorn, 
She stole the blushes of the morn ; 
Stole all the softness JEther pours 
On primrose buds in vernal showers : 
There's no repeating all her wiles — 
She stole the Graces' winning smiles ; 
'Twas quickly seen she robbed the sky, 
To plant a star in either eye ; 



PHILOSOPHICAL GRAMMAR. 249 

She pilfered orient pearl for teeth, 
And stole the cow's ambrosial breath ; 
The cherry steeped in morning dew, 
Gave moisture to her lips and hue. 
These were her infant spoils, a store 
To which, in time, she added more : 
At twelve she stole from Ciprus' queen 
Her air and love-commanding mien : 
She sung — amazed the Sirens heard, 
And, to assert their voice, appeared : 
She played — the Muses, from their hill, 
Wondered who thus had stole their skill : 
Apollo's wit was next her prey, 
And then the beams that light the day ; 
While Jove, her pilfering thefts to crown, 
Pronounced these beauties all her own ; 
Pardoned her crimes, and praised her art ; 
And t' other day she stole — my heart. 



RODERICK DHU AND MALCOLM. 

Twice through the hall the chieftain strode ; 
The wavings of his tartans broad, 
And darkened brow, where wounded pride 
With ire and disappointment vied, 
5. Seemed, by the torch's gloomy light, 
Like the ill demon of the night, 
Stooping his pinions' shadowy sway 
Upon the nighted pilgrim's way : 
But, unrequited love, thy dart 

10. Plunged deepest its envenomed smart, 
And Roderick, with thine anguish stung, 
At length the hand of Douglas wrung ; 
While eyes that mocked at tears before, 
With bitter drops were running o'er. 

15. The death-pangs of long-cherished hope, 
Scarce in that ample breast had scope, 



250 AN ANALYTICAL AND 

But, straggling with his spirit proud, 
Convulsive heaved its checkered shroud, 
While every sob — so mute were all — 

20. Was heard distinctly through the hall ; 
The son's despair, the mother's look, 
111 might the gentle Ellen brook ; 
She rose, and to her side there came, 
To aid her parting steps, the Graeme.* 

25. Then Roderick from the Douglas broke; — 
As flashes flame through sable smoke, 
Kindling its wreaths long, dark, and low, 
To one broad blaze of ruddy glow, 
So the deep anguish of despair 

30. Burst, in fierce jealousy, to air — 
With stalwart grasp his hand he laid 
On Malcolm's breast, and belted plaid; 
" Back, beardless boy !" he sternly said, 
" Back, minion ! hold'st thou thus at naught 

35. The lesson I so lately taught ? 

This roof, the Douglas and that maid, 
Thank thou for punishment delayed." 
Eager as grey-hound on his game, 
Fiercely with Roderick grappled Graeme ; 

49. " Perish my name, if aught afford 
Its chieftain safety, save his sword !" 
Thus as they strove, their desperate hand 
Griped to the dagger or the brand ; 
And death had been — But Douglas rose, 

45. And thrust between the struggling foes 

His giant strength : . . . . " Chieftains, forego ! 
I hold the first who strikes, my foe. 
Madmen, forbear your frantic jar ! 
What ! is the Douglas fallen so far, 

50. His daughter's hand is deemed the spoil 
Of such dishonorable broil ?" 

* Pronounced Grame; a as in late. 



PHILOSOPHICAL GRAMMAR. 251 

Sullen and slowly they unclasp, 

As struck with shame, their desperate grasp ; 

And each upon his rival glared, 
55. With foot advanced, and blade half bared. 
Ere yet the brands aloft were flung, 

Margaret on Roderick's mantle hung; 

And Malcolm heard his Ellen's scream, 

As faltered through terrific dream. 
60. Then Roderick plunged in sheath his sword, 

And veiled his wrath in scornful word. 

" Rest safe till morning ; pity 'twere 

Such cheeks should feel the midnight air ! 

Then may'st thou to James Stuart tell, 
65. Roderick will keep the lake and fell, 

Nor lackey, with his free-born clan, 

The pageant pomp of earthly man. 

Morej would he of Clan-Alpine know, 

Thou canst our strength and passes show. 

Malise, what, ho !" his henchman came; 
70. "Give our safe conduct to the Graeme." 

Young Malcolm answered, calm and bold, 

" Fear nothing for thy favorite hold. 

The spot an angel deigned to grace, 

Is blessed, though robbers haunt the place! 
75. Thy churlish courtesy for those 

Reserve, who feel to be thy foes. 

As safe to me the mountain way 

At midnight, as in blaze of day, 

Though, with his boldest at his back, 
80. Even Roderick Dhu beset the track. 



GOD'S UNIVERSAL DOMINION. 

1. Hark ! the song of Jubilee, 

Loud as mighty thunders roar, 
Or the fullness of the sea, 

When it breaks upon the shore : — 



252 AN ANALYTICAL AND 

Hallelujah ! for the Lord 

God omnipotent shall reign ; 
Hallelujah ! let the word 

Echo round the earth and main. 

2. Hallelujah ! hark ! the sound, 

From the depth unto the skies, 
Wakes above, beneath, around, 

All creation's harmonies : 
See Jehovah's banner furled, 

Sheathed his sword : he speaks, — 'tis done ; 
And the kingdoms of this world 

Are the kingdoms of his Son. 

3. He shall reign from pole to pole 

With illimitable sway : 
He shall reign, when like a scroll, 

Yonder heavens have passed away : — 
Then the end ; — beneath his rod 

Man's last enemy shall fall ; 
Hallelujah ! Christ in God, 

God in Christ is all in all. 



THE END. 



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